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l)VALUATION, CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS AND THE COST OF CAPITAL
This thesis consists of six essays in Corporate Finance. In Chapter 1 we examine the
relation between the quality of corporate governance and the value of excess cash for
large European firms. We use ratings for Shareholder rights, Takeover defenses, Disclosure
and Board structure as proxies for the quality of corporate governance. We find that the
value of excess cash is negatively related to anti-takeover provisions only. Chapter 2
discusses the relation between corporate governance and the cost of debt. We find a
negative relation between Disclosure and the cost of debt and uncover that this relation
depends on the quality of Shareholder rights. This novel interaction effect is explained by
our share rights or disclose hypothesis. In Chapter 3 and 4 we formulate the capital struc -
ture decision within a multi-criteria framework. We conclude that the capital structure
decision is unfit for consideration as an optimization problem. Rather, it makes sense to
solicit a variety of solutions from finance specialists that can be compared on criteria
consi dered to be important. In Chapter 4 we discuss a merger and acquisition case as
illustration. We compare different solutions generated by mutually independent financial
experts on criteria which are relevant for the shareholders and for the management. In
Chapter 5 we derive a general formula for the cost of government’s claim. We show that
the present value of tax shields is equal to the difference between the present value of the
expected taxes paid by the unlevered firm and those paid by the levered firm. In Chapter 6
the required return of intangible assets is determined for a variety of business sectors. The
required returns are subsequently compared to several proxies used in practice. For most
sectors, the levered cost of equity seems to be the best proxy.
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Outline 
 
This dissertation consists of six chapters in Corporate Finance. Each chapter is based 
on a paper that deals with valuation, capital structure decisions and/or the cost of 
capital. 
In Chapter 1 we examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance 
and the value of excess cash for large European firms. We use Deminor ratings which 
can be subdivided into four corporate governance categories: shareholder rights; range 
of takeover defences; disclosure and board structure. Following the method of Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007), we first estimate a cash model to determine the level of 
normal cash holdings and subsequently the level of excess cash. Then we analyse the 
influence of governance on the value of excess cash. Given prior empirical research 
for U.S. firms, we expect to find a positive relation between the quality of governance 
and the value of excess cash. Our unique dataset enables us to uncover which 
governance component, i.e. shareholder rights, range of takeover defences, disclosure 
or board structure, is of highest influence on the value of excess cash holdings. 
In Chapter 2 we examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance 
and the cost of debt for large European firms. We use the Deminor ratings from 
Chapter 1 as proxies for the quality of corporate governance. As proxy for the cost of 
debt we use the yield and yield spread of 319 bonds issued in the years 2001-2005. In 
this chapter we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the effects of different 
components of corporate governance on the cost of debt. We do not limit ourselves to 
examining the effects of the various components on the cost of debt, but explore the 
possibility of interaction effects as well. In this chapter we introduce and test the 
‘share rights or disclose’ hypothesis which states that the relevance of the quality of 
disclosure depends on the level of shareholder rights.  
In Chapter 3 we show that despite a vast literature on the capital structure of the 
firm, there still is a big gap between theory and practice. Starting with the seminal 
work by Modigliani and Miller, much attention has been paid to the optimality of 
capital structure from the shareholders’ point of view. In this chapter, we give an 
overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the 
literature and show that capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria 
decisions. 
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Chapter 4 discusses a merger and acquisition case as illustration of the multi-
criteria framework developed in Chapter 3. We analyse financing solutions as 
proposed by different financing specialists. We ask each specialist to construct three 
financing proposals: the first would focus on the interests of current shareholders; the 
second would center on the interests of management; and the third would examine 
how the specialist should advise the management of the bidder. We compare the 
resulting proposals using criteria described in Chapter 3 along with additional criteria 
mentioned by the specialists. 
Chapter 5 deals with the valuation of debt tax shields and the implied required 
return for the government. We discuss a valuation framework of the total firm which 
aims to improve the understanding of ‘the tax shield valuation discussion’. The value 
of the debt tax shield is presented in textbooks as the present value of the future debt 
tax shields, i.e. the present value of the tax savings due to the use of debt instead of 
equity. Alternatively, the value of the debt tax shield is equal to the difference 
between the present value of the expected tax payments to the government by an 
unlevered firm and a levered firm. We derive the implied required return for the 
government and compare this implied return for various valuation models. 
Chapter 6 is about the cost of capital for the separate valuation of intangible assets. 
The need for separate valuation partly arises from new international accounting 
standards of the International Accounting Standards Board. Under certain conditions, 
these accounting standards allow the value of intangible assets to be determined using 
the discounted cash flow method, which requires the determination of the cost of 
capital of the relevant intangible assets. In this chapter, the required return of 
intangible assets for 8 different business sectors is determined by means of an 
empirical study of companies from the U.S. Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. The 
resulting required return is subsequently compared with proxies for the required return 
on intangible assets used in practice, such as the weighted average cost of capital.  
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Chapter 1 
Corporate governance and the value of excess cash holdings 
of large European firms1 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance and the value of 
excess cash for large European firms (FTSEurofirst 300 Index). We use Deminor 
ratings for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board as proxies 
for the quality of corporate governance. We find that the value of excess cash is 
positively related to the Takeover defences score only. It seems that governance 
mechanisms—except the market for corporate control—are not strong enough to 
prevent managers from wasting excess cash. For non-UK firms we find that the value 
of €1 of excess cash in a poorly governed firm is valued at only €0.89 while the value 
is €1.45 for a good governed firm. We show that poorly governed firms dissipate 
excess cash relatively quickly with a negative impact on their operating performance 
as a result. 
 
1.1. Introduction 
We study the impact of corporate governance on the value of excess cash holdings by 
firms. Jensen (1986) argues that poorly monitored managers of publicly listed 
companies waste free cash by investing money in value decreasing projects. In this 
context corporate governance could be of great value, if it protects shareholders 
against mismanagement and irresponsible dissipation of cash.  
In the absence of any market imperfections, the value of €1 on the bank account of 
firms should be valued equally by the capital market. However, in practice it is 
possible that management invests this €1 in a project that is worth less. These agency 
costs (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976) imply that the €1 held within the firm will be 
valued at a discount. The higher the probability of misallocation of cash holdings 
under management’s control, the lower its market value. Good corporate governance 
could lower this probability of wasting by management and as such increase the value 
of firms’ cash holdings.  
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on Schauten, Van Dijk and Van der Waal (2008). 
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If firms held only little amounts of cash, the sketched problem would be of minor 
importance. However, firms’ cash holdings often are substantial. For the largest listed 
European non-financial firms the sum of cash and cash equivalents was more than 
13% of net assets (total assets minus cash) in the year 2000, while by 2005 this 
percentage had even increased to almost 17%.2 For some individual firms these 
percentages are much higher. For example, cash holdings by H & M Hennes & 
Mauritz from Sweden were 52% and 103% of net assets in 2000 and 2005, 
respectively. Firm’s cash holdings also are very volatile. For example, AFC Ajax 
NV’s cash holdings varied from 79% in 1998 (the IPO year of ACF Ajax) via 18% in 
2000 to 27% in 2005. If agency problems did not exist, there would be no valuation 
problem, even if the cash holdings are at such high levels as observed in practice. 
However, if shareholders fear misallocation of firm’s cash by the incumbent 
management, the negative effects on the valuation of the firm can be huge.3 
A large body of literature explores the influence of corporate governance on the 
return on equity, firm value and firm performance, see Nesbitt (1994, 1995), Yermack 
(1996), Core et al. (1999), Gompers et al. (2003), Bauer et al. (2004), Bebchuk et al. 
(2005), Cremers and Nair (2005), Brown and Caylor (2006) and Core et al. (2006), 
among others. However, previous literature has not related the quality of corporate 
governance directly to the value of firm-level cash holdings. A notable exception is 
Pinkowitz et al. (2006), who study the relationship between cash holdings and firm 
value and the influence of governance on that relationship in an international context 
using a sample of firms from 35 countries. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) find that a dollar 
increase in cash holdings is worth roughly a dollar in countries with strong investor 
protection, but much less than a dollar in countries with poor investor protection. 
Other papers that deal with the value of cash are Faulkender and Wang (2006) and 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005). Both papers study the marginal value of cash but 
without taking into consideration corporate governance. Faulkender and Wang (2006) 
find, amongst other things, that the marginal value of cash holdings declines with 
                                                 
2 Or 11.5% and 14.5% as percentage of total assets. The percentage of cash holdings for large publicly 
traded U.S. firms in 2003 was 13%, see Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).  
3 According to Maarten Oldenhof, former director of Ajax, Ajax’ selection and investment in new 
soccer players (‘aankoopbeleid’) is ‘a drama for years’, and ‘the more liquid assets, the more unwise - 
within Ajax - the allocation’ (NRC Handelsblad, February 16, 2008). See Myers and Rajan (1998) who 
hypothesize that more liquid assets can lead to increased agency problems. 
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larger cash holdings and higher leverage, while Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005) 
document that the value of cash depends on both the investment and financing 
opportunity sets of the firm.4 
In this chapter we focus on the effect of corporate governance on the value of 
excess cash, as this part of cash holdings is most easily accessible by management to 
derive ‘private benefits’. As pointed out by Myers and Rajan (1998), it is easier to 
make cash disappear than to make a plant disappear. We argue that it is even easier to 
make excess cash disappear, as this part of the firm’s cash holdings is not needed for 
other, economically motivated purposes such as financing new investment 
opportunities. We are interested in the valuation of excess cash by the market and 
especially in the influence of corporate governance on this valuation. A first attempt 
to examine this issue was made by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) for U.S. firms. 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that governance has a positive effect on the 
value of excess cash and on the marginal value of total cash. In particular, the market 
value of excess cash for firms that have poor internal or external corporate governance 
in the form of extensive anti-takeover provisions and a low level of large shareholder 
monitoring, respectively, is found to be approximately one-half of the value of excess 
cash for firms that are well governed. Depending on the measure of corporate 
governance, the marginal value of $1.00 held by a poorly governed firm varies 
between $0.42 and $0.88, compared to $1.27 to $1.62 for a well governed firm. 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) further show that poorly governed firms dissipate 
cash more quickly5 and in such a way that they experience lower operating 
performance.6 Explanations given by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) for the lower 
                                                 
4 Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005) find that firms with good growth options have their cash valued at a 
premium to those with poor growth prospects and that nearer financial distress and access to capital 
decreases the value of cash.  
5 This finding is in accordance with Harford et al. (2008) who document for U.S. firms a positive 
relation between corporate governance and cash reserves. They explain this finding by the fact that 
weak governed firms dissipate their cash reserves more quickly (primarily on acquisitions) than do 
managers of firms with stronger governance (they call this the ‘spending hypothesis’). Note that cross-
country (worldwide) evidence shows that greater shareholder rights are associated with lower cash 
holdings, see e.g., Dittmar et al. (2003) and Pinkowitz et al. (2004). 
6 Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that operating performance lowers, if poorly governed firms 
with positive excess at t-1 reduce their cash between t-1 and t. They do not find this for well governed 
firms. This finding is confirmed by Harford et al. (2008), who find for U.S. firms that management’s 
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value of (excess) cash for poorly governed firms are that these firms invest (more) 
money in negative NPV projects (poorly governed firms spend more on acquisitions)7 
and may make managers ‘lazy’ in the sense that it reduces their incentives to control 
costs, improve margins etc.8  
In contrast to Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), our study analyses the relation 
between four different governance mechanisms and excess cash, i.e. Shareholder 
rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board functioning. Our unique governance 
dataset provided by Deminor9 makes it possible to pinpoint which governance 
provisions influence the value of excess cash and which ones do not. In addition, we 
focus on the effects of corporate governance on the value of excess cash for a sample 
of large publicly listed European firms. 
To determine the effects of governance on the value of excess cash we follow the 
methodology of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). We use a cash model based on 
Opler et al. (1999) to determine the normal cash holdings and define excess cash as 
the difference between the actual cash holdings and the predicted normal cash 
holdings. We use value regressions as employed in Fama and French (1998) and 
                                                                                                                                            
spending of poorly governed firms, ‘often on capital expenditures and acquisitions, reduces firm value. 
Nonetheless, as documented in Bliss and Rosen (2001) for acquisitions and Harford and Li (2007) for 
both acquisitions and large capital expenditures, CEO compensation and wealth increase after such 
investments, even if those investments destroy value. Given these incentives and the potential for 
external discipline arising from accumulating large cash reserves, weakly controlled managers choose 
to spend the cash quickly on acquisitions or capital expenditures.’ Ibid, p.537. Note that Mikkelson and 
Partch (2003) find that prior large cash reserves do not hinder operating performance and do not 
represent conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders. This contradicts the findings by 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford et al. (2008) and Harford (1999). Harford (1999) shows that 
cash-rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions and that their acquisitions are more likely to be 
value decreasing; he suggests (without investigating the influence of corporate governance) relating 
shareholders of these cash rich firms have a reason to be concerned. 
7 Note, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that acquisitions undertaken by both well and poorly 
governed (high excess cash) firms may lower firm’s return on assets.  
8 After controlling for the effect of acquisitions Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) still find that initial 
excess cash holdings have a negative impact on future operating performance of poorly governed firms 
that dissipate cash.  
9 Deminor offers since 1993 corporate governance ratings. Deminor was acquired by Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) in 2005. ISS was acquired by RiskMetrics in 2007.  
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return regressions as used by Faulkender and Wang (2006) to determine the value of 
(positive) excess cash.10 
We find that the level of (excess) cash as well as the value of excess cash is 
positively related to the score for the corporate governance measure of Takeover 
defences.11 These findings indicate that firms with less anti-takeover provisions (low 
management rights) hold more cash than well protected firms (high management 
rights), and that excess cash held by the first type of firms is valued higher. Other 
corporate governance measures do not explain differences in (excess) cash holdings 
nor in the valuation of excess cash. For non-UK firms we find that the value of € 1 of 
excess cash is only €0.89 for the lower Takeover defences quartile and €1.45 for the 
upper quartile. We interpret these findings as follows. The value of excess cash of 
firms with high management rights is relatively low, because the capital market 
cannot correct nor prevent the misuse of these cash holdings. Cash holdings of these 
firms are accordingly valued below ‘face value’. On the other hand, firms with low 
management rights run the risk of being taken over if they destroy value (now or 
probably in the future) by investing in negative NPV projects or by operating 
extremely inefficient. Because of this threat of control over the amount of excess cash, 
the probability that it will be allocated wrongly is smaller and hence excess cash is 
valued higher. We find empirical evidence that firms with high management rights 
spend their excess cash more quickly and on less profitable investments than firms 
with low management rights (that is, high governance scores). This indicates that 
indeed well governed firms operate under the fear of the capital market for 
misallocation of their excess cash holdings. The other governance mechanisms do not 
seem to be strong enough to convince the capital market that management will act in 
the shareholders’ best interests. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the Deminor 
governance data. In section 3 we present the models we use to estimate normal and 
excess cash and the relation between corporate governance and the value of excess 
                                                 
10 Note that Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) use the value regressions to determine the value 
difference of excess cash between poor and well governed firms and the return regressions for the 
determination of marginal value of total cash.  
11 Anti-takeover provisions that prevent a successful acquisition by a bidder are seen as an indication of 
poor corporate governance. This is comparable with the interpretation of the Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) measure. 
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cash. Data and summary statistics on cash are provided in the same section. In section 
4 we report our empirical results. We conclude in Section 5. 
 
1.2. Governance data 
We use Deminor ratings to measure the quality of firm-level corporate governance. 
These ratings cover firms included in the FTSEurofirst 300 Index for the years 2000-
2004. The Deminor ratings are based on 300 different governance indicators that refer 
to internationally accepted standards, as outlined by the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN), the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the Conference Board (Deminor Rating, 
2004).12,13 The different indicators or criteria can be classified into four categories: 
rights and duties of shareholders (referred to as Shareholder rights in the remainder of 
the chapter); range of takeover defences (Takeover defences); disclosure on financial 
matters and corporate governance (Disclosure); and Board structure and functioning 
(Board). For each category a rating is available on a scale from 1 to 10, where a score 
of 10 (1) corresponds to the best (worst) possible governance quality. The total 
governance score is simply the sum of the rating scores of the four categories.14 
The first category of governance criteria, Shareholder rights, concerns the question 
whether shareholders can exert sufficient power to determine corporate action. The 
score is based on i) the ‘one share - one vote - one dividend’ principle; ii) access to 
and voting procedures at general meetings, and iii) maintenance of pre-emptive rights. 
Firms that respect the control and ownership roles of shareholders, score high on the 
‘one share - one vote - one dividend’ principle. Deminor evaluates whether companies 
submit voting issues that are perceived as particular significant to the general meeting 
                                                 
12 The Deminor rating methodology further takes into consideration the main orientations chosen by 
national Codes of Best Practice, among which: the Combined Code in the UK (2003); the Vienot 
reports and the Bouton report in France (1995, 1999 and 2002); the Kodex in Germany (2002); the 
Preda Code in Italy (1999); the Tabaksblat Code in The Netherlands (2003). 
13 About the same criteria are used by Standard & Poor’s for their corporate governance score 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2002). This, taken together with the fact that all of these institutions have more or 
less the same ideas concerning good corporate governance, leads us to conclude that the Deminor 
rating is a representative measure for the quality of a firm’s corporate governance. 
14 According to Deminor (2004), the rating score reflects the extent to which a company adopts and 
complies with the ‘best practice’. Hence, the highest score represents best practice and the lowest the 
most questionable standard.  
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of shareholders and assesses the voting structure. Furthermore, companies should 
respect the pre-emptive rights of the existing shareholders as these stakeholders would 
like to prevent dilution of their voting or economic power. 
The second category, Takeover defences, examines the extent to which the firm 
attempts to decrease the likelihood of a hostile takeover through the adoption of anti-
takeover provisions. Deminor examines the presence and strength of anti-takeover 
devices such as poison pills, golden parachutes, core shareholdings and extensive 
cross-shareholdings. To achieve a high score for this aspect of governance, the range 
of takeover defences should lead to a favourable bidding process and not preclude the 
success of a takeover attempt per se. 
The third category, Disclosure, measures whether shareholders are able to obtain 
convenient and comprehensive information about the company’s financial matters as 
well as its governance characteristics. Deminor analyses for instance the quantity and 
quality of non-financial information, such as the diversity and independence of board 
members, board committees, accounting standards and information on major 
shareholders of the company. 
The fourth category, Board, measures issues relating to the governance of a Board, 
such as the presence of independent directors, the division between the role of 
Chairman and Chief Executive and the election of the board.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the governance scores for our sample, 
comprising 271 large European firms over the period 2000-2004 (905 firm-year 
observations). We observe a positive trend in the overall governance scores, as well as 
in the sub-scores. The average total score in 2000 is equal to 19.02, which gradually 
increases to 23.84 in 2004. This trend is in line with the increased attention paid to 
governance structures by policy makers, see footnote 12 for a list of National Codes 
of Best Practice, and the subsequent firm actions to improve their corporate 
governance.15 
 
                                                 
15 We note that the cross-section of firms varies across the different years in the sample period. We find 
a similar positive trend when restricting the sample to those firms for which ratings are available over 
the complete sample period. 
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Table 1. Corporate governance scores per year, 2000-2004 
 
Year  Governance total Shareholder Takeover Disclosure Board  
    rights defences   N
  Mean Standard     
   deviation     
2000  19.02 6.38 6.01 3.82 4.88 4.35 150
2001  20.69 6.58 6.26 4.14 5.65 4.64 166
2002  20.98 6.27 6.36 3.86 6.03 4.74 191
2003  22.48 6.19 6.58 3.89 6.73 5.28 194
2004  23.84 5.65 6.89 4.05 7.06 5.83 204
All  21.57 6.39 6.45 3.95 6.15 5.02 905
Note: The table presents average Deminor corporate governance scores per year for Shareholder rights, 
Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. For the total governance score the standard deviation is 
shown as well. The rightmost column shows the number of observations. 
 
Table 2. Corporate governance scores by country, 2000-2004 
 
Country  Governance total Shareholder Takeover Disclosure Board  
    rights defences   N
  Mean Standard     
   deviation     
Austria  17.61 2.01 7.36 0.81 5.83 3.61 3
Belgium  17.45 3.17 6.51 1.64 4.67 4.63 21
Switzerland  16.61 6.05 5.58 2.28 4.78 3.96 53
Denmark  15.60 3.90 6.05 1.35 4.86 3.35 17
Finland  23.55 3.97 6.98 5.64 6.12 4.80 18
France  20.79 4.59 6.40 3.42 5.83 5.14 163
Germany  18.92 3.97 7.18 2.88 5.48 3.38 113
Greece  16.80 3.06 6.97 1.29 4.84 3.71 7
Ireland  28.09 2.11 6.65 8.09 6.90 6.45 11
Italy  19.55 3.00 6.18 1.42 6.97 4.98 40
Luxembourg  12.08 5.35 4.01 0.50 3.96 3.61 2
Netherlands  17.23 5.47 4.89 1.97 5.99 4.39 71
Norway  18.95 4.06 7.59 2.91 4.66 3.79 16
Portugal  12.13 3.23 4.13 0.25 4.68 3.07 8
Spain  16.60 3.38 5.58 1.08 5.26 4.68 43
Sweden  19.27 4.95 5.93 4.09 5.13 4.12 55
United Kingdom  27.93 4.77 7.02 6.79 7.56 6.56 264
All  21.57 6.39 6.45 3.95 6.15 5.02 905
Note: The table presents average Deminor corporate governance scores by country for Shareholder 
rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. For the total governance score the standard deviation 
is shown as well. The rightmost column shows the number of observations. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the governance scores by country and industry, 
respectively.16 The extensive investor rights in common law countries such as the 
United Kingdom and Ireland (LaPorta et al., 1998) are confirmed by the relatively 
high governance scores for firms in these countries. The average scores for the United 
Kingdom and Ireland are equal to 27.93 and 28.09, respectively. The average scores 
for these countries are higher than the overall European average for all four 
categories, with the difference being most pronounced for Takeover defences. 
                                                 
16 See Appendix A for Industry codes.  
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Interestingly, even when leaving the UK and Ireland out of consideration, the cross-
country variation in the average score for Takeover defences is considerably larger 
than for the other three governance categories, ranging between 0.25 for Portugal and 
5.64 for Finland. Also note that the number of observations varies widely across 
countries, from just 2 for Luxembourg to 264 for the UK. 
 
Table 3. Corporate governance scores by industry, 2000-2004 
 
Industry  Governance total Shareholder Takeover Disclosure Board  
    rights defences   N
  Mean Standard     
   deviation     
Aerospace  18.73 2.06 5.22 0.25 7.32 5.93 12
Apparel  21.71 5.85 7.25 5.15 5.65 3.67 3
Automotive  19.59 4.42 6.30 3.73 5.58 3.98 43
Beverages  23.30 6.40 7.12 3.89 6.54 5.75 23
Chemicals  21.02 6.59 6.46 4.12 5.74 4.70 76
Construction  24.98 5.13 6.75 6.05 6.51 5.67 32
Diversified  20.45 5.09 6.52 3.67 5.59 4.67 59
Drugs, cosmetics and health care  20.53 6.72 6.62 3.22 5.99 4.74 67
Electrical  21.45 4.15 6.36 3.91 6.02 5.16 18
Electronics  21.75 5.78 6.39 4.20 6.23 4.93 60
Food  22.58 7.06 6.06 4.46 6.77 5.38 35
Machinery and equipment  21.39 5.32 6.46 5.96 5.14 3.83 27
Metal producers  25.57 5.74 6.59 4.60 7.60 6.77 15
Metal product manufacturers  25.55 7.52 6.84 6.69 6.50 5.52 10
Oil, gas, coal and related services  22.69 6.45 6.35 3.56 6.92 5.86 30
Paper  20.57 4.71 6.14 4.38 5.67 4.37 15
Printing and publishing  22.86 7.30 5.82 4.99 6.60 5.45 36
Recreation  21.73 5.32 7.12 3.13 6.34 5.15 18
Retailers  23.19 6.86 6.88 4.73 6.20 5.37 68
Textiles  22.21 0.30 8.11 0.50 7.03 6.57 2
Tobacco  26.30 6.19 6.81 6.40 6.87 6.21 19
Transportation  19.53 5.56 6.19 2.09 6.44 4.81 22
Utilities  19.53 6.74 6.17 2.59 6.01 4.76 149
Miscellaneous  22.91 6.69 6.70 4.70 6.27 5.24 66
All  21.57 6.39 6.45 3.95 6.15 5.02 905
Note: The table presents average Deminor corporate governance scores by industry for Shareholder 
rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. For the total governance score the standard deviation 
is shown as well. The rightmost column shows the number of observations. 
 
Across industries, we observe from Table 3 that Construction, Metal producers, 
Metal product manufacturers and Tobacco have relatively high total governance 
scores. These relatively high scores are (at least partly) due to the UK country effect 
given that 10 of the 32 Construction observations, 14 of the 15 Metal producers 
observations, 5 of the 10 Metal product manufacturers observations and 14 of the 19 
Tobacco observations concern UK (or Irish) firms. However, controlling for country 
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(and year effects), we still find higher total governance scores for the Construction, 
Metal product manufacturers and Tobacco industries.17 
 
1.3. Models and data 
1.3.1. Models 
To determine the level of excess cash we first need to estimate the level of normal 
cash holdings for a firm. The regression model that we use for this purpose includes 
variables that are used in prior literature on the determinants of cash holdings in 
imperfect capital markets, including Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999), Ferreira 
and Vilela (2004), and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004). Our main specification for the 
determination of the level of normal cash holdings is given by18 
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where (data source codes are listed in Appendix B): Cashi,t = Cash and Cash 
Equivalents of firm i at time t, NAi,t = Net Assets (= Total Assets minus Cash and 
Cash Equivalents) at time t, RealAssetsi,t = Total Assets at time t inflated to 2005 
prices, CFi,t = Cash Flow over year t, NWCi,t = Net Working Capital (= Working 
Capital minus Cash and Cash Equivalents) at time t, Sigmai,t = industry average of 
prior 6 year standard deviation of CF/NA, MVi,t = Year-End Market Capitalization 
plus Total Debt at time t, RDi,t = Research and Development expenses (set to 0 if 
missing) over year t, YFE = Year Fixed Effects, and FFE = Firm Fixed Effects.  
                                                 
17 To control for country and year effects we regress the total governance scores on country dummies 
and year dummies and compute industry averages for the residuals from this model. In that case we 
find that besides Construction, Metal product manufacturers and Tobacco also Automotive, Chemicals, 
Electrical, Electronics, Machinery and equipment and Textiles have mean scores above the overall 
average. Lower mean scores are found for Aerospace, Drugs, cosmetics and health care, and Paper and 
Transportation. 
18 In our main specification we follow Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). In alternative models (see 
Opler et al., 1999, and Ferreira and Vilela, 2004) we include Leverage (Total Debt divided by Net 
Assets), a Dividend dummy (the dummy equals 1 if a firm pays out dividend and 0 otherwise) as well 
as Capital Expenditures (Capital Expenditures divided by Net Assets). Our main value results are 
robust to these alternative specifications.  
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Our main specification includes measures for size, cash flow, cash substitutes, risk, 
growth options, and costs of financial distress. These variables are commonly used as 
proxies for the determinants of normal cash holdings that arise through the 
transactions motive and the savings motive, where the latter refers to the incentive to 
accumulate cash for financing new investment opportunities when external finance is 
costly, see Opler et al. (1999). Size plays a double role, in the sense that it acts both as 
a measure of the transactions motive as well as a proxy for access to financial 
markets. Cash flow and net working capital are interpreted as substitutes for cash. The 
market-to-book ratio and R&D expenses serve as proxies for growth opportunities, 
information asymmetry, and financial costs of distress. We expect a negative 
coefficient for size and net working capital and a positive coefficient for growth 
opportunities, R&D expenses and risk. The expected sign for cash flow is positive 
according to the pecking order theory and negative according to the trade-off theory. 
The year dummies are included to account for macroeconomic factors which may 
influence overall demand and supply of liquidity. The firm fixed effects control for 
the fact that due to idiosyncratic reasons some firms may consistently hold higher or 
lower normal cash levels than required for economic reasons. Excess cash is defined 
as the difference between the actual cash holdings and the estimated normal cash 
holdings, that is, the residual from (1). Following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), 
however, we do include the firm fixed effects as part of excess cash, as this does not 
reflect the generally accepted economic reasons for holding cash, such as operational 
needs or future investments.19 As Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), we include the 
year fixed effects as part of excess cash as well. 
Following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), to determine the effect – if any – of 
corporate governance on the value of excess cash, we estimate value regressions 
based on Fama and French (1998).20 The dependent variable is the market-to-book 
ratio, which is taken as a measure of total firm value (equity and debt). The regression 
model includes control variables representing factors that are likely to affect 
investors’ expectations of future net cash flows. Specifically, the control variables are 
past changes, future changes, and current levels of earnings, R&D expenses, 
                                                 
19 For example, Foley et al. (2007) show that US multinationals hold cash, in part, as a consequence of 
the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income. 
20 For value regressions of cash see also Pinkowitz and Williamson (2005) and Pinkowitz et al. (2006). 
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dividends, interest expenses, as well as past and future net assets, and future changes 
of the market value of the firm. Given that we aim to measure the effect of excess 
cash on firm value and, in particular, the influence of corporate governance on this 
effect, we also include excess cash (scaled by net assets) and the interaction between 
the governance score and excess cash. In addition, the governance score itself is 
included to control for the fact that corporate governance may affect firm value also 
through other channels besides excess cash. In sum, for each governance measure, i.e. 
the Total governance score and the sub-scores on Shareholder rights, Takeover 
defences, Disclosure and Board, we estimate the following regression: 
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   (2) 
where dXi,t indicates a change in variable X from time t-1 to t, and MVi,t = Year End 
Market Capitalization plus Total Debt at time t, NAi,t = Net Assets (= Total Assets 
minus Cash and Cash Equivalents) at time t, Ei,t = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
(EBIT) over year t, RDi,t = Research and Development expenses (set to 0 if missing) 
over year t, Divi,t = Common Dividends over year t, Ii,t = Interest Expenses over year 
t, XCashi,t = Excess Cash (= Total Cash and Cash Equivalents minus the normal level 
of cash from equation (1)) at time t, GOVi,t = Governance measure, which is the 
governance score for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure or Board, or 
the overall score for these four categories, YFE = Year Fixed Effects and FFE = Firm 
Fixed Effects. We include year fixed and firm fixed effects to capture macroeconomic 
and time trend effects and unobserved heterogeneity and fixed industry effects, 
respectively. 
Because we are interested in the value of a firm’s cash ‘surplus’ we estimate the 
value regression on all firms with positive excess cash. The coefficient of key interest 
in model (2) obviously is β18. If the quality of corporate governance positively 
influences the value of excess cash, this coefficient for the interaction term between 
the governance score and excess cash should be positive. 
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In addition to the value regression model as given in (2), we estimate an alternative 
model where we focus on value effects of changes in excess cash instead of levels. In 
this model, which is based on Faulkender and Wang (2006), the dependent variable is 
the excess stock return, while the regressors of interest are the change in excess cash 
and its interaction with the governance score. The main specification of this return 
model is given by: 
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where, dXi,t indicates a change in X from time t-1 to t, and ri,t = stock return over year 
t, Ri,t = market model21 return over year t, XCashi,t = Excess Cash (= Total Cash and 
Cash Equivalents minus the normal level of cash from equation (1)) at time t, MEi,t = 
Market Value equity (= Market Capitalization) at time t, Ei,t = Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes (EBIT) over year t, NAi,t = Net Assets (= Total Assets minus Cash 
and Cash Equivalents) at time t, RDi,t = Research and Development expenses (set to 0 
if missing) over year t, Ii,t = Interest Expenses over year t, Divi,t = Common Dividends 
over year t, Li,t = Leverage (= Total Debti,t / (Total Debti,t + MEi,t)) at time t, NFi,t = 
New Finance (= Net New Equity Issues (Sale of Common & Preferred stock minus 
Purchase of Common & Preferred Stock) + New Debt Issues (Long Term Debt 
Issuance minus Long Term Debt Reduction)) over year t, GOVi,t = Governance 
measure and YFE = Year Fixed Effects and FFE = Firm Fixed Effects. In addition to 
the excess return we will also use as dependent variable (MEi,t-MEi,t-1)/MEi,t-1. 
The control variables in the return regression as given in (3) account for firm-
specific characteristics that may be correlated with both returns and cash holdings due 
to changes in profitability (Ei,t), investment (NAi,t and RDi,t) and financing (Ii,t, Divi,t, 
Li,t and NFi,t), see Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
Again we are interested in the value of a cash surplus, and therefore we estimate 
the return regression on all firms with positive excess cash at t-1. The key coefficient 
                                                 
21 We estimate the market model using the year t-1 arithmetic returns derived from the daily stock 
return index of each firm and the FTSEurofirst 300 Index. 
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in this model is β12. If the quality of one or more corporate governance measures 
positively influences the value of excess cash, the coefficient for the interaction term 
between the governance score and the change in excess cash should be positive. Using 
the estimates of (3) we can determine the difference in marginal value of €1 held by 
poorly governed firms compared to well governed firms. 
 
1.3.2. Data 
Our sample consists of publicly traded European firms that were included in the 
FTSEurofirst 300 Index at some point between 2000 and the end of 2004 and were 
given a governance rating by Deminor. We retrieve data items for these firms—as far 
as available—for the longer period from 1990 to 2005. Firm data is obtained from the 
Worldscope database, Datastream and Thomson Financial Database. Variable 
identifiers are listed in Appendix B. We exclude financial firms (Worldscope Industry 
Group 4300), because their business involves inventories of marketable securities that 
are included in cash, and because of their need to meet statutory capital 
requirements.22 Some firms were excluded from the sample due to data problems.23 
As discussed in Section 2, various aspects of the corporate governance quality of the 
firms is measured by means of the Deminor ratings, which are available for the years 
2000-2004. Year t ratings are published at the beginning of year t+1. 
To mitigate the impact of outliers on our results, we winsorize all variables except 
the governance scores at the mean plus or minus three times the standard deviation. In 
case of ratios, only the ratio is winsorized. The effects of price inflation are handled 
by inflating the variables to 2005 prices, using the Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP) obtained from the European Central Bank.  
We estimate the normal cash model as given in (1) over the years 1990-2005, and 
both the value regression in (2) and the return regression in (3) over the years 2000-
                                                 
22 We do not exclude the Utilities sector as in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) since this would 
seriously limit the size of our sample. 
23 No reliable data could be obtained for Allied Domecq (FIN), Sonera (FR), Orange (FR), Pchiney 
(FR), Rexel (FR), Telecom Italia Mobile (IT) and Terra Networks (SP). Due to mergers also no reliable 
data could be obtained for Royal Dutch Shell and LogicaCMG (UK). In addition, we exclude 
Dampskbselsskabet Svendborg for this company was incorporated twice, with different governance 
ratings. We also exclude Vivendi Environment for this company is a subsidiary of Vivendi which also 
has a Deminor rating. 
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2004. The maximum number of firm-year observations for the period 1990-2005 is 
3,831, while the maximum number for the period 2000-2004 is 1,340. The sample 
includes observations for 271 firms. 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics cash-to-assets ratio by country, 1990-2005 
The cash-to-assets ratio is defined as Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Net Assets, where Net 
Assets is Total Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalents. The cash-to-assets ratio is winsorized at the 
mean plus and minus three times the standard deviation. 
 
Country  25th  75th   
 Mean Percentile Median Percentile Std. Dev.      N 
Austria 0.038 0.007 0.027 0.051 0.038  41 
Belgium 0.109 0.035 0.071 0.173 0.101  93 
Switzerland 0.263 0.091 0.225 0.376 0.208  235 
Denmark 0.176 0.086 0.141 0.240 0.131  54 
Finland 0.137 0.027 0.044 0.152 0.209  61 
France 0.152 0.062 0.104 0.179 0.157  691 
Germany 0.150 0.048 0.101 0.204 0.153  466 
Greece 0.156 0.012 0.057 0.150 0.238  46 
Ireland 0.458 0.190 0.405 0.738 0.265  37 
Italy 0.123 0.042 0.093 0.158 0.116  212 
Luxembourg 0.119 0.053 0.080 0.125 0.120  32 
Netherlands 0.147 0.051 0.090 0.194 0.151  238 
Norway 0.178 0.064 0.087 0.342 0.176  56 
Portugal 0.060 0.003 0.013 0.060 0.096  24 
Spain 0.095 0.017 0.060 0.137 0.104  239 
Sweden 0.177 0.050 0.108 0.197 0.209  204 
United Kingdom 0.157 0.043 0.093 0.194 0.178  1,102 
All 0.156 0.046 0.099 0.197 0.172  3,831 
 
Table 4 shows the number of firm-year observations and summary statistics for the 
cash-to-assets ratio per country for the period 1990-2005. The overall mean of the 
cash-to-assets ratio (Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Net Assets) is 15.6%. 
Although for most countries the average cash-to-assets ratio is close to this overall 
mean, for some countries it deviates considerably. Switzerland and Ireland have 
relatively high average cash-to-assets ratios of 26.3% and 45.8%, respectively. 
Countries with relatively low cash-to-assets ratios are Austria, Portugal and Spain 
with averages equal to 3.8%, 6.0% and 9.5%, respectively. According to Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004), this cross-country heterogeneity can be a consequence of different 
accounting standards as well as different institutional environments, including 
bankruptcy laws, the state of development of capital markets, and patterns of 
corporate governance.24 
                                                 
24 We note that these cross-country differences in our sample should be interpreted with care, as the 
number of observations for countries such as Ireland, Austria and Portugal are limited. Nevertheless, 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) also report a relatively high average cash-to-assets ratio for Ireland and 
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Appendix C presents the same summary statistics for the cash-to-assets ratio per 
country for the shorter period 2000-2004 that is used to estimate the value and return 
regressions. Generally, these correspond quite closely to the numbers in Table 4. 
 
Table 5. Summary statistics cash-to-assets ratio by industry, 1990-2005 
The cash-to-assets ratio is defined as Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Net Assets, where Net 
Assets is Total Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalents. The cash-to-assets ratio is winsorized at the 
mean plus and minus three times the standard deviation. 
 
Industry  25th  75th   
 Mean Percentile Median Percentile Std. Dev.      N 
Aerospace 0.223 0.170 0.200 0.253 0.083  40 
Apparel 0.154 0.029 0.119 0.255 0.134  31 
Automotive 0.167 0.086 0.137 0.200 0.126  149 
Beverages 0.093 0.038 0.071 0.127 0.077  110 
Chemicals 0.091 0.038 0.065 0.129 0.073  274 
Construction 0.146 0.067 0.115 0.171 0.132  235 
Diversified 0.155 0.063 0.106 0.175 0.143  247 
Drugs, cosmetics and health care 0.283 0.121 0.244 0.389 0.215  234 
Electrical 0.128 0.082 0.108 0.157 0.073  53 
Electronics 0.283 0.127 0.203 0.338 0.234  241 
Food 0.188 0.072 0.100 0.258 0.179  118 
Machinery and equipment 0.193 0.050 0.183 0.271 0.165  99 
Metal producers 0.129 0.067 0.107 0.155 0.102  64 
Metal product manufacturers 0.110 0.050 0.066 0.141 0.100  60 
Oil, gas, coal and related services 0.066 0.031 0.052 0.084 0.052  133 
Paper 0.034 0.021 0.030 0.042 0.017  45 
Printing and publishing 0.128 0.026 0.064 0.150 0.173  148 
Recreation 0.109 0.038 0.077 0.130 0.105  119 
Retailers 0.158 0.053 0.086 0.163 0.193  280 
Textiles 0.153 0.113 0.135 0.196 0.048  7 
Tobacco 0.122 0.045 0.097 0.181 0.094  52 
Transportation 0.209 0.075 0.132 0.243 0.204  97 
Utilities 0.082 0.014 0.039 0.101 0.116  553 
Miscellaneous 0.214 0.059 0.154 0.253 0.221  442 
All 0.156 0.046 0.099 0.197 0.172  3,831 
 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the cash-to-assets ratio by industry for the 
period 1990-2005, while Appendix D shows these for the period 2000-2004. We 
observe substantial differences across industries, with the mean ratio ranging from a 
minimum of 0.034 for Paper to a maximum of 0.283 for Drugs, cosmetics and health 
care, and Electronics. As far as these industry effects are not accounted for by our 
economic regressors in the normal cash model and as long as they are constant over 
time, they will be captured by the firm specific dummies included in (1). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
relatively low averages for Austria and Portugal, see also Dittmar et al. (2003). Our overall average 
ratio of 15.6% is rather close to the mean of 14.8% reported by Ferreira and Vilela (2004) for a sample 
of firms from EMU countries over the period 1987-2000. 
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1.4. Results 
1.4.1. Cash model 
The results of the cash model are presented in Table 6. Model [1] presents the results 
of our main specification. The results of this model are used to determine excess cash. 
Model [2] and [3] are variations and based on Opler (1999) and Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004).25 We find that cash-to-assets increases with investment opportunities (market 
to book), the magnitude of the cash flow (Cash Flow / Assets), industry risk (sigma 
industry) and R&D expenditures (R&D / Assets). Cash-to-assets decrease with 
liquidity (Net Working Capital / assets). The relation with leverage is significantly 
positive; however there is neither a relation with capital expenditure nor with dividend 
and size. The findings are mainly consistent with previous empirical studies on the 
determinants of cash holdings (see e.g., Ferreira and Vilela, 2004, Opler et al., 1999, 
Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007). 
To analyse the influence of the quality of corporate governance on the total level of 
cash holdings, models [4] and [5] include—in addition to the variables of model [1] —
the corporate governance scores. Actual cash holdings are positively related to the 
total governance rating (see model [4]), which is driven by the government measure 
Takeover defences (see model [5]). Note that the positive coefficient for Takeover 
defences means that firms with less anti-takeover provisions hold more cash than 
firms with more takeover defences. Since we do not include governance variables in 
our cash model, because we are interested in the normal level of cash holdings, this 
result implies that firms with a high quality of the corporate governance measure 
Takeover defences hold more excess cash.26 This result is consistent with Harford et 
al. (2008) who find that firms in the U.S. with weaker corporate governance have 
smaller cash reserves.27 Further tests by Harford et al. (2008) suggest that firms with 
weaker corporate governance dissipate their cash reserves more quickly than do 
                                                 
25 In the appendix E we test the hypothesis that cash holdings are mean reverting. We find a significant 
negative correlation between delta cash and the lagged cash level. 
26 If we regress excess cash on the four corporate governance scores, including firm fixed and year 
fixed effects, we find a significant coefficient for governance measure Takeover defences (coefficient 
is 0.005 and a p-value of 0.000) and insignificant coefficients for the other three governance measures. 
27 Our results contrast with Dittmar et al. (2003) who find that corporations in countries (worldwide) 
where shareholder rights are not well protected hold up to twice as much cash as corporations in 
countries with good shareholder protection.  
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managers of firms with stronger governance and that rather than investing internally, 
they spend the cash primarily on acquisitions. See also Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007) for similar results.  
To analyse differences in spending between well and poorly governed firms, we 
form a sample with firms that both have positive excess cash at time t-1 and reduce 
their excess cash between t-1 and t. We then regress the change in excess cash on the 
four governance scores including year fixed and firm fixed effects. The regression 
equation is as follows: 
ti
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where Assetsi,t = Total Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalent at time t-1.  
The results are presented in column 1 of Table 7. The positive coefficient for 
Takeover defences indicates that the reduction in excess cash is indeed higher for 
firms with a low takeover defences governance score. Put differently, spending firms 
with a high score for Takeover defences, spend their money less quickly. This finding 
is in accordance with the results by e.g. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Harford 
et al. (2008).28 In column 2 we present the results where the change in Excess cash is 
normalized by the market value of equity at time t-1. The results are similar as in 
model 1.29 
                                                 
28 Pinkowitz (2000) finds that the probability that a firm will be acquired decreases with cash and states 
that managers may hold cash to entrench themselves at shareholder’s expense. Following this line of 
reasoning, firms with a high score for Takeover defences may hold higher levels of cash to protect 
themselves from being targeted. 
29 To analyse whether governance influences the decision to accumulate excess cash, we form a sample 
with firms that both have negative excess cash at time t-1 and increase their excess cash between t-1 
and t. If we then regress the change in excess cash on the four governance scores, we do not find any 
relation between the accumulation of excess cash and governance. This finding is in accordance with 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
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Table 6. Cash models 
This table shows the regression results of the cash models. In all variables Assets are net of Cash. The 
dependent variable is the ratio Cash / assets. The independent variables include: Size (natural logarithm 
of the Total Assets), Market-to-Book ((Market capitalization + Total Debt) / Assets), Cash Flow / 
Assets, NWC / Assets (Net Working Capital / Assets), Sigma (Industry Cash Flow volatility over past 6 
years), R&D / Assets (Research and Development, set to zero if missing), Leverage (Total Debt / 
Assets), Capex / Assets (Capital Expenditures / Assets), Dividend Dummy (set to 1 if the firm pays 
dividend, zero otherwise), Governance total (sum of Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure 
and Board), Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. Regressions are made with 
firm fixed and year fixed effects. OLS regression is used with White’s heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors. Standard errors are presented between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
 Expected      
Variables sign [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Size ? 0.006 0.002 0.002 -0.010 -0.011 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.016) 
Market to Book + 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.011 0.011 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
Cash Flow / Assets + 0.379*** 0.445*** 0.482*** 0.271*** 0.281*** 
  (0.095) (0.104) (0.104) (0.094) (0.099) 
NWC / Assets - -0.233*** -0.193*** -0.191*** -0.271*** -0.268*** 
  (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.062) (0.059) 
Sigma + 0.625*** 0.602*** 0.673*** 0.440*** 0.445*** 
  (0.074) (0.077) (0.071) (0.150) (0.156) 
R&D / Assets + 1.144*** 1.114***  2.237*** 2.243*** 
  (0.143) (0.139)  (0.356) (0.373) 
Leverage ?  0.115*** 0.122***   
   (0.020) (0.016)   
Capex / Assets +  -0.037    
   (0.061)    
Dividend Dummy -  -0.008 -0.010   
   (0.006) (0.007)   
Governance total     0.002**  
     (0.001)  
Shareholder rights      -0.002 
      (0.004) 
Takeover defences      0.005*** 
      (0.001) 
Disclosure      -0.003 
      (0.003) 
Board      -0.001 
      (0.006) 
Constant  -0.031 -0.024 -0.009 0.049 0.128 
  (0.072) (0.068) (0.074) (0.150) (0.176) 
       
Adjusted partial R²  0.200 0.208 0.185 0.254 0.255 
Sample Size  3154 3142 3154 842 842 
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Table 7. Delta excess cash and corporate governance 
This table shows the regression results of the change in Excess Cash on the Governance scores. Assets 
are net of Cash. The dependent variable in model [1] is the ratio (ExcessCashi,t- ExcessCashi,t-1) / 
Assetsi,t-1 and in model [2] (ExcessCashi,t- ExcessCashi,t-1) / MEi,t-1 where MEi,t-1 = Market value of 
Equity at time t-1. The independent variables include the Governance scores Shareholder rights, 
Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. The sample is the intersection of firms with positive lagged 
excess cash and firms for which excess cash declined over the year; i.e. for model (ExcessCashi,t- 
ExcessCashi,t-1) / Assetsi,t-1 < 0 and for model [2] (ExcessCashi,t- ExcessCashi,t-1) / MEi,t-1 <0. 
Regressions are made with firm fixed and year fixed effects. OLS regression is used with White’s 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Standard errors are presented between parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
 Expected   
Variables sign [1] [2] 
Shareholder rights + 0.005 0.001 
  (0.016) (0.025) 
Takeover defences + 0.016** 0.022** 
  (0.007) (0.009) 
Disclosure + -0.010 -0.025 
  (0.013) (0.024) 
Board + -0.010 0.003 
  (0.010) (0.033) 
Constant  -0.062 -0.039 
  (0.099) (0.155) 
    
Adjusted partial R²  0.578 0.443 
Sample Size  119 119 
 
 
1.4.2. Governance and the value of excess cash 
We estimate our value regression (equation 2) on all firms with positive excess cash at 
time t. Table 8 presents the results. Model [1] uses the sum of the four separate 
governance scores as governance measure, while models [2]-[5] are based on the sub-
scores for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board, respectively. 
We find that good governance, as measured by the total score, has a significantly 
positive effect on the value of excess cash. The results of models [2]-[5] reveal that 
this relation is driven purely by the quality of governance measure Takeover defences. 
The coefficient on the interaction variable between excess cash and this governance 
measure is positive (0.508) and significant (p-value of 0.038).30 We interpret this 
outcome as follows. The management of firms with a low score for Takeover 
defences have good possibilities to prohibit being acquired by a hostile bidder. The 
so-called ‘management rights’ for these firms are high. If these firms hold excess cash 
and destroy value because of negative NPV projects (such as overpaid acquisitions) or 
                                                 
30 In untabulated results, we use excess cash as estimated by models [2] and [3] in Table 6. The results 
confirm the finding that Takeover defences have a significant and positive influence on the value of 
excess cash. 
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inefficiency, the capital market is in the worst case not able to take over the firm and 
to disgorge the cash in order to prevent it from being wasted. The value of their excess 
cash is accordingly, relatively low. However, if well governed firms hold excess cash, 
the capital market can, if she wishes, take over the firm and extract the cash if 
necessary. Because of this threat of control over the amount of excess cash, the 
probability that it will be allocated wrongly is smaller and, hence, excess cash is 
valued higher.  
In Table 9, where the governance score is Takeover defences, we report the results 
of alternative specifications. Model [1] includes normal cash as obtained from the 
cash model as extra control variable, whereas model [2] includes normal cash and the 
additional interaction term between normal cash and the corporate governance 
measure Takeover defences. As expected, the coefficient on the additional interaction 
term is insignificant. Normal cash as part of cash reserves for daily operations and 
investments is not valued differently between well and poorly governed firms. 
However, the interaction term on corporate governance and excess cash remains 
positive and significant, in model [1] as well as model [2]. In models [3] and [4] we 
exclude insignificant control variables from our main value specification (model [3] in 
Table 8). Our results are robust for these alternative specifications. 
Note that since we use the M/B ratio as proxy for growth opportunities in our cash 
model and as proxy for firm value in our value model, it is plausible that the excess 
cash variable in the value model is related to firm value because of investment 
opportunity hedging needs rather than to direct value implications. However, our 
coefficient of interest is not the coefficient for Excess cash (in total) but primarily the 
coefficient on the interaction term between excess cash and governance. Although the 
total effect of excess cash on the value of the firm could be biased by the use of M/B 
as proxy for growth in the cash model, we assume this is not the case for the 
coefficient of the interaction term (see Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007).31  
                                                 
31 If we estimate the cash model with the three year lagged sales growth instead of the M/B ratio as 
proxy for growth opportunities or without proxy for growth opportunities, we still find a significantly 
positive coefficient for the interaction term between excess cash and governance measure Takeover 
defences. The results of these alternative cash models are consistent with the results presented in Table 
8 and Table 9.  
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Table 8. Value models 
This table shows the regression results for the value regressions. All models are estimated with firm 
and year fixed effects. In all variables Assets are net of Cash. The dependent variable in all models is 
the ratio of firm’s market value to assets. The independent variables include the following variables 
over assets: Earnings, R&D, Dividend, Interest, Assets, Market Value and Excess Cash. Excess cash is 
computed as the residual from model [1] in Table 6. In model [2]-[5] X is equal to, Shareholder rights, 
Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board respectively. In model [1] X is equal to the sum of 
Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. Δ L Y indicates a change in Y from time 
t-1 to t. Δ Y indicates a change in Y from time t to t+1. All models use only firms with positive excess 
cash. OLS regression is used with White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Standard errors 
are presented between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 level, respectively. 
 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Earnings / Assets 2.507*** 1.979*** 2.788*** 2.013*** 1.984*** 
 (0.616) (0.709) (0.757) (0.614) (0.716) 
Δ L Earnings / Assets -0.256 0.074 -0.376 -0.036 0.066 
 (0.246) (0.173) (0.285) (0.178) (0.198) 
Δ Earnings / Assets 1.062 1.008 1.142* 1.017 1.024 
 (0.652) (0.807) (0.645) (0.673) (0.792) 
R&D / Assets 7.525** 5.265** 10.059*** 5.026** 6.092* 
 (3.273) (2.602) (3.377) (2.118) (3.157) 
Δ L R&D / Assets 1.744 2.951 1.554 1.720 3.025 
 (3.485) (3.405) (2.848) (3.812) (3.277) 
Δ R&D / Assets 8.127*** 8.195*** 8.786*** 8.271*** 8.553*** 
 (2.479) (2.820) (2.153) (2.274) (2.826) 
Dividend / Assets 1.541*** 1.824*** 1.394*** 1.588*** 1.852*** 
 (0.324) (0.277) (0.287) (0.322) (0.317) 
Δ L Dividend / Assets 2.624* 1.551 3.283*** 2.585 1.427 
 (1.545) (1.229) (1.052) (1.696) (1.485) 
Δ Dividend / Assets -0.009 -0.072 0.001 0.042 -0.097 
 (0.283) (0.315) (0.292) (0.208) (0.273) 
Interest / Assets -11.462 -15.611 -9.618 -10.183 -17.429 
 (12.375) (12.643) (7.936) (12.846) (11.633) 
Δ L Interest / Assets -0.450 -1.650 -0.508 -1.440 -1.389 
 (1.881) (2.135) (3.535) (2.213) (2.034) 
Δ Interest / Assets -15.169 -18.300 -14.273 -14.094 -19.046 
 (13.614) (12.733) (10.122) (12.737) (12.344) 
Δ L NA / Assets 0.250* 0.289* 0.192 0.301*** 0.263 
 (0.149) (0.147) (0.121) (0.107) (0.162) 
Δ NA / Assets 0.429** 0.458** 0.349*** 0.463** 0.466** 
 (0.194) (0.178) (0.130) (0.214) (0.207) 
Δ MV / Assets -0.513*** -0.499*** -0.496*** -0.518*** -0.491*** 
 (0.084) (0.078) (0.085) (0.070) (0.075) 
Excess Cash / Assets -1.175 2.652 0.191 -0.556 2.151 
 (1.214) (1.750) (0.633) (2.258) (1.414) 
Governance X -0.006 0.062 -0.078 0.066* -0.007 
 (0.019) (0.039) (0.052) (0.035) (0.031) 
Governance X x Excess Cash / Assets 0.145** -0.152 0.508** 0.377 -0.080 
 (0.069) (0.288) (0.242) (0.396) (0.292) 
Constant 1.270** 0.941*** 1.274*** 0.854*** 1.361*** 
 (0.514) (0.139) (0.195) (0.123) (0.211) 
      
Adjusted partial R² 0.629 0.620 0.649 0.630 0.618 
Sample Size 256 256 256 256 256 
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Table 9. Alternative value models (robustness) 
This table shows the regression results for the value regressions. All models are estimated with firm 
and year fixed effects. In all variables Assets are net of Cash. The dependent variable in all models is 
the ratio of firm’s market value to assets. The independent variables include the following variables 
over assets: Earnings, R&D, Dividend, Interest, Assets, Market Value, Normal Cash and Excess Cash. 
Normal cash is computed with the estimated model [1] in Table 6; Excess cash is computed as the 
residual from model [1] in Table 6. Gov. t.d. is the governance score for Takeover defences. Δ L Y 
indicates a change in Y from time t-1 to t. Δ Y indicates a change in Y from time t to t+1. OLS 
regression is used with White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Standard errors are 
presented between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
level, respectively. 
 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Earnings / Assets 2.981*** 2.963*** 2.250*** 2.331*** 
 (0.823) (0.770) (0.709) (0.631) 
Δ L Earnings / Assets -0.365 -0.311   
 (0.286) (0.252)   
Δ Earnings / Assets 1.206* 1.206* 0.865 0.918 
 (0.692) (0.676) (0.685) (0.615) 
R&D / Assets 10.768*** 10.425*** 14.387** 13.635** 
 (3.195) (3.504) (6.202) (6.145) 
Δ L R&D / Assets 1.511 1.301   
 (2.798) (2.979)   
Δ R&D / Assets 8.640*** 8.276*** 12.058*** 11.399*** 
 (2.192) (1.999) (1.829) (2.087) 
Dividend / Assets 1.368*** 1.348*** 1.650*** 1.604*** 
 (0.272) (0.281) (0.341) (0.362) 
Δ L Dividend / Assets 3.494*** 3.464*** 3.675*** 3.631** 
 (0.844) (0.958) (1.334) (1.427) 
Δ Dividend / Assets -0.002 0.012   
 (0.285) (0.277)   
Interest / Assets -9.871 -10.180   
 (7.983) (8.456)   
Δ L Interest / Assets -0.679 -0.877   
 (3.582) (3.911)   
Δ Interest / Assets -14.487 -14.589   
 (10.094) (9.641)   
Δ L NA / Assets 0.189 0.220* 0.232 0.261 
 (0.119) (0.124) (0.186) (0.188) 
Δ NA / Assets 0.383** 0.395**   
 (0.157) (0.159)   
Δ MV / Assets -0.501*** -0.500*** -0.522*** -0.517*** 
 (0.090) (0.093) (0.072) (0.076) 
Normal Cash / Assets -0.609 0.264 -0.204 1.304 
 (0.993) (1.610) (0.830) (1.599) 
Excess Cash / Assets 0.217 0.086 0.161 -0.115 
 (0.618) (0.561) (0.690) (0.692) 
Gov. t.d. -0.078 -0.052 -0.080 -0.040 
 (0.051) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) 
Gov. t.d. x Normal Cash / Assets  -0.163  -0.259 
  (0.161)  (0.246) 
Gov. t.d. x Excess Cash / Assets 0.514** 0.531** 0.418** 0.471** 
 (0.241) (0.235) (0.173) (0.205) 
Constant 1.332*** 1.210*** 1.119*** 0.892*** 
 (0.277) (0.354) (0.180) (0.336) 
     
Adjusted partial R² 0.648 0.655 0.629 0.640 
Sample Size 256 256 257 257 
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Governance may be endogenously determined with value as well (see Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith, 2007). In untabulated results, we estimate our value regression using the 
2 year lagged governance score to avoid this endogeneity issue. The results confirm 
that Takeover defences have a significant and positive impact on the value of excess 
cash holdings.  
The results in Tables 8 and 9 indicate that poorly governed firms do not allocate 
their excess liquidity as well as the well governed firms do. In section 1.4.1. we have 
shown that spending firms with excess cash at t-1 and with a high score for Takeover 
defences, spend their money less quickly than firms with low governance scores. To 
analyse whether spending poorly governed firms with excess cash at t-1 lower their 
return on assets relatively (ROA) during the period t-1 to t we estimate the following 
regression32: 
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   (5) 
where ROAi,t = EBIT in year t divided by Assets at time t minus Cash and Cash 
Equivalents at time t minus industry average ROA, XCashi,t = Excess Cash at time t = 
Total Cash and Cash Equivalents minus the normal level of cash from equation (1) at 
time t, GOVi,t-1 is the governance score takeover defences at t-1, Assetsi,t-1 = Total 
Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalents at time t-1, RealAssetsi,t = Total Assets at 
time t inflated to 2005 prices, PPEi,t = Property, Plant and Equipment at time t.  
We are interested in the coefficient of the interaction term lagged excess cash times 
the lagged governance measure. A positive coefficient (β3) on this interaction term 
indicates that for every euro of excess cash held at time t-1, firms with bad corporate 
governance who used up excess cash experienced a lower ROA in that year compared 
to firms with good corporate governance. The results in Table 10 show that this 
indeed is the case, cf. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). The coefficient on the 
interaction term is significantly positive except—surprisingly—for the corporate 
governance measure Takeover defences (see model [3]). However, if we replace 
                                                 
32 The equation is similar to equation (3) of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and controls for size, asset 
structure and lagged industry adjusted ROA.  
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ROAi,t by ROAi,t+1 we find a significantly positive coefficient for takeover defences, 
while the coefficients of the other governance scores remain significantly positive.33 
 
Table 10. The impact of the use of excess cash and corporate governance on the ROA 
This table shows the regression results for the return on assets regressions. The dependent variable is 
ROA (EBIT over Assets) minus industry average ROA. Assets are computed net of cash. In model [2]-
[5] X (X in governance X) is equal to, Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board 
respectively. In model [1] X is equal to the sum of Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure 
and Board. Independent variables are: one-year lagged excess cash to assets, one-year lagged 
governance scores X, the interaction between lagged excess cash and lagged governance, Size (LN 
RealAssets), property, plant and equipment to assets (PPE/Assets), and lagged industry adjusted ROA. 
The sample is the intersection of firms with positive lagged excess cash and firms for which excess 
cash declined over the year; i.e. (ExcessCashi,t- ExcessCashi,t-1) / Assetsi,t-1 < 0. Regressions are made 
with firm fixed and year fixed effects. OLS regression is used with White’s heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. Standard errors are presented between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Lagged Xcash -0.247 -0.198 0.058 -0.976*** -0.478 
 (0.310) (0.291) (0.179) (0.236) (0.285) 
Lagged Governance X -0.001 -0.014 -0.004** -0.008 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) 
Lagged Xcash x Lagged Governance X 0.018* 0.057* 0.018 0.172*** 0.108*** 
 (0.009) (0.031) (0.013) (0.029) (0.032) 
Size -0.112*** -0.132*** -0.137*** -0.091*** -0.103*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.036) 
PPE / Assets -0.807* -0.856* -0.900* -0.660* -0.787* 
 (0.425) (0.457) (0.457) (0.379) (0.408) 
Lagged ROA 0.104 0.123 0.111 0.055 0.114 
 (0.117) (0.102) (0.116) (0.111) (0.119) 
Constant 1.278*** 1.548*** 1.541*** 1.079*** 1.190*** 
 (0.326) (0.369) (0.252) (0.308) (0.308) 
Adjusted partial R² 0.363 0.237 0.207 0.477 0.417 
Sample Size 143 143 143 143 143 
 
The lower value of excess cash held by poorly governed firms could thus be 
explained by the negative influence of their spending on the ROA. Because of the lack 
of corporate control, managers of firms with high management rights can potentially 
destroy value. If these firms had no anti-takeover provisions, the capital market would 
probably have made corrective actions by taking over control in order to prevent 
future wasteful spending.34  
                                                 
33 If we regress acquisitions divided by net assets on the lagged amount of excess cash and on total 
governance - including fixed firm and fixed year effect - and we restrict the sample to firms with 
positive lagged excess cash, we find no relation between acquisitions and the quality of corporate 
governance. And we do not find evidence that acquisitions have a significant impact on the return on 
assets.  
34 Faleye (2004) investigates the role of proxy fights in relation to cash holdings. Faleye (2004) finds 
that proxy fight targets hold 23% more cash than comparable firms and that following a contest, 
executive turnover and special cash distributions to shareholders increase. 
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To further check the robustness of our results and to assess the marginal value of 
excess cash holdings we estimate the return model as presented in section 6.3.1. Table 
11 presents the results. Given the results from the value regressions, we expect that 
the governance measure Takeover defences significantly increases the value of excess 
cash. Models [1]-[3] present the results where we use the percent increase of market 
capitalization as dependent variable, model [4]-[6] present results where the market 
model excess return is the dependent variable.  
 
Table 11. Return models (robustness) 
This table shows the regression results for the return regressions. All models are estimated with firm 
and year fixed effects. ME is the market value of equity at t-1. The dependent variable in models [1]-
[3] is MEt minus MEt-1 divided by MEt-1. De dependent variable in models [4]-[6] is the annual market 
model excess return. Model [1] and [4] include all observations. Model [2] and [5] include the 
observations for non-UK firms only and model [3] and [6] for UK firms only. Models [1]-[6] include 
observations only if XCasht-1 is positive. Δ L X indicates a change in X from time t-1 to t. Governance 
t.d. is the governance score for Takeover defences. OLS regression is used with White’s 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Standard errors are presented between parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Δ L XCash / ME 1.418** 1.183* 0.377 0.998 0.931 -8.438 
 (0.563) (0.669) (2.696) (0.665) (0.663) (16.061) 
Δ L Earnings / ME 1.231*** 0.399 1.238 0.206 0.428*** 0.739 
 (0.256) (0.484) (1.458) (0.422) (0.111) (4.002) 
Δ L Net Assets / ME 0.110** -0.136 0.359 -0.085 -0.045 4.227 
 (0.053) (0.111) (0.366) (0.122) (0.108) (2.061) 
Δ L R&D / ME 0.053 -0.516 -11.183 2.924*** 1.918 -82.567 
 (1.149) (1.380) (14.072) (0.941) (1.383) (146.365) 
Δ L Interest / ME -2.801*** -1.288 16.495 -6.112** -5.952*** 13.518 
 (0.796) (1.999) (23.495) (2.917) (1.386) (24.454) 
Δ L Dividend / ME 4.104* 1.658 5.539 -1.968 0.739 -18.536 
 (2.202) (1.691) (8.132) (2.129) (1.382) (34.370) 
Lagged Xcash / ME 3.052*** 2.329*** 3.093 2.313*** 2.268*** 8.062** 
 (0.738) (0.748) (1.922) (0.689) (0.467) (2.041) 
Leverage -1.297*** -1.382*** -1.746 -1.279*** -1.731*** 1.846 
 (0.414) (0.325) (1.052) (0.286) (0.207) (3.017) 
New Finance / ME 0.029*** 0.228 0.010 -0.063 0.008 -4.318** 
 (0.008) (0.362) (0.017) (0.447) (0.341) (0.954) 
Lagged XCash / ME x Δ L XCash / ME 2.101 5.519*** -3.631 1.041 2.180 -5.974 
 (1.474) (1.084) (7.760) (0.737) (1.584) (8.949) 
Leverage x Δ L XCash / ME -0.872 -3.938*** -1.532 -0.051 -1.215** -15.227 
 (0.727) (0.443) (5.575) (0.920) (0.568) (30.944) 
Governance t.d. x Δ L XCash / ME 0.086*** 0.197*** 0.559 -0.012 0.110*** 2.932 
 (0.031) (0.067) (0.320) (0.030) (0.028) (3.359) 
Governance t.d. 0.035 0.014 0.009 -0.007 0.038 -0.212 
 (0.022) (0.038) (0.119) (0.031) (0.037) (0.181) 
Constant -0.037 0.175 0.299 0.165 0.178 0.327 
 (0.118) (0.231) (0.619) (0.172) (0.138) (1.443) 
       
Adjusted partial R² 0.542 0.579 0.735 0.374 0.449 0.645 
Sample Size 192 147 45 188 147 41 
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The results in model [1] confirm that the stock market places a higher value on 
excess cash for well governed firms relative to poorly governed firms. If we split the 
sample in non-UK and UK firms then we find that the coefficient is highly significant 
for non-UK firms.35 
Model [4] with excess return as dependent variable does not indicate that 
governance pays off. However, if we again split the sample in non-UK and UK firms, 
we find a highly significant positive coefficient on the interaction term GOV t.d. x ΔL 
XCash / ME for the non-UK firms. This implies that for non-UK firms, the marginal 
value of excess cash is higher for well governed firms than for poorly governed firms. 
For the non-UK firms we calculate the marginal value of €1 of excess cash, which is 
equal to the sum of the coefficient on the change in excess cash (Δ L XCash) and the 
coefficients on the interaction variables that include the change in excess cash times 
the ‘in sample means’ of the regressors interacting with the change in excess cash. 
The results are remarkable. The marginal value of €1 XCash for the non-UK firms 
following model [5] then is equal to € 1.14 on average. However, the value of €1 
excess cash is only €0.89 for the lower Governance t.d. quartile and €1.45 for the 
upper quartile. This finding is consistent with Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
 
1.5. Summary 
In this chapter we examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance 
and the value of excess cash for large European firms (FTSEurofirst 300). We use 
Deminor ratings for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board as 
proxies for the quality of corporate governance. Following the approach of Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007) we first estimate a cash model to determine the level of 
normal cash holdings and subsequently the level of excess cash. Then we analyse the 
influence of governance on the value of excess cash. We find that the level of excess 
cash as well as the value of excess cash is positively related to the governance 
Takeover defence score. Spending firms with excess cash and a low quality of 
corporate governance seem to spend more than firms with a high quality of corporate 
                                                 
35 The difference in the results between non-UK and UK firms could imply that the relevance of 
Shareholder rights for the valuation of unexpected changes in the level of excess cash is higher for non-
UK firms than for UK firms. Alternatively, it could be that for this small sample of UK-firms with in 
general high scores for governance component Takeover defences, it is difficult to capture the effect of 
governance on the value of excess cash. 
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governance. We further find that governance positively influences the ROA in the 
years after the year of spending. If we assume that projects that lower the ROA are 
negative NPV projects, the ‘value destructive investing behaviour’ of poorly governed 
firms could explain the value differential of excess cash between well and poorly 
governed firms. For non-UK firms we find that the value of €1 of excess cash is only 
€0.89 for the lower Takeover defences scores quartile and €1.45 for the upper 
quartile. Firms that (potentially) invest in negative NPV projects, and cannot be 
corrected by being taken over, are valued lower accordingly. We find no relation 
between the level nor the value of excess cash and the quality of firms’ corporate 
governance categories Shareholder rights, Disclosure and Board. Given our empirical 
results, only the market for corporate control seems strong enough to prevent 
managers from wasting excess cash. 
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Appendix A. Industry codes 
 
Worldscope Industry codes. Industry represents a four digit numeric code assigned to 
the company to represent its industry group. Each company is classified into a major 
industry group and subsequent minor industry groups. We only use the major industry 
group classification. 
 
Table A.1 Industry codes 
 
Industry Description   Industry Description 
1300  AEROSPACE   5200  METAL PRODUCERS  
1600  APPAREL   5500   METAL PRODUCT 
1900  AUTOMOTIVE    MANUFACTURERS 
2200  BEVERAGES   5800  OIL, GAS, COAL & 
2500  CHEMICALS     RELATED SERVICES 
2800  CONSTRUCTION  6100  PAPER 
3100  DIVERSIFIED  6400  PRINTING &  
3400  DRUGS, COSMETICS   PUBLISHING 
  HEALTH CARE  6700  RECREATION 
3700  ELECTRICAL  7000  RETAILERS 
4000  ELECTRONICS   7300  TEXTILES 
4300  FINANCIAL   7600  TOBACCO 
4600  FOOD    7900  TRANSPORTATION 
4900  MACHINERY &  8200  UTILITIES 
  EQUIPMENT   8500  MISCELLANEOUS 
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Appendix B. Variables and variable codes 
 
The first column shows the variable name and the second columns shows the database 
identifiers. WS stands for Worldscope database. DS stands for Datastream database, 
TF stands for Thomson Financial Database. 
 
Table B.1 Data variables identifiers 
 
Variable     Identifier 
Acquisitions     WS.NetAssetsFrAcquisitionsCFStmt 
Capital Expenditures    WS.CapitalExpendCFstd 
Cash and Cash Equivalents   WS.CashAndEquivGeneric 
Cash Flow     WS.CashFlow 
Dividend     WS.CommonDividendsCash 
EBIT      WS.EarningsBeforeInterestAndTaxes 
EBITDA     WS.EarningsBeforeIntTaxesAndDepr 
Income Tax     WS.IncomeTaxes 
Industry code     WS.IndustryGroup 
Interest expenses    TF.InterestExpenseonDebt 
Long Term Debt Issuance   WS.LTDebtIssuanceCFStmt 
Long Term Debt Reduction   WS.LTDebtReductionCFStmt 
Market capitalization    WS.YrEndMarketCap 
Working Capital    WS.WorkingCapBalSht 
Property, Plant & Equipment   WS.TotalPropPlantEquipNet 
Purchase of Common & Preferred Stock WS.PurchOfComAndPfdStkCFStmt 
R&D         WS.ResearchAndDevelopmentExpense 
Return index     DS.ReturnIndex 
Return on Assets    WS.ReturnOnAssets 
Sale of Common & Preferred Stock  WS.SaleOfComAndPfdStkCFStmt 
Sales Growth 3Yr     WS.Sales3YrGrowth 
Share Price     DS.PriceClose 
Total Assets     WS.TotalAssets 
Total Debt     WS.TotalDebt 
Total shares outstanding   DS.CommonSharesOutstanding 
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Appendix C. Cash-to-assets per country, 2000-2004 
 
Table C.1 Summary statistics of cash-to-assets by country, 2000-2004. 
The cash-to-assets ratio is defined as Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Net Assets, where Net 
Assets is Total Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalents. The cash-to-assets ratio is winsorized at the 
mean plus and minus three times the standard deviation. The rightmost column in the table shows the 
number of observations. 
 
Country  25th  75th   
 Mean Percentile Median Percentile Std. Dev. N 
Austria 0.030 0.005 0.027 0.041 0.032 15 
Belgium 0.118 0.043 0.088 0.174 0.088 30 
Switzerland 0.244 0.101 0.225 0.357 0.174 90 
Denmark 0.126 0.062 0.113 0.158 0.088 24 
Finland 0.172 0.018 0.028 0.159 0.291 20 
France 0.167 0.055 0.106 0.186 0.184 234 
Germany 0.126 0.035 0.075 0.162 0.143 165 
Greece 0.172 0.010 0.045 0.149 0.274 25 
Ireland 0.455 0.160 0.322 0.830 0.319 15 
Itlay 0.094 0.043 0.083 0.125 0.089 73 
Luxembourg 0.066 0.047 0.056 0.083 0.031 15 
Netherlands 0.164 0.053 0.099 0.219 0.158 80 
Norway 0.169 0.073 0.097 0.256 0.153 20 
Portugal 0.081 0.012 0.027 0.184 0.096 10 
Spain 0.114 0.024 0.079 0.137 0.123 80 
Sweden 0.168 0.044 0.082 0.156 0.230 70 
United Kingdom 0.133 0.037 0.070 0.156 0.162 374 
All 0.149 0.041 0.087 0.177 0.173 1,340 
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Appendix D. Cash-to-assets per industry, 2000-2004 
 
Table D.1 Summary statistics of cash-to-assets by industry, 2000-2004. 
The cash-to-assets ratio is defined as Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Net Assets, where Net 
Assets is Total Assets minus Cash and Cash Equivalents. The cash-to-assets ratio is winsorized at the 
mean plus and minus three times the standard deviation. The rightmost column in the table shows the 
number of observations. 
 
Industry  25th  75th   
 Mean Percentile Median Percentile Std. Dev. N 
Aerospace 0.210 0.127 0.179 0.245 0.109 15 
Apparel 0.100 0.028 0.109 0.156 0.062 10 
Automotive 0.144 0.071 0.107 0.137 0.128 50 
Beverages 0.063 0.026 0.052 0.088 0.046 35 
Chemicals 0.100 0.033 0.065 0.151 0.088 99 
Construction 0.129 0.068 0.118 0.151 0.089 80 
Diversified 0.134 0.046 0.084 0.161 0.134 80 
Drugs, cosmetics and health 0.262 0.115 0.253 0.367 0.197 85 
Electrical 0.157 0.083 0.134 0.210 0.097 22 
Electronics 0.314 0.107 0.217 0.399 0.273 80 
Food 0.170 0.062 0.087 0.224 0.164 40 
Machinery and equipment 0.190 0.042 0.068 0.349 0.200 35 
Metal producers 0.089 0.052 0.070 0.112 0.073 25 
Metal product manufacturers 0.107 0.045 0.060 0.160 0.086 20 
Oil, gas, coal and related 0.053 0.032 0.041 0.068 0.036 44 
Paper 0.023 0.017 0.024 0.027 0.008 15 
Printing and publishing 0.154 0.024 0.053 0.159 0.231 48 
Recreation 0.074 0.022 0.049 0.101 0.084 40 
Retialers 0.143 0.052 0.087 0.146 0.175 89 
Textiles 0.143 0.106 0.135 0.175 0.043 5 
Tobacco 0.142 0.058 0.131 0.181 0.103 20 
Transportation 0.232 0.074 0.108 0.251 0.250 39 
Utilities 0.090 0.019 0.050 0.107 0.125 203 
Miscellaneous 0.181 0.048 0.118 0.203 0.208 161 
All 0.149 0.041 0.087 0.177 0.173 1,340 
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Appendix E. Mean reversion in total cash holdings 
 
To test whether total cash holdings are mean reverting, we estimate the following 
regression: 
titititi AssetsCashAssetsCashAssetsCash ,1,101,, )/()/()/( εββ ++=− −−   
The estimation results presented in Table E.1 show a significantly negative relation 
between the change in cash and the lagged cash level, providing evidence for a mean 
reversion effect in total cash holdings. Put differently, the cash-to-assets ratio is 
stationary around an overall mean of 0.156 (= 0.066/0.423).  
 
Table E.1 Results of mean reversion model 
The dependent variable is the change in Cash to Net Assets and 
the independent variable lagged Cash position divided by lagged 
Net Assets. The regression period is 1990-2005, the number of 
observations 3560. Year fixed and fixed effects are included. The 
adjusted partial R2 is 0.21. T-Statistics are based on White cross-
section standard errors. 
 
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.
Lagged Cash / Assets -0.423 -10.782 0.000
Constant 0.066 10.802 0.000  
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Chapter 2 
Corporate governance and the cost of debt 
of large European firms36 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the relation between the quality of corporate governance and 
the cost of debt for large European firms (FTSEurofirst 300 Index). We use Deminor 
scores for Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board as proxies 
for the quality of corporate governance. As a proxy for the cost of debt we use the 
yield and yield spread of 319 bonds issued in the years 2001-2005. After adjusting for 
issuer characteristics, issue characteristics and market characteristics, we find a 
negative relation between disclosure and the cost of debt. We uncover that this 
relation is in fact nonlinear and crucially depends on the quality of shareholder 
rights. If the quality of shareholder rights is high, the effect of disclosure on the cost 
of debt is insignificant. However, if the quality of shareholder rights is low, the 
negative effect of disclosure is statistically and economically significant. This novel 
interaction effect between shareholders rights and disclosure on the cost of debt is 
explained by our ‘share rights or disclose’ hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, 
agency conflicts between the management and the providers of capital are negatively 
related with the quality of shareholder rights. We argue that firms with higher 
shareholder rights exhibit lower information risk. 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
In this chapter we examine the relation between European firm’s quality of corporate 
governance and their cost of debt. The quality of corporate governance is measured by 
means of the corporate governance rating constructed by Deminor. This rating 
contains four different components i.e., 1) rights and duties of shareholders; 2) range 
of takeover defences; 3) disclosure on financial matters and corporate governance; 
and 4) supervisory board structure and functioning. The cost of debt is measured by 
the yield to maturity on new debt issues and the yield spread of these issues.  
                                                 
36 This chapter is a follow up of Blom and Schauten (2003). We thank Floris Pot and Marijke Scheerder 
for their excellent research assistance. 
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A large body of literature explores the influence of corporate governance on the 
return on equity, firm value and firm performance, see e.g. Nesbitt (1994, 1995), 
Yermack (1996), Core et al. (1999), Gompers et al. (2003), Bauer et al. (2004), 
Bebchuk et al. (2005), Cremers and Nair (2005), Brown and Caylor (2006) and Core 
et al. (2006). Previous literature on the effects of corporate governance on the cost of 
debt (which is discussed in more detail in Section 3) includes Sengupta (1998), 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Anderson et al. (2004), and Klock, Mansi and Maxwell 
(2005). These studies have in common that they only consider the effects of a specific 
aspect of corporate governance, such as shareholder rights or board structure.  
In this chapter, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the effects of different 
components of corporate governance on the cost of debt.37 We do not limit ourselves 
to examining the effects of these components in isolation, but we also explore the 
possibility of interaction effects. In particular we formulate the hypothesis that the 
effects of disclosure on the cost of debt crucially depends on the level of shareholder 
rights. This ‘share rights or disclose’ hypothesis refers to the role that governance 
plays in agency conflicts between management and the providers of capital in 
combination with information risk.38 We hypothesize that these agency problems and 
information risk are positively related. We find that firms’ cost of debt is negatively 
associated with the quality of the corporate governance measure ‘Disclosure’. We also 
uncover that this relation crucially hinges upon the quality of the corporate 
governance measure ‘Shareholder rights’ which is in accordance with the ‘share rights 
or disclose’ hypothesis. If the quality of shareholder rights is high, the relevance of 
Disclosure for the cost of debt is low. However, if the quality of Shareholder rights is 
low, the negative effect of disclosure is statistically and economically significant. We 
find that the credit spread for firms with shareholder rights lower than 5 (on a scale 
from 1-10) decreases with approximately 70 basis points if we move within this 
category from the lower quartile to the upper quartile of the governance measure 
                                                 
37 Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) investigate whether U.S. firms with strong corporate governance 
benefit from higher firms’s credit ratings relative to firms with weaker governance. They use variables 
based on the four governance components from Standard & Poor’s framework. 
38 Bhojraj and Sengupta, (2003), p.456, define information risk as ‘…the risk that firm managers have 
private information that would adversely affect the default risk of the loan.’ According to Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003) governance mechanisms can help reduce information risk by inducing firms to 
disclose information in a timely manner. 
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Disclosure. We do not find support for the hypotheses we formulate for the other 
governance components. We find no relation between Takeover defences and the cost 
of debt nor between governance component Board and the cost of debt. 
This research contributes to the literature in two ways. First, our governance 
measure contains four different components of corporate governance from one 
independent source. This makes it possible to determine the relevance of each 
component as well as their interaction for the cost of debt. This makes our study more 
comprehensive than studies that take one aspect into account only. We introduce the 
‘share rights or disclose’ hypothesis and present empirical evidence in favour of this 
new hypothesis. Second, we provide empirical evidence for European firms instead of 
U.S. firms.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 2 we present the Deminor 
governance data. We discuss related prior empirical research in section 3 and 
formulate expected relations for each governance measure with the cost of debt. 
Section 4 describes our main model, our sample and some descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 presents the main empirical results. Section 6 gives a brief summary. 
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2.2. Governance data39 
We use Deminor ratings to measure the quality of firm-level corporate governance. 
These ratings cover firms included in the FTSEurofirst 300 Index for the years 2000-
2004. The Deminor ratings are based on 300 different governance indicators that refer 
to internationally accepted standards, as outlined by the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN), the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the Conference Board (Deminor Rating, 
2004).40,41 The different indicators or criteria can be classified into four categories: 
rights and duties of shareholders (referred to as Shareholder rights in the remainder of 
the chapter); range of takeover defences (Takeover defences); disclosure on financial 
matters and corporate governance (Disclosure); and Board structure and functioning 
(Board). For each category a rating is available on a scale from 1 to 10, where a score 
of 10 (1) corresponds to the best (worst) possible governance quality. The total 
governance score is simply the sum of the rating scores of the four categories.42 
The first category of governance criteria, Shareholder rights, concerns the question 
whether shareholders can exert sufficient power to determine corporate action. The 
score is based on i) the ‘one share - one vote - one dividend’ principle; ii) access to 
and voting procedures at general meetings, and iii) maintenance of pre-emptive rights. 
Firms that respect the control and ownership roles of shareholders, score high on the 
‘one share - one vote - one dividend’ principle. Deminor evaluates whether companies 
submit voting issues that are perceived as particular significant to the general meeting 
of shareholders and assesses the voting structure. Furthermore, companies should 
                                                 
39 The description of the governance data is copied from Chapter 1 to facilitate the reading of this 
chapter. 
40 The Deminor rating methodology further takes into consideration the main orientations chosen by 
national Codes of Best Practice, among which: the Combined Code in the UK (2003); the Vienot 
reports and the Bouton report in France (1995, 1999 and 2002); the Kodex in Germany (2002); the 
Preda Code in Italy (1999); the Tabaksblat Code in The Netherlands (2003). 
41 About the same criteria are used by Standard & Poor’s for their corporate governance score 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2002). This, taken together with the fact that all of these institutions have more or 
less the same ideas concerning good corporate governance, leads us to conclude that the Deminor 
rating is a representative measure for the quality of a firm’s corporate governance. 
42 According to Deminor (2004), the rating score reflects the extent to which a company adopts and 
complies with the ‘best practice’. Hence, the highest score represents best practice and the lowest the 
most questionable standard. 
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respect the pre-emptive rights of the existing shareholders as these stakeholders would 
like to prevent dilution of their voting or economic power. 
The second category, Takeover defences, examines the extent to which the firm 
attempts to decrease the likelihood of a hostile takeover through the adoption of anti-
takeover provisions. Deminor examines the presence and strength of anti-takeover 
devices such as poison pills, golden parachutes, core shareholdings and extensive 
cross-shareholdings. To achieve a high score for this aspect of governance, the range 
of takeover defences should lead to a favourable bidding process and not preclude the 
success of a takeover attempt per se. 
The third category, Disclosure, measures whether shareholders are able to obtain 
convenient and comprehensive information about the company’s financial matters as 
well as its governance characteristics. Deminor analyses for instance the quantity and 
quality of non-financial information, such as the diversity and independence of board 
members, board committees, accounting standards and information on major 
shareholders of the company. 
The fourth category, Board, measures issues relating to the governance of a Board, 
such as the presence of independent directors, the division between the role of 
Chairman and Chief Executive and the election of the board.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the governance scores for our sample from 
2000-2004. As shown, there is a positive trend in the total governance scores (sum of 
the four categories) from 2000-2004 as well as in the sub-scores. The total score in 
2000 is 19.36 while the score in 2004 equals 24.06. Disclosure increases from 5.20 to 
7.24. This trend is in line with the increased attention paid to governance structures by 
policy makers, see footnote 40 for a list of National Codes of Best Practice. 
 
Table 1. Corporate governance scores per year 
Year  Governance total Shareholder Takeover Disclosure Board  
    rights defences   N
  Mean Standard     
   deviation     
2000  19.36 6.24 5.78 3.77 5.20 4.61 61
2001  21.93 6.71 6.50 5.07 5.62 4.74 62
2002  21.05 6.25 6.31 3.80 6.07 4.87 96
2003  22.98 6.00 6.54 4.02 6.91 5.50 48
2004  24.06 5.38 6.76 4.05 7.24 6.01 52
All  21.68 6.32 6.35 4.12 6.13 5.07 319
Note: The table presents average Deminor corporate governance scores per year for Shareholder rights, 
Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. For the total governance score the standard deviation is 
shown as well. The rightmost column shows the number of observations. 
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Tables 2 and 3 present the governance scores by country and industry respectively. 
The extensive investor rights in common law countries such as the United Kingdom 
and Ireland (Laporta et al., 1998) are confirmed by the governance scores in our 
sample. The average scores for the United Kingdom and Ireland are the highest at 
27.92 and 29.02 respectively. Note that the number of observations for the UK is 93, 
but for Ireland only 2. Industries Beverages, Metal product manufacturers and 
Tobacco have relatively high total governance scores. These relatively high scores are 
probably influenced by the UK country effect since 6 of the 8 Beverages observations, 
1 of the 2 Metal product manufacturers observations and 8 of the 10 Tobacco 
observations are UK firms. However, if we control43 for country (and year effects) we 
still find higher total governance scores for Beverages and Tobacco.44 
 
Table 2. Corporate governance scores by country, 2000-2004 
Country  Governance total Shareholder Takeover Disclosure Board  
    rights defences   N
  Mean Standard     
   deviation     
Austria  18.05 2.63 7.31 1.21 5.77 3.76 2
Belgium  15.85 4.30 6.06 1.75 4.15 3.89 4
Switzerland  17.64 6.14 5.69 3.12 4.72 4.10 17
Finland  19.16 2.55 5.99 2.00 6.11 5.06 4
France  21.34 4.62 6.44 3.78 5.90 5.23 78
Germany  18.63 4.17 7.09 3.01 5.32 3.20 43
Greece  18.52 NA 7.16 1.00 6.37 3.99 1
Ireland  29.02 0.04 6.51 8.00 7.50 7.01 2
Italy  19.83 3.17 5.90 1.00 7.48 5.45 15
Luxembourg  12.08 5.35 4.01 0.50 3.96 3.61 2
Netherlands  15.16 3.95 4.40 1.04 5.57 4.15 20
Norway  17.38 4.41 7.21 4.00 3.43 2.74 4
Portugal  7.78 NA 4.11 0.00 2.01 1.67 1
Spain  15.33 2.36 4.96 0.72 4.91 4.74 18
Sweden  21.51 5.36 6.12 5.76 5.40 4.23 15
United Kingdom  27.92 4.59 6.90 6.97 7.49 6.55 93
All  21.68 6.32 6.35 4.12 6.13 5.07 319
Note: The table presents average Deminor corporate governance scores by country for Shareholder 
rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. For the total governance score the standard deviation 
is shown as well. The rightmost column shows the number of observations. 
                                                 
43 To control for country and year effects we regress the total governance scores on country dummies 
and year dummies and compute industry averages for the residuals from this model. Only the residuals 
of the industries Transportation, Tobacco, Metal producers, Machinery and equipment, Construction 
and Beverages are significant. 
44 Metal product manufacturers is not significant, this finding confirms our expectation. Further, we 
find that Metal producers and Transportation have lower adjusted scores and Machinery and equipment 
and Construction higher adjusted scores. 
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Table 3. Summary descriptives, governance scores per industry, 2000-2004 
Industry  Governance total Shareholder Takeover Disclosure Board  
    rights defences   N
  Mean Standard     
   deviation     
Aerospace  18.55 2.87 5.07 0.25 7.19 6.04 4
Apparel  24.46 NA 6.72 8.00 5.99 3.75 1
Automotive  18.88 4.63 6.43 3.34 5.41 3.71 28
Beverages  27.02 6.22 7.41 7.00 6.77 5.84 8
Chemicals  21.54 6.11 6.64 4.33 5.85 4.71 22
Construction  24.37 4.76 6.31 5.88 6.45 5.73 18
Diversified  22.10 5.13 6.34 4.74 5.89 5.13 19
Drugs, cosmetics and health care  22.21 9.17 6.20 4.40 6.29 5.33 10
Electrical  21.41 2.22 6.34 4.04 6.10 4.93 4
Electronics  21.24 5.74 6.19 4.47 5.78 4.80 15
Food  22.24 7.09 6.10 4.27 6.45 5.41 11
Machinery and equipment  21.85 5.96 7.01 6.91 4.47 3.46 11
Metal producers  23.86 5.36 5.63 4.00 7.59 6.64 5
Metal product manufacturers  28.06 5.42 6.54 7.97 7.46 6.10 2
Oil, gas, coal and related services  23.56 6.45 6.29 4.10 7.13 6.03 20
Paper  20.29 1.43 5.52 2.67 6.68 5.43 3
Printing and publishing  19.61 9.09 5.33 3.40 6.13 4.75 10
Recreation  26.38 5.96 6.87 6.52 7.04 5.95 6
Retailers  21.38 6.30 6.63 3.92 5.70 5.14 24
Tobacco  27.16 4.80 7.02 6.56 7.20 6.38 10
Transportation  18.40 2.56 5.71 0.70 6.60 5.39 10
Utilities  20.10 6.94 6.22 2.99 6.02 4.88 63
Miscellaneous  22.04 6.00 6.64 3.93 6.17 5.30 15
All   21.68 6.32 6.35 4.12 6.13 5.07 319
Note: The table presents average Deminor corporate governance scores by industry for Shareholder 
rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board. For the total governance score the standard deviation 
is shown as well. The rightmost column shows the number of observations. 
 
2.3. Prior empirical research and expected relations 
This section is structured in two parts. First, we discuss seminal empirical research on 
the relation between corporate governance and the cost of debt. Second, we 
summarize empirical findings per governance measure and formulate expected 
relations for each of these four measures. 
 
2.3.1. Prior empirical research 
Sengupta (1998) shows a negative relation between the quality of a firms’ disclosure 
and their cost of debt.45 This finding would suggest that governance mechanisms can 
affect bond yields indirectly through a reduction in ‘information risk’. The measure 
                                                 
45 The relation between disclosure and the cost of equity is analysed by e.g. Welker (1995) and Botosan 
(1997). Welker (1995) documents a negative association between financial analysts’ disclosure 
measurement and the bid-ask spread set by market makers. Botosan (1997) finds for the machinery 
industry a negative association between disclosures in annual reports and firm’s cost of equity, but only 
for firms with low analyst following. 
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for the quality of the disclosure used by Sengupta (1998) is a rating of the firm by 
financial analysts (AIMR disclosure ratings). The research uses two different 
measures for the cost of debt: i) the yield to maturity on new issues and ii) the total 
interest expenses of the new issues. Results show both measures to be negatively 
related to the measure for the quality of the disclosure, taking other possible 
determinants of the cost of debt into account. Moreover, the results imply the specific 
importance of disclosure to firms with insecure future prospects, using the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns as a measure for future insecurity. 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that bond yields are negatively associated with 
the percentage of shares held by institutions and the fraction of the board made up by 
nonofficers. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) assume that governance mechanisms reduce 
potential conflicts of interest between the management and the providers of capital 
through effective monitoring their actions (‘active monitoring’ hypothesis). However 
they find that concentrated institutional ownership has an adverse impact on bond 
yields since the decisions made by the firm could be influenced by these institutions 
in their own advantage (‘private benefits’ hypothesis).46 
Anderson et al. (2004) relate the cost of debt to characteristics of the board and 
document a negative relation between the cost of debt and board independence and 
board size. They also find that ‘…fully independent audit committees are associated 
with a significantly lower cost of debt financing. Similarly, yield spreads are also 
negatively related to audit committee size and meeting frequency. Overall, these 
                                                 
46 Many hypotheses in literature refer to the same or partly the same effects or actions.  We list a few 
hypotheses here: the ‘active monitoring hypothesis’ states that ‘the existence of large shareholders 
leads to better monitoring of managers’ (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990, p. 143, see also Demsetz, 1983 
and Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) while according to the ‘passive monitoring hypothesis’ large investors 
have limited incentives to monitor management actions due to the free-riding problem among large 
investors (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). The ‘management disciplining hypothesis’ refers to ‘the role 
governance plays in mitigating the agency conflicts between management and all stakeholders’ 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, 2006, p.207). The ‘wealth redistribution hypothesis’ states that certain governance 
features can be beneficial for shareholders but potentially harmful to bondholders and vice versa 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, 2006). The ‘private benefits hypothesis’ states that concentrated ownership  
‘…allows the blockholder to exercise undue influence over the management to secure benefits that are 
to the detriment of the other providers of capital (shareholders and bondholders).’ (Bhojraj and 
Sengupta, 2003, p.457.) The ‘shared benefits hypothesis’ suggests that concentrated ownership leads to 
more efficient monitoring and that benefits are shared by all stockholders (Ibid).  
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results provide market-based evidence that boards and audit committees are important 
elements affecting the reliability of financial reports.’ Ibid, p.315. 
Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2005) examine the relation between the Gompers et al. 
(2003) governance index and firm value from the view of the bondholders.47 
According to Klock et al. (2005) the expected relation is not straightforward since 
anti-takeover provisions might influence the value of debt in several ways. First, 
takeovers could reduce the cost of debt as a result of coinsurance (see Billet et al., 
2004).48 Anti-takeover provisions could in this perspective be interpreted as negative 
for the value of debt, since this coinsurance effect (which is positive for the 
debtholders of the target) is prohibited by the use of the anti-takeover provisions. 
Second, a takeover, could also have a negative effect on bondholders’ wealth and 
increase the cost of debt if e.g. management increases leverage or increases the payout 
(excess cash) to shareholders (on behalf of the shareholders) after the takeover; in this 
perspective anti-takeover provisions reduce the cost of debt. Third, anti-takeover 
                                                 
47 Gompers et al. (2003) have studied the influence of corporate governance on stock returns. Using 24 
antitakeover indicators, the authors compose a ‘governance index’, which is used to estimate the rights 
of approximately 1500 firms’ shareholders in the period 1990-1999. A low index score implies stronger 
shareholder rights (weak antitakeover provisions) and a high score vice-versa. The authors find a 
significantly negative relation between this index and stock returns. Furthermore firms with stronger 
shareholder rights have higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital 
expenditures, and made fewer acquisitions. Bauer et al. (2004) perform the same kind of analysis for 
Europe (EMU countries versus UK) as Gompers et al. (2003) did for the U.S. Instead of using 
antitakeover indicators, Bauer et al. (2004) uses the Deminor corporate governance rating (total score) 
for 2000 and 2001 instead. Bauer et al. (2004) find some evidence that governance affects stock returns 
positively for UK firms but not for EMU countries. The impact of corporate governance on firm value 
is rather strong for EMU firms but not for the UK. 
48 Klock et al. (2005), p.694, suggest there is a negative relation between the premiums shareholders of 
the target capture and the cost of debt. We do not agree with this assumption. First, if the shareholders 
of the target are paid in cash, this payment negatively influences the value of the assets of the new 
combination. A positive relation between the premium and the cost of debt could be assumed then. 
Second, if the shareholders of the target are paid in new shares, the fraction that the shareholders of the 
target get, does not influence the value of the assets of the new combination, which implies no relation 
between the premium and the cost of debt. Of course, for the shareholders of the target, antitakeover 
provisions are positively rewarded if management can extract higher offers from the bidder. 
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provisions could improve capital investment decisions49 which have a positive 
influence on shareholder and bondholder wealth and decrease the cost of debt. Fourth, 
if takeover defences make managers invulnerable for the market for corporate control 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983) this could have a negative impact on firm performance 
(because of e.g. shirking of effort) as well as on the wealth of the shareholders and 
bondholders. This would increase the cost of debt. Fifth, anti-takeover provisions 
might decrease the risk of the firm and cost of debt if managers invest less in risky 
projects to protect their job and to reduce their human capital risk (Amihud and Lev, 
1981). Klock et al. (2005) find a difference of about 34 basis points between the cost 
of debt of firms with the strongest management rights (strongest anti-takeover 
provisions) and the strongest shareholder rights (weakest anti-takeover provisions). 
Strong anti-takeover provisions are associated with a lower cost of debt while weak 
anti-takeover provisions are associated with a higher cost of debt. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2006) structure their analysis by using a 
framework developed by Standard & Poor’s.50 They find that firms overall credit 
ratings are 1) negatively associated with the number of block holders that own at least 
5% ownership in the firm (this variable captures S&P’s component Ownership 
Structure and Influence); 2) positively related to weaker shareholder rights in terms of 
takeover defences (S&P component Financial Stakeholder Rights and Relations); 3) 
positively related to the quality of ‘working capital accruals’ and the ‘timeliness of 
earnings’ (S&P component Financial Transparency); and 4) positively related to 
overall board independence, board stock ownership, board expertise and negatively 
related to CEO power on the board (S&P component Board Structure and Processes). 
(Ibid., p.204.) The relations are explained by the effect of the selected variables on 
agency conflicts between external stakeholders (bondholders and shareholders) and 
management (‘management disciplining’ hypothesis) and potential conflicts between 
bondholders and shareholders (‘wealth redistribution’ hypothesis). 
 
                                                 
49 Stein’s (1988) model suggests that managers of sheltered firms are more likely to invest in R&D like 
projects. Harris (1990) shows that e.g. golden parachutes positively influences managerial investment 
in specialized human capital beneficial for the shareholders.  
50 This framework focuses on four major components of governance: Ownership Structure and 
Influence, Financial Stakeholder Rights and Relations, Financial transparency and Board Structure and 
Processes (Standard & Poor, 2002). 
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2.3.2. Expected relations 
Shareholder rights. Consistent with the ‘management disciplining’ hypothesis, 
governance systems in favour of shareholders are likely to provide better monitoring 
and control over management leading to more effective and efficient managerial 
decision making (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). This would lead to a negative 
relation between shareholder rights and the cost of debt. Following the management 
disciplining hypothesis, we expect that firms with high scores for shareholder rights 
benefit more from active monitoring shareholders and make it easier for shareholders 
to take corrective action when it is deemed necessary. These actions have a positive 
effect on firm value and a negative impact on the cost of debt.51 However, if large 
shareholders exercise their influence over management to secure benefits for 
themselves i.e., they expropriate wealth from (minor shareholders and) bondholders 
then a positive relation is possible as well (see Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). 
Examples of wealth expropriation of bond holders are the approval of mergers or 
acquisitions that only serve the interests of shareholders (Asquith and Wizman, 1990; 
Warga and Welch, 1993; and Billet et al., 2004) and asset substitution (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Given the definition of our shareholder rights measure (see section 
2.) we expect a negative relation between Shareholder rights and the cost of debt. 
Take over defences. Klock et al. (2005) give several explanations for theoretical 
negative as well as positive relations of the level of anti-takeover provisions with the 
cost of debt. In their empirical research they find a negative relation between takeover 
defences and the cost of debt. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) find a positive effect 
between takeover defences and firms credit ratings (in other words a negative relation 
with the cost of debt) and Cremers et al. (2007) document an interaction effect 
between shareholder control and takeover defences. They find that shareholder control 
(proxied by large institutional block holders) is associated with higher (lower) yields 
if the firm is exposed to (protected from) takeovers. Given these prior results, we 
leave the prediction for Takeover defences unsigned. 
                                                 
51 Evidence by e.g., Nesbitt (1994, 1995), shows that firm value increases, the years after firms are 
being targeted by an active institutional investor (CalPERS). Cremers et al. (2007) find a negative 
association between shareholder control and bond yields only if the firm is protected from takeovers. In 
our sample, the median score for takeover defences is 4.00, which implies that the median firm is 
protected more from takeover than the shareholders wish (the higher the score, the better the outcome 
for the shareholders of a possible bidding process).  
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Disclosure. Sengupta (1998) finds a negative association between the quality of 
corporate disclosure and bond yields. Firms that consistently make timely and 
informative disclosures are assumed less likely to withhold important and relevant 
information.52 Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) document a positive relation between the 
degree of financial transparency and firm’s credit rating. This indicates that the yield 
is assumed to be lower for firms with high financial transparency. We further argue 
that the relevance of Disclosure might be higher for firms with low shareholder rights 
than for firms with high shareholder rights. Following Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), 
we distinguish agency risk and information risk. We hypothesize that if agency risk is 
low i.e., the quality of shareholder rights is high, then information risk is relatively 
low as well. However if agency risk is high i.e., the quality of shareholder rights is 
low, the need for a high quality of Disclosure is relatively high. We suggest that the 
more rights shareholders have to discipline management, the less important disclosure 
is for the providers of debt. This suggests that bondholders benefit from more 
shareholder rights, which makes the quality of disclosure less relevant. A higher 
quality of shareholder rights would lead to better managerial decision making and 
would benefit all providers of capital, holders of equity and debt. Alternatively, low 
shareholder rights imply higher risk for the providers of capital which explains the 
additional need for Disclosure in order to reduce the information risk. For 
convenience, we refer to this interaction between Shareholder rights and Disclosure as 
the ‘share rights or disclose’ hypothesis. Management that does not share rights with 
shareholders i.e., firms that do not score high on Shareholder rights, have higher costs 
of debt if their score for Disclosure is low. Firms that do not share rights but 
communicate relatively well, are rewarded with a lower cost of debt. 
Board structure. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Anderson et al. (2004), and 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) document significant relations between board 
composition, board size, independence of committees and the cost of debt directly or 
indirectly. Given the criteria the score for Board structure is based on, in combination 
                                                 
52 Related empirical research to information risk is Mansi, Maxwell and Miller (2006). They argue that 
analyst disagreement about future earnings represent a measure of uncertainty about firm value and 
find that firms with more diverse analysts forecasts on future earnings have lower credit ratings. 
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with prior results, we expect a negative relation between Board structure and the cost 
of debt.53 
In short, our main hypothesis states that Disclosure leads to a lower cost of debt 
and is negatively influenced by Shareholder rights. We further expect a negative 
relation between the cost of debt and Shareholder rights and Board. We leave the 
relation with Takeover defences unsigned. 
 
2.4. Model and data 
2.4.1. Model 
The influence of a firm’s corporate governance quality on the cost of debt is examined 
by the following model54: 
 
CODt+1 = f (COGOt, Control variables)      (1) 
 
where CODt+1 is the cost of debt issued in year t+1; as proxies for the Cost of Debt in 
year t+1 we use i) the yield to maturity (YIELD) on debt issued in year t+1; and ii) the 
yield spread (SPREAD) on the first day of the issue in year t+1; SPREAD is defined 
as the YIELD minus the yield to maturity of a government bond at the same date, in 
the same currency and of similar maturity; COGOt is the measure for the quality of 
corporate governance measured over a period finishing in year t; COGO reflects the 
quality of Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board structure or 
the total governance score. 
The control variables in (1) comprise issue characteristics (issue size, maturity, and 
special features of the debt); issuer characteristics (leverage, profitability, interest 
coverage, size and risk); and market characteristics (treasury yield and the yield 
spread of Moody’s Aaa bonds).55 The definitions of the control variables and their 
predicted relation with the cost of debt are listed in Table 4. 
                                                 
53 Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) find that firms that have a higher quality structure and performance 
of the supervisory board overall perform better than firms that have a low quality structure and 
performance. According to the management disciplining hypothesis this would imply a negative 
relation with the cost of debt.  
54 The model used by Sengupta (1998) serves as a basis for the method used in this chapter. 
55 The control variables have been selected by using prior research into the determinants of bond 
ratings and yields, see Fisher (1959), Jaffee (1975), Sorensen (1979), Boardman and McEnally (1981), 
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Table 4. Control variable definitions and predicted signs. 
Variable Definition and predicted sign 
Issue characteristics 
LNSIZE 
 
 
LNMATUR 
 
 
CALL 
 
Logarithm of the issue amount; as a result of the size-effect the measure 
for the cost of debt is expected to be negatively related to the issue 
amount. 
Logarithm of the maturity; bonds with a longer maturity are expected to 
have a higher yield, because of the increased exposure to interest rate 
risk. 
1 if the obligation is callable and 0 if the bond is not callable from the 
date of issue. The issuer of the bond will have to pay extra if the bond is 
callable; therefore a positive relation between CALL and the yield is 
expected. 
CONVERT 
 
 
SUBORD 
 
Issuer characteristics 
DE 
 
 
MARGIN 
 
 
TIMES 
 
 
LNASSET 
 
STDRETN 
 
 
Market characteristics 
TREASURY 
 
 
BC 
 
 
1 if the obligation is convertible into shares, otherwise 0; convertible 
bonds are expected to have a lower yield, because part of the 
compensation for investors comes from the value of the option. 
1 if the bond is subordinated, otherwise 0; subordinated bonds are 
expected to have a higher yield. 
 
Book value of long term interest bearing debt divided by the market 
value of equity at the end of year t; firms with a higher DE ratio are 
expected to have a higher yield. 
Net income before preferred dividends in year t divided by net sales or 
revenues in year t; firms with a higher profit margin are expected to have 
a lower yield. 
The sum of net income before interest and tax expense of year t divided 
by interest expense in year t; firms with a higher ratio are expected to 
have a lower yield. 
Logarithm of the total assets at the end of year t; large firms are expected 
to have a lower yield. 
Standard deviation of the daily stock return in year t corrected for 
dividends and stock splits. Standard deviation is a measure of total risk of 
equity. We assume a positive relation with the yield. 
 
Yield to maturity of a government bond at the same date, in the same 
currency and of similar maturity; we expect a positive relation between 
the yield of the issued bonds and the treasury bonds. 
Yield (on the date of the company’s bond issue) on Moody’s US Aaa-
bonds minus the yield on US government bonds with the longest 
maturity (also on the date of issue); the yield and spread of the issued 
bond are expected to increase with an increase of BC. We assume this 
U.S. risk spread is related to the European risk spread. 
 
We estimate the model using the SPREAD and the YIELD as proxy for the cost of 
debt respectively, where we exclude TREASURY in the first model. To capture the 
influence of the quality of shareholder rights on the relation between disclosure and 
the cost of debt we include the interaction term Shareholder rights x Disclosure.  
                                                                                                                                            
Kidwell et al. (1984), Wilson and Howard (1984), Fung and Rudd (1986), Lamy and Thompson 
(1988), Feroz and Wilson (1992), Ziebart and Reiter (1992), Sengupta (1998), and Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003). 
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The YIELD model we estimate including the interaction term56: 
 
YIELD = α1Shareholder rights + α2Takeover defences + α3Disclosure + α4Board + 
α5Shareholder rights x Disclosure + α6DE+ α7MARGIN + α8TIMES + α9LASSET + 
α10STDRETN + α11LSIZE + α12LMATUR + α13CALL + α14CONVERT + 
α15SUBORD + α16TREASURY + α17BC + YRDUMMIES + ε   (2) 
 
The expected signs of the governance coefficients are: α1 <0, α2 unsigned, α3 < 0, 
α4 < 0, and α5 > 0. Since we expect that the relevance of disclosure decreases as 
shareholders rights increase, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient of the 
interaction term Shareholder rights x Disclosure. We include year dummies since a 
positive trend in governance ratings (see section 2) and a negative trend in yields and 
or spreads might lead to spurious results.  
 
2.4.2. Data 
The original dataset consists of corporate governance ratings for European companies 
for the period 2000-2004. The corporate governance quality of the firms from the 
dataset has been measured by means of the Deminor corporate governance ratings for 
the years 2000-2004. Year t ratings are each year published at the beginning of year 
t+1. The ratings by Deminor rating as well as the research are based on publicly 
available information. We excluded financial firms (Worldscope Industry Group code 
4300) as their financing decisions are affected by somewhat different factors than 
those of the industrial firms (Sengupta, 1998) and some accounting variables of 
financial firms are difficult to compare to those of non financial firms. 
Information on bond issues in 2001-2005 was obtained from Bloomberg. 
Companies that issued bonds in either Japanese Yen or a Floating Rate Note (FRN) 
were removed because of their strongly deviating yields. The yield of the JPY-
denominated bonds is low, and the yield of the FRN fluctuates along with the market 
interest rate. This complicates a comparison to the other observations. We further 
excluded Royal Dutch Shell, Unilever since no reliable data could be obtained about 
the identity of the issuing entity; an issue by Danone because the issue was in CZK 
and OTE because we could not find reliable data of this firm. All of this finally 
                                                 
56 The firm and time subscripts are not shown. 
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resulted in a dataset consisting of 319 issues by 156 firms from 16 European 
countries.57  
The issue characteristics of the 319 bonds (Size, Maturity, Callable, Convertible 
and Subordinated) have been obtained from Bloomberg. All the issue amounts (size) 
have been converted into Euro, using several exchange rates on the issue date. 
The issuer characteristics are obtained from various sources. An overview of the 
variables used and their corresponding source and code can be found in Appendix A.  
Market condition TREASURY is the yield of a comparable government bond 
(same maturity) in the same currency of the issued bond. European government bonds 
were used for bond issues in euros (source Ecowin). To calculate BC, Moody’s Aaa-
rated bonds were used as well as U.S. government bonds with the longest maturity. 
TREASURY and BC were calculated on the day the particular company issued its 
debt.  
To reduce the weight of outliers, we winsorize the data except the governance 
variables. Observations exceeding the mean plus or minus three times the standard 
deviation have been set to this value. 
Table B1 in Appendix B provides descriptive statistics for the variables we use 
throughout the analysis. Included are the mean, median, standard deviation and the 
25th and 75th percentile values. The table shows that the mean YIELD is 4.88% 
whereas the mean SPREAD is 0.78%. The median issue size €500 million and the 
median time to maturity 7 years. The median size of the firms (total assets in book 
value) is about € 20 billion. 
Table B2 in Appendix B, shows Pearson correlation coefficients among the 
variables. The correlation coefficients between the independent variables are all far 
below 80% except Disclosure and Board. The correlation between these governance 
measures is 80%. Because of this high correlation we run our models i) including the 
additional interaction term Board structure x Shareholder rights and ii) without Board 
structure. As will be shown in the next section, the results are not influenced by this 
alternate specification. 
 
                                                 
57 Austria (2 issues), Belgium (4), Switzerland (17), Finland (4), France (78), Germany (43), Greece 
(1), Ireland (2), Italy (15), Luxembourg (2), The Netherlands (20), Norway (4), Portugal (1), Spain 
(18), Sweden (15), United Kingdom (93).  
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2.5. Results  
The results for the SPREAD and YIELD model are given in Table 5 and 6 
respectively. Model [1] includes the interaction term Disclosure x Shareholder rights 
and presents the results of our main hypothesis. The results show that the coefficients 
for Disclosure and Disclosure x Shareholder have the expected sign and are statistical 
significant (based on a two-tailed test). The coefficient for Disclosure in the SPREAD 
model is -0.288 and -0.295 in the YIELD model, while the coefficient for the 
interaction term is 0.041 and 0.043 respectively. The coefficients are statistically and 
economically significant. The results indicate for instance that the spread is 
approximately 7 basis points lower (-0.288 + 5.31 x 0.041) for each additional score 
on disclosure for firms from the lower quartile of the governance measure shareholder 
rights.58 Model [2] and [3] provide the results without interaction term and show no 
relation between governance and the cost of debt, since the interaction is not captured 
in these models. However if we focus on the 50% firms with the lowest scores for 
shareholder rights, we again find a negative relation between Disclosure and the 
spread and yield respectively. The coefficient is -0.128 and -0.123 for the SPREAD 
and YIELD model respectively (see models [5] in Table 5 and 6). If we focus on firms 
with an even lower quality for shareholder rights, the negative effect of disclosure on 
the spread increases further. For example, we find that the credit spread for firms with 
shareholder rights lower than 5, decreases with approximately 70 basis points if we 
move within this category from lower quartile to the upper quartile of the governance 
measure disclosure.59  
We do not find evidence for any relation between Takeover defences and the cost 
of debt nor between Board and the cost of debt. The coefficient for Takeover defences 
and Board are highly insignificant for the SPREAD model as well as the YIELD 
model. 
                                                 
58 The 25% observation for the governance measure Shareholder rights, is 5.31.  
59 The results of this model are not published. The disclosure score for firms with a shareholder rights 
score lower than 5 is for the first quartile 4.6 and for the fourth quartile 6.9. 
64
 54
Table 5. Results SPREAD model 
Model [1] includes the interaction term Disclosure x Shareholder rights and tests our ‘share rights or 
disclose’ hypothesis. Models [2] and [3] present the results for the total sample whereas the sample of 
models [4] and [5] include observations if shareholder rights < 6.655 (median) only. OLS regression is 
used with White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Standard errors are presented between 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 Expected      
Variables sign [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Corporate governance       
Shareholder rights - -0.246*  -0.013  -0.088 
  (0.129)  (0.040)  (0.063) 
Takeover defences ? -0.002  0.004  -0.007 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.021) 
Board structure - 0.016  0.018  0.090 
  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.070) 
Disclosure - -0.288**  -0.036  -0.128** 
  (0.130)  (0.050)  (0.062) 
Disclosure x Shareholder rights + 0.041**     
  (0.020)     
Corporate governance total -  -0.002  -0.015  
   (0.008)  (0.015)  
Issue characteristics       
LNSIZE - 0.010 0.009 0.013 -0.030 -0.021 
  (0.044) (0.041) (0.044) (0.069) (0.072) 
LNMATUR + 0.362*** 0.338*** 0.344*** 0.313** 0.338*** 
  (0.115) (0.113) (0.114) (0.125) (0.129) 
CALL + -0.247 -0.209 -0.203 -0.826 -0.882* 
  (0.249) (0.243) (0.247) (0.499) (0.521) 
CONV - -2.608*** -2.611*** -2.615*** -1.950*** -1.946*** 
  (0.257) (0.258) (0.260) (0.468) (0.474) 
SUBORD + 0.547** 0.530** 0.521** 0.123 0.123 
  (0.254) (0.253) (0.254) (0.217) (0.205) 
Firm characteristics       
DE + 0.512*** 0.518*** 0.527*** 0.755*** 0.813*** 
  (0.115) (0.111) (0.114) (0.205) (0.205) 
MARGIN - -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.013 -0.015 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) 
TIMES - 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.018 0.021 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) 
LNASSETS - -0.179*** -0.189*** -0.185*** -0.246*** -0.236** 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.092) (0.095) 
STDRETN + 0.525*** 0.519*** 0.526*** 0.521*** 0.520*** 
  (0.092) (0.093) (0.092) (0.141) (0.140) 
Market characteristics       
Treasury       
       
BC + 0.352 0.333 0.338 0.309 0.349 
  (0.268) (0.277) (0.275) (0.344) (0.338) 
Year dummies       
2001  4.057*** 2.822** 2.721** 5.137** 5.032** 
  (1.495) (1.313) (1.329) (2.438) (2.476) 
2002  4.199*** 2.928** 2.845** 5.184** 5.107** 
  (1.472) (1.312) (1.325) (2.486) (2.535) 
2003  4.204*** 2.925** 2.858** 5.110** 5.094** 
  (1.469) (1.341) (1.340) (2.525) (2.519) 
2004  4.167*** 2.870** 2.824** 5.248** 5.326** 
  (1.462) (1.334) (1.330) (2.564) (2.559) 
2005  4.523*** 3.236** 3.198** 5.467** 5.539** 
  (1.472) (1.340) (1.334) (2.498) (2.487) 
Adjusted R²  0.521 0.520 0.516 0.390 0.393 
Sample Size  319 319 319 159 159 
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Table 6. Results YIELD model 
Model [1] includes the interaction term disclosure x shareholder rights and tests our ‘share rights or 
disclose’ hypothesis. Models [2] and [3] present the results for the total sample whereas the sample of 
models [4] and [5] include observations if shareholder rights < 6.655 (median) only. OLS regression is 
used with White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Standard errors are presented between 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 Expected      
Variables sign [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Corporate governance       
Shareholder rights - -0.253*  -0.013  -0.075 
  (0.132)  (0.042)  (0.066) 
Takeover defences ? 0.003  0.009  -0.007 
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.022) 
Board structure - 0.020  0.022  0.083 
  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.071) 
Disclosure - -0.295**  -0.036  -0.123* 
  (0.130)  (0.050)  (0.064) 
Disclosure x Shareholder rights + 0.043**     
  (0.020)     
Corporate governance total -  0.001  -0.014  
   (0.008)  (0.016)  
Issue characteristics       
LNSIZE - 0.009 0.007 0.012 -0.035 -0.026 
  (0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.070) (0.073) 
LNMATUR + 0.442*** 0.426*** 0.431*** 0.330** 0.341** 
  (0.128) (0.127) (0.129) (0.153) (0.157) 
CALL + -0.274 -0.232 -0.226 -0.867 -0.928* 
  (0.269) (0.262) (0.266) (0.537) (0.558) 
CONV - -2.810*** -2.815*** -2.819*** -2.038*** -2.035*** 
  (0.291) (0.291) (0.294) (0.491) (0.498) 
SUBORD + 0.707*** 0.695*** 0.684** 0.237 0.222 
  (0.265) (0.266) (0.265) (0.259) (0.241) 
Firm characteristics       
DE + 0.541*** 0.544*** 0.555*** 0.774*** 0.831*** 
  (0.118) (0.115) (0.118) (0.215) (0.217) 
MARGIN - -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.014 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016) 
TIMES - 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.017 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.019) 
LNASSETS - -0.203*** -0.214*** -0.209*** -0.271*** -0.261*** 
  (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.093) (0.097) 
STDRETN + 0.526*** 0.518*** 0.526*** 0.523*** 0.526*** 
  (0.098) (0.099) (0.097) (0.144) (0.142) 
Market characteristics       
Treasury + 0.816*** 0.799*** 0.802*** 0.892*** 0.919*** 
  (0.087) (0.090) (0.090) (0.142) (0.143) 
BC + 0.266 0.239 0.246 0.283 0.326 
  (0.263) (0.272) (0.270) (0.339) (0.333) 
Year dummies       
2001  5.495*** 4.293*** 4.177*** 6.306** 6.075** 
  (1.573) (1.447) (1.457) (2.665) (2.707) 
2002  5.575*** 4.332*** 4.238*** 6.367** 6.163** 
  (1.556) (1.445) (1.452) (2.716) (2.769) 
2003  5.407*** 4.134*** 4.062*** 6.164** 6.044** 
  (1.536) (1.441) (1.440) (2.712) (2.713) 
2004  5.422*** 4.132*** 4.084*** 6.330** 6.293** 
  (1.536) (1.443) (1.438) (2.756) (2.756) 
2005  5.662*** 4.369*** 4.333*** 6.506** 6.479** 
  (1.538) (1.430) (1.425) (2.675) (2.671) 
Adjusted R²  0.689 0.688 0.686 0.626 0.624 
Sample Size  319 319 319 159 159 
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The total governance score does not reveal any relation with the cost of debt. This 
confirms the idea that corporate governance measures that combine different 
components obscure the separate effects and that models that focus on one of the 
components only suffer from the fact that relevant variables are omitted. 
Since the correlation between Disclosure and governance measure Board structure 
is high (0.80), we estimate the main model again i) including an additional interaction 
term Board structure x shareholder rights (see models [2] and [4] in Table 7) and ii) 
without the governance measure Board structure (see models [1] and [3] in Table 7). 
Models [1] and [2] show the results for the SPREAD and models [3] and [4] for the 
YIELD as independent variable. The results show that the main hypothesis is still 
confirmed. The coefficients for Disclosure and the interaction term Disclosure x 
Shareholder rights are significant, have the expected sign and are comparable with the 
coefficients presented in Tables 5 and 6.60 
All significant coefficients for the included control variables have their expected 
signs. Bond issues with a longer maturity have a higher cost of debt, as well as 
subordinate bonds. Convertibles have a lower cost. The coefficient for the subordinate 
dummy is 0.547 for SPREAD model [1] in Table 5 and 0.707 for YIELD model [1] in 
Table 6. The spread and yield for convertibles are respectively 2.608% and 2.810% 
lower compared with non convertible bonds. The coefficients for firm characteristics 
leverage, firm size and risk have the expected sign and are highly significant. Market 
characteristic government yield is significant in the yield model.61  
In general, the estimated coefficients on Disclosure and the interaction term 
between Disclosure and Shareholder rights support our ‘disclose or share rights’ 
hypothesis that a lower quality of shareholder rights increases the importance of the 
quality of disclosure for the bondholders.  
 
 
                                                 
60 If we include additional dummies for the industries Transportation, Tobacco, Metal producers, 
Machinery and equipment, Construction and Beverages and a country dummy for UK, the main 
hypothesis is still confirmed, although the significance level then is 10% (on a two sided basis). 
61 The magnitude of the coefficients of the significant control variables are comparable to those 
reported in Sengupta (1998). For instance, Sengupta reports for his YIELD model 0.434 for the 
subordinate dummy, and -2.450 for the convertible dummy. 
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Table 7. Alternative specifications SPREAD and YIELD model 
Models [1] and [3] present the results for the SPREAD and YIELD models respectively where board 
structure is excluded from the model. Models [2] and [4] show the results for the SPREAD and YIELD 
models respectively where the additional interaction term board structure x shareholder rights is 
included. OLS regression is used with White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Standard 
errors are presented between parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 Expected     
Variables sign [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Corporate governance      
Shareholder rights - -0.248* -0.243* -0.256* -0.252* 
  (0.128) (0.131) (0.131) (0.135) 
Takeover defences ? -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.003 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Board structure -  0.142  0.086 
   (0.229)  (0.236) 
Board structure x Shareholder rights +  -0.020  -0.010 
   (0.034)  (0.035) 
Disclosure - -0.276** -0.385** -0.281** -0.347* 
  (0.131) (0.178) (0.133) (0.181) 
Disclosure x Shareholder rights + 0.042** 0.057** 0.043** 0.051* 
  (0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.029) 
      
      
Issue characteristics      
LNSIZE - 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.008 
  (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) 
LNMATUR + 0.361*** 0.357*** 0.442*** 0.439*** 
  (0.115) (0.116) (0.128) (0.129) 
CALL + -0.245 -0.245 -0.271 -0.273 
  (0.249) (0.250) (0.269) (0.270) 
CONV - -2.607*** -2.613*** -2.809*** -2.812*** 
  (0.257) (0.258) (0.291) (0.292) 
SUBORD + 0.553** 0.537** 0.715*** 0.701*** 
  (0.253) (0.256) (0.265) (0.267) 
Firm characteristics      
DE + 0.508*** 0.511*** 0.535*** 0.541*** 
  (0.113) (0.115) (0.117) (0.118) 
MARGIN - -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
TIMES - 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
LNASSETS - -0.181*** -0.184*** -0.205*** -0.206*** 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.050) 
STDRETN + 0.521*** 0.527*** 0.520*** 0.527*** 
  (0.094) (0.092) (0.100) (0.098) 
Market characteristics      
Treasury +   0.815*** 0.817*** 
    (0.087) (0.087) 
BC + 0.354 0.351 0.268 0.266 
  (0.269) (0.268) (0.263) (0.263) 
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Table 7 (Continued)      
Year dummies  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
2001  4.126*** 4.187*** 5.582*** 5.560*** 
  (1.501) (1.480) (1.580) (1.555) 
2002  4.263*** 4.326*** 5.656*** 5.639*** 
  (1.481) (1.461) (1.566) (1.543) 
2003  4.269*** 4.329*** 5.488*** 5.471*** 
  (1.482) (1.454) (1.548) (1.517) 
2004  4.230*** 4.297*** 5.502*** 5.489*** 
  (1.473) (1.447) (1.547) (1.516) 
2005  4.587*** 4.656*** 5.742*** 5.730*** 
  (1.482) (1.456) (1.545) (1.516) 
      
Adjusted R²  0.522 0.520 0.690 0.688 
Sample Size  319 319 319 319 
 
2.6. Summary 
We document a significant negative relation between the corporate governance 
measure Disclosure and the cost of debt, but only if Shareholder rights are low. This 
finding is new and confirms our ‘share rights or disclose’ hypothesis, which states that 
the higher the quality of shareholder rights are, the lower are the agency conflicts 
between management and the providers of capital (following the ‘management 
disciplining’ hypothesis), with a lower level of ‘information risk’ and need for 
disclosure as a result. Information risk is lower then, because i) shareholders will 
prevent managers to make decisions that will shift firm’s distribution of future cash 
flows downward and ii) shareholders can make corrective actions afterwards, if 
needed. On the other hand, if shareholder rights are low, and information risk is high, 
then providers of debt reward firms with a lower cost of debt if these firms give them 
more insight in their financial situation and governance structure i.e., if their quality 
of disclosure is high. Alternatively, if shareholder rights are low and the quality of 
disclosure is low, then the firm is as a black box and the perceived risk by the 
bondholders is relatively high. We do not present evidence in support of any relation 
between Takeover defences nor Board and the cost of debt.  
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Appendix A. Data sources and codes 
 
Table A1 shows an overview of all the variables and their corresponding source and 
code. The extra description provides extra codes if those codes were necessary for the 
acquiring of the particular variable. 
 
 
Table A.1 Sources and Codes 
 
Variable Source Code Extra description 
Yield Bloomberg   
COGO rating Deminor Ratings Deminor Ratings  
Shareholder rights Deminor Ratings DEM1  
Takeover defences Deminor Ratings DEM2  
Disclosure Deminor Ratings DEM3  
Board structure Deminor Ratings DEM4  
Size Bloomberg   
Maturity Bloomberg   
Call Bloomberg   
Convert Bloomberg   
Subord Bloomberg   
Long-term debt Thomson financials TF.TotalLTDebt  
Market value equity Bloomberg MKT_VAL_OF_EQY  
Total assets Thomson financials TF.TotalAssets  
Margin Worldscope WS.NetMargin  
Times Worldscope WS.FixedChargeCoverageRatio  
STDRETN Bloomberg STDRETN HR (for Historical Returns) 
TREASURY Ecowin   
Yield US Aaa Bloomberg MOODCAAA  
Exchange rates Bloomberg CRNCY WCV (for currency codes) 
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Appendix B. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Table B.1 Summary statistics 
This table provides summary statistics of the test variables of 319 bond issues over the period 2001-
2005. The variables are defined as follows: YIELD is the yield to maturity at issue date; SPREAD is 
the difference between YIELD and TREASURY; LNSIZE is natural log of the size of the issued bonds 
in euros; LNMATURITY is the natural log of number of years to maturity of the issued bonds; CALL 
= 1 if the debt is callable, 0 otherwise; CONVERT = 1 if the debt is convertible, 0 otherwise; SUBORD 
= 1 if the debt is subordinate, 0 otherwise; D/E is the book value of long term interest bearing debt at 
the end of year t divided by the market value of common stock at the end of year t; MARGIN the sum 
of net income before extraordinary items and equity income of year t divided by net sales in year t; 
TIMES the sum of net income before interest and tax expense of year t divided by interest expense in 
year t; LNASSET is the natural log of book value of total assets at the end of year t in euros; 
STDRETN is the standard deviation of the daily stock return in year t corrected for dividends and stock 
splits; TREASURY is the yield (on the bond issue date) of government bonds in the same currency and 
with approximately the same maturity as the issued bond; BC is the yield (on the date of the company’s 
bond issue) on Moody’s Aaa-bonds minus the yield on U.S. government bonds with the longest 
maturity (also on the date of issue); Shareholder rights, Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board are 
Deminor’s corporate governance scores for the four categories; Governance total is the sum of the four 
governance scores. 
 
Variables Mean Standard Median 25% 75%
  deviation   
YIELD 4.88 1.41 4.93 4.08 5.78
SPREAD 0.78 1.09 0.78 0.45 1.25
LNSIZE 19.84 1.08 20.03 19.52 20.44
LNMATURITY 2.02 0.47 1.95 1.61 2.30
CALL 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
CONVERT 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
SUBORD 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
D/E 0.47 0.44 0.34 0.14 0.64
MARGIN 5.18 9.62 5.36 2.25 8.82
TIMES 4.82 6.43 3.93 2.47 6.74
LNASSET 23.76 1.03 23.71 23.04 24.47
STDRETN 2.33 0.92 2.20 1.73 2.71
TREASURY 4.10 0.79 4.14 3.44 4.77
BC 0.94 0.42 0.69 0.59 1.16
Shareholder rights 6.35 1.36 6.66 5.31 7.39
Takeover defences 4.12 3.74 4.00 0.00 8.00
Disclosure 6.13 1.54 6.44 5.06 7.41
Board 5.07 1.55 5.38 3.75 6.45
Governance total 21.68 6.32 20.84 16.57 27.46
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Chapter 3 
Optimal capital structure: 
reflections on economic and other values62 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm there still is a big gap 
between theory and practice. Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani and 
Miller, much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital structure from the 
shareholders’ point of view. Over the last few decades studies have been produced on 
the effect of other stakeholders’ interests on capital structure. Well-known examples 
are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the 
company. Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation 
between managerial incentives and capital structure. Furthermore, the issue of 
corporate control and, related, the issue of corporate governance, receive a lion’s 
part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions. From all 
these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather, the 
management of the capital structure over time) has to deal with more issues than the 
maximization of the firm’s market value alone. In this chapter, we give an overview of 
the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. 
We show that capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria decision 
problems which can then benefit from multiple criteria decision support tools that are 
widely available. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Despite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm (see Harris and Raviv, 
1991, and Copeland et al., 2005, for overviews) there still is a big gap between theory 
and practice (see e.g. Cools, 1993, Tempelaar, 1991, Boot and Cools, 1997, Graham 
and Harvey, 2001, Brav et al., 2005). Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani 
                                                 
62 This chapter is based on Schauten and Spronk (2006) and is presented at the XXXIX’th meeting of 
the EURO Working Group on Financial Modelling, CERAM, Antibes, France, November 2006. We 
thank J.O. Soares of the Technical University in Lisbon for his useful suggestions. 
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and Miller (1958, 1963), much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital 
structure from the shareholders’ point of view. 
Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other 
stakeholders’ interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of 
customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company (see e.g. 
Grinblatt and Titman, 2002). Another area that has received considerable attention is 
the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, 
the issue of corporate control63 (see Jensen and Ruback, 1983) and, related, the issue 
of corporate governance64 (see Shleifer and Vishney, 1997), receive a lion’s part of 
the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions. 
From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather, 
the management of the capital structure over time) involves more issues than the 
maximization of the firm’s market value alone. In this chapter, we give an overview 
of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. 
We make a distinction between two broadly defined situations. The first is the 
traditional case of the firm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares 
for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization 
enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the 
goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the firm that explicitly chooses 
for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the 
shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different 
ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating finance literature. 
An example of the latter is the co-operation, a legal entity which can be found, in 
                                                 
63 Corporate Control is defined by Jensen and Ruback (1983) as the rights to determine the 
management of corporate resources - that is, the rights to hire, fire and set the compensation of top-
level managers. 
64 According to Shleifer and Vishney (1997) corporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. A broader 
definition is given by the OECD: ‘Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations 
are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures fro making decisions on 
corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are 
set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance.’ 
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among others, many European countries. For a discussion on why firms are facing 
multiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk (2002a, 2002b).  
In Section 2 we will describe objectives and considerations that, directly or 
indirectly, clearly help to create and maintain a capital structure which is ‘optimal’ for 
the value maximizing firm. In Section 3 we describe other objectives and 
considerations. Some of these may have a clear negative effect on economic value, 
others may be neutral and in some cases the effect on economic value is not always 
completely clear. Section 4 shows how, for both cases, capital structure decisions can 
be framed as multiple criteria decision problems which can then benefit from multiple 
criteria decision support tools. Section 5 gives a brief summary. 
 
3.2. Maximizing shareholder value 
According to the neoclassical view on the role of the firm, the firm has one single 
objective: maximization of shareholder value. Shareholders possess the property 
rights of the firm and are thus entitled to decide what the firm should aim for. Since 
shareholders only have one objective in mind—wealth maximization—the goal of the 
firm is maximization of the firm’s contribution to the financial wealth of its 
shareholders. The firm can accomplish this by investing in projects with a positive net 
present value.65 Part of shareholder value is determined by the corporate financing 
decision.66 Two theories about the capital structure of the firm—the trade-off theory 
and the pecking order theory—assume shareholder wealth maximization as the one 
and only corporate objective. We will discuss both theories including several market 
value related extensions. Based on this discussion we formulate a list of criteria that is 
relevant for the corporate financing decision in this essentially neoclassical view.  
The original proposition I of Miller and Modigliani (1958) states that in a perfect 
capital market the equilibrium market value of a firm is independent of its capital 
structure, i.e. the debt-equity ratio.67 If proposition I does not hold then arbitrage will 
                                                 
65 This view is seen as an ideal by many; see for example Jensen (2001). 
66 Financial decisions that influence the value of the firm are the capital budgeting decision and the 
corporate financing decision. In this chapter we focus on the corporate financing decision made by the 
firm.  
67 As Miller and Modigliani (1958) formulate their proposition I in a perfect capital market: ‘The 
market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and is given by capitalizing its expected 
return (i.e. cash flows) at the ρk (i.e. capitalization rate) appropriate to its class.’ With as a result of the 
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take place. Investors will buy shares of the undervalued firm and sell shares of the 
overvalued firm in such a way that identical income streams are obtained. As 
investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of the overvalued shares will 
fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equal. 
When corporate taxes are introduced, proposition I changes dramatically. Miller 
and Modigliani (1958, 1963) show that in a world with corporate tax the value of 
firms is among others a function of leverage. When interest payments become tax 
deductible and payments to shareholders are not, the capital structure that maximizes 
firm value involves a hundred percent debt financing. By increasing leverage, the 
payments to the government are reduced with a higher cash flow for the providers of 
capital as a result. The difference between the present value of the taxes paid by an 
unlevered firm (Gu) and an identical levered firm (Gl) is the present value of tax 
shields (PVTS). Figure 1 depicts the total value of an unlevered and a levered firm. 
The higher leverage, the lower Gl, the higher Gu - Gl (= PVTS). 68 
 
Figure 1. Pre-tax value of the firm 
This figure presents the expanded balance sheet of the unlevered and the levered firm with on the left 
hand side the pre-tax value of the firm and on the right hand side the present value of the tax payments 
to the government by the unlevered firm (Gu) and the levered firm (Gl), the market value of equity of 
the unlevered firm (Eu) and the levered firm (El) and the market value of debt of the levered firm (D). 
 
           Balance sheet of the unlevered firm
           Balance sheet of the levered firm
Total value (TV )
PV residual claim equityholders (E l )
Debt (D )
Pre-tax firm value
Total value (TV )
PV government's claim (G u )
PV residual claim equityholders (E u )
Total value (TV ) Total value (TV )
Pre-tax firm value PV government's claim (G l )
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
former ‘That is, the average cost of capital to any firm is completely independent of its capital structure 
and is equal to the capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of its class.’ (Miller and Modigliani, 1958, 
p.268-269.) 
68 See Chapter 5 for a derivation of the cost of tax for the government. Figure 1 in this chapter is an 
exact copy of Figure 1 in Chapter 5. 
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In the traditional trade-off models of optimal capital structure it is assumed that 
firms balance the marginal present value of interest tax shields69 against the marginal 
direct costs of financial distress or direct bankruptcy costs.70 Additional factors can be 
included in this trade-off framework. Other costs than direct costs of financial distress 
are agency costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Often cited examples of agency 
costs of debt are the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977)71, the asset substitution 
problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Galai and Masulis, 1976), the ‘play for 
time’ game by managers, the ‘unexpected increase of leverage (combined with an 
equivalent pay out to stockholders to make to increase the impact)’, the ‘refusal to 
contribute equity capital’ and the ‘cash in and run’ game (Brealey et al., 2006). These 
problems are caused by the difference of interest between equity and debt holders and 
could be seen as part of the indirect costs of financial distress. Another benefit of 
debt—besides the PVTS—is the reduction of agency costs between managers and 
external holders of equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Jensen, 1986, 1989). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that debt, by allowing larger managerial residual 
claims because the need for external equity is reduced by the use of debt, increases 
managerial effort to work. In addition, Jensen (1986) argues that high leverage 
reduces free cash (flow) with less resources to waste on unprofitable investments as a 
result.72 The agency costs between management and external equity are often left out 
                                                 
69 Miller (1977) argued that under certain conditions, the corporate tax advantage of debt may be offset 
by tax disadvantages at the personal level, making leverage from a tax shield perspective irrelevant. 
70 Direct bankruptcy costs are the costs of the use of the legal mechanism allowing creditors to take 
over a firm when it defaults (Brealey et al., 2006). Direct bankruptcy costs consist of administrative 
costs and legal fees. Robicheck and Myers (1966) and Baxter (1967) suggest that the cost associated 
with bankruptcy might represent the missing element in the theory of Miller and Modigliani. However, 
Miller and Modigliani (1958) already remark that reorganization involves costs and might have 
unfavorable effects on earnings prospects, with a discount on the value of heavily indebted companies 
as a result, see Ibid. footnote 18. 
71 The underinvestment problem is sometimes referred to as the debt overhang problem (Grinblatt and 
Titman, 2002, p.563). 
72 Jensen predicts a positive relation between leverage and profitability if the market for corporate 
control is effective and forces firms to commit to paying out cash by levering up. However, if this 
market is ineffective, i.e. managers prefer to avoid the disciplining role of debt, a negative relation 
between profitability and leverage could be expected (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The free cash flow 
theory of Jensen could then be presented as separate theory that assists the trade-off theory in 
78
 68
the trade-off theory since it assumes managers not acting on behalf of the shareholders 
(only) which is an assumption of the traditional trade-off theory. 
In Myers’ (1984) and Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order model there is no 
optimal capital structure.73 Instead, because of asymmetric information and signaling 
problems associated with external financing, firm’s financing policies follow a 
hierarchy, with a preference for internal over external finance, and for debt over 
equity.74 A strict interpretation of this model suggests that firms do not aim at a target 
debt ratio. Instead, the debt ratio is just the cumulative result of hierarchical financing 
over time. (See Shyum-Sunder and Myers, 1999.) Original examples of signaling 
models are the models of Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977). Ross (1977) 
suggests that higher financial leverage can be used by managers to signal an 
optimistic future for the firm and that these signals cannot be mimicked by 
unsuccessful firms.75 Leland and Pyle (1977) focus on owners instead of managers. 
They assume that entrepreneurs have better information on the expected cash flows 
than outsiders have. The inside information held by an entrepreneur can be transferred 
to suppliers of capital because it is in the owner’s interest to invest a greater fraction 
of his wealth in successful projects. Thus the owner’s willingness to invest in his own 
projects can serve as a signal of project quality. The value of the firm increases with 
the percentage of equity held by the entrepreneur relative to the percentage he would 
have held in case of a lower quality project. (See Copeland et al., 2005.) 
                                                                                                                                            
explaining why managers do not fully exploit the tax advantages of borrowing (as suggested by Myers, 
2001, p.99). 
73 In 1984, the pecking order story was not new. Donaldson (1971, 1984) for example observed pecking 
order behavior in case studies. However, the pecking order until then was viewed as managerial 
behavior - possibly to avoid the discipline of capital markets.  
74 The pecking order theory assumes that managers know more about their companies’ prospects, risks 
and values than do outside investors. 
75 Such unsuccessful firms do not have sufficient cash flow. This concept is easily applied to dividend 
policy as well. A firm that increases dividend payout is signalling that it has expected future cash flows 
that are sufficiently large to meet debt payments and dividend payments without increasing the 
probability of bankruptcy. (See Copeland et al., 2005.) Miller and Rock (1985) develop a financial 
signalling model founded on the concept of ‘net dividends’. An unexpected increase in dividends will 
increase shareholders’ wealth and an unexpected issue of new equity or debt will be indebted as bad 
news about the future prospects of the firm. 
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The stakeholder theory formulated by Grinblatt and Titman (2002) suggests that 
the way in which a firm and its non-financial stakeholders interact is an important 
determinant of the firm’s optimal capital structure. Non-financial stakeholders are 
those parties other than the debt and equity holders.76 Non-financial stakeholders 
include firm’s customers, employees, suppliers and the overall community in which 
the firm operates. These stakeholders can be hurt by a firm’s financial difficulties. For 
example customers may receive inferior products that are difficult to service, 
suppliers may lose business, employees may lose jobs and the economy can be 
disrupted. Because of the costs they potentially bear in the event of a firm’s financial 
distress, non-financial stakeholders will be less interested ceteris paribus in doing 
business with a firm having a high(er) potential for financial difficulties. This 
understandable reluctance to do business with a distressed firm creates a cost that can 
deter a firm from undertaking excessive debt financing even when lenders are willing 
to provide it on favorable terms (Ibid., p.598). These considerations by non-financial 
stakeholders are the cause of their importance as determinant for the capital structure. 
This stakeholder theory could be seen as part of the trade-off theory (see Brealey et 
al., 2006, p.481, although the term ‘stakeholder theory’ is not mentioned) since these 
stakeholders influence the indirect costs of financial distress.77  
As the trade-off theory (excluding agency costs between managers and 
shareholders) and the pecking order theory, the stakeholder theory of Grinblatt and 
Titman (2002) assumes shareholder wealth maximization as the single corporate 
objective.78 
Based on these theories, a huge number of empirical studies have been produced. 
See e.g. Harris and Raviv (1991) for a systematic overview of this literature.79 More 
                                                 
76 The stakeholder theory is probably inspired by, among others, Baxter (1967) and Kim (1978) who 
discuss indirect costs of financial distress. 
77 The stakeholder theory could also explain observed pecking order behaviour in the market. See 
Grinblatt and Titman, 2002, p. 613. 
78 In the Modigliani and Miller world, where agency problems are absent, maximizing the value of the 
firm is identical to maximizing shareholder’s wealth. When agency problems exist there are ways to 
increase shareholder wealth at the expense of other stakeholders. (See e.g., Cools, 1993, p.261.) 
79 Harris and Raviv divide the evidence into four categories: i) evidence of general capital structure 
trends; ii) event studies that measure the impact on share prices of an announcement of a capital 
structure change, iii) studies that relate firm/industry characteristics to capital structure, iv) studies that 
measure the relationship between capital structure and factors associated with corporate control.  
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recent studies are e.g. Shyum-Sunder and Myers (1999), testing the trade-off theory 
against the pecking order theory, Kemsley and Nissim (2002) estimating the present 
value of tax shields, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) estimating the costs of financial 
distress and Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigating the determinants of capital 
structure in the G-7 countries. Rajan and Zingales (1995)80 explain differences in 
leverage of individual firms with firm characteristics. In their study leverage is a 
function of tangibility of assets, market-to-book ratio, firm size and profitability.81 
Barclay and Smith (1995) provide an empirical examination of the determinants of 
corporate debt maturity. Graham and Harvey (2001) survey 392 CFOs about among 
others capital structure. We come back to this Graham and Harvey study in Section 
3.82  
 
Cross sectional studies as by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Wald (1999) model capital structure mainly in terms of 
leverage and then leverage as a function of different firm (and market) characteristics 
as suggested by capital structure theory.83 We do the opposite. We do not analyse the 
effect of several firm characteristics on capital structure (c.q. leverage), but we 
analyse the effect of capital structure on variables that co-determine shareholder 
value. In several decisions, including capital structure decisions, these variables may 
get the role of decision criteria. Criteria which are related to the trade-off and pecking 
order theory are listed in Table 1. We will discuss these criteria using a simplified 
example in Section 4. Figure 2 illustrates the basic idea of our approach. 
                                                 
80 Examples of other cross sectional studies before 1991 are: Bradley et al. (1984), Long and Malitz 
(1985) and Titman and Wessels (1988). 
81 See Lemmon et al. (2006) for empirical evidence against the explanatory power of determinants of 
capital structure such as size, market-to-book, profitability, and industry. 
82 For European firms Brounen et al. (2004) did a similar survey as Graham and Harvey did for U.S. 
firms.  
83 In cross-sectional research, capital structure theories are tested by analyzing the relation between 
leverage (as endogenous variable) and some firm (and or country/institutional) characteristics (as 
exogenous variables). For example the static trade-off theory predicts that firms with a high 
profitability have higher leverage. A positive cross-sectional relation between the determinant 
profitability and leverage will be analysed. Proxies are used to measure leverage on the one hand and 
profitability on the other. If proxies are perfect indicators for the determinants then econometric tests 
reveal whether a relation between the variables exists. See e.g. Cools (1993). 
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Figure 2. Example of the basic idea of assumed relations within the neoclassical view 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that shareholder value is related to the present value of tax shields 
and agency costs (both listed in Table 1 as determinants of shareholder value). The 
financing decision or ‘capital structure choice’ now is an instrument that influences 
the value of these determinants. For example, the higher the leverage, the higher the 
present value of the tax shield. However, besides the financing decision, ‘other 
instruments’ could have an influence (reflected with dotted arrows in Figure 2) on the 
value of these determinants as well. For example the decision to acquire assets that 
could be written of fast, influences the tax benefits of the interest deductibility. Of 
course, the financing decision influences the agency costs as well. For example, it 
could be argued that the agency costs between equity and debt increase with leverage. 
However, the tangibility of assets influences these agency costs as well. If a firm 
decides to invest in tangible assets this could have a negative impact on the magnitude 
of these agency costs. Put differently, agency costs are not minimized using one 
instrument only. Instead, a multiplicity of instruments is involved. 
The financing problem—even in a neoclassical context—is complex, because i) 
relevant ‘value determinants’ are not influenced by capital structure only and ii) most 
if not all of these determinants cannot be translated into clearly quantifiable costs or 
benefits, even if we neglect the possible effect of other instruments on the selected 
determinants. 
 
Agency costs equity-debt Agency costs equity-management 
Shareholder value
Capital structure
Present value tax shield 
Other instrument Other instrument 
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Table 1. Multiple Criteria or determinants of Capital Structure 
 
Category # Multiple Criteria References 
1 Tax shield 
- corporate level 
- personal level 
 
Miller & Modigliani (1958, 1963) 
Miller (1977) 
2a Direct costs of financial distress Miller & Modigliani (1958) 
2b Agency costs equity-debt 
- underinvestment  
- asset substitution (risk shifting) 
 
 
- refusing to contribute equity capital 
- cash in and run 
- playing for time 
- bait and switch 
 
Myers (1977) 
Jensen & Meckling (1976), 
Galai & Masulis (1976), 
Brealey et al. (2006) 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
2c 
 
Non-financial stakeholders 
- customers 
- employees 
- suppliers 
- community 
 
Grinblatt & Titman (2002) 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
3 Agency costs equity-management 
- residual claim 
- reduction free cash flow (overinvestment); 
  corporate control shareholders, 
  corporate governance 
 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
Jensen (1986) 
Jensen & Ruback (1983) 
Shleifer & Vishney (1997) 
4 Following hierarchy and 
flexibility (real options) 
Myers (1984), 
Myers & Mailuf (1984) 
5 Signaling Ross (1977), 
Leland & Pyle (1977) 
Ec
on
om
ic
 v
al
ue
s 
6 Subsidy Galai (1998) 
 
3.3. Other objectives and considerations  
A lot of evidence suggests that managers act not only in the interest of the 
shareholders (see Myers, 2001). Neither the static trade-off theory nor the pecking 
order theory can fully explain differences in capital structure. Myers (2001, p.82) 
states that ‘Yet even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our 
understanding of these firms financing choices is limited.’84 Results of several surveys 
(see Cools 1993, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Brounen et al., 2004) reveal that CFOs 
do not pay a lot of attention to variables relevant in these shareholder wealth 
maximizing theories. Given the results of empirical research, this does not come as a 
surprise.  
                                                 
84 These firms are public, non-financial corporations with access to U.S. or international capital 
markets. 
83
 73
The survey by Graham and Harvey finds only moderate evidence for the trade-off 
theory. Around 70% have a flexible target or a somewhat tight target or range. Only 
10% have a strict target ratio. Around 20% of the firms declare not to have an optimal 
or target debt-equity ratio at all.  
In general, the corporate tax advantage seems only moderately important in capital 
structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is most important for large regulated 
and dividend paying firms. Further, favorable foreign tax treatment relative to the 
U.S. is fairly important in issuing foreign debt decisions.85 Little evidence is found 
that personal taxes influence the capital structure.86 In general potential costs of 
financial distress seem not very important although credit ratings are. According to 
Graham and Harvey this last finding could be viewed as an (indirect) indication of 
concern with distress. Earnings volatility also seems to be a determinant of leverage, 
which is consistent with the prediction that firms reduce leverage when the probability 
of bankruptcy is high. Firms do not declare directly that (the present value of the 
expected) costs of financial distress are an important determinant of capital structure, 
although indirect evidence seems to exist. Graham and Harvey find little evidence that 
firms discipline managers by increasing leverage. Graham and Harvey (2001, p.227) 
explicitly note that ‘1) managers might be unwilling to admit to using debt in this 
manner, or 2) perhaps a low rating on this question reflects an unwillingness of firms 
to adopt Jensen’s solution more than a weakness in Jensen’s argument.’ 
The most important issue affecting corporate debt decisions is management’s 
desire for financial flexibility (excess cash or preservation of debt capacity). 
Furthermore, managers are reluctant to issue common stock when they perceive the 
market is undervalued (most CFOs think their shares are undervalued). Because 
asymmetric information variables have no power to predict the issue of new debt or 
equity, Harvey and Graham conclude that the pecking order model is not the true 
model of the security choice.87 
                                                 
85 According to Graham and Harvey the most popular reason to issue foreign debt is that it provides a 
natural hedge against foreign currency devaluation. 
86 Graham (2000) argues that companies do not make full use of interest rate tax shields. 
87 For European firms Brounen et al. (2004, p.99) find moderate support for the static trade-off theory. 
The results of the pecking order theory, the desire for financial flexibility and pecking order behavior 
are important considerations but as Graham and Harvey (2001) conclude, asymmetric information is 
not the driving force behind this behavior. 
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The fact that neoclassical models do not (fully) explain financial behavior could be 
explained in several ways. First, it could be that managers do strive for creating 
shareholder value but at the same time also pay attention to variables other than the 
variables listed in Table 1. Variables of which managers think, that they are 
(justifiably or not) relevant for creating shareholder value. Second, it could be that 
managers do not (only) serve the interest of the shareholders but of other stakeholders 
as well.88 As a result, managers integrate variables that are relevant for them and or 
other stakeholders in the process of managing the firm’s capital structure. The impact 
of these variables on the financing decision is not per definition negative for 
shareholder value. For example if ‘value of financial rewards for managers’ is one of 
the goals that is maximized by managers—which may not be excluded—and if the 
rewards of managers consists of a large fraction of call options, managers could 
decide to increase leverage (in combination with the repurchase of shares) to lever the 
volatility of the shares with an increase in the value of the options as a result. The 
increase of leverage could have a positive effect on shareholder wealth (e.g. the 
agency costs between equity and management could be lower) but the criterion ‘value 
of financial rewards’ could (but does not have to) be leading. Third, shareholders 
themselves do possibly have other goals than shareholder wealth creation alone. 
Fourth, managers rely on certain (different) rules of thumb or heuristics that do not 
harm shareholder value but can not be explained by neoclassical models either.89 
Fifth, the neoclassical models are not complete or not tested correctly (see e.g. 
Shyum-Sunder and Myers, 1999). 
Either way, we do expect that variables other than those founded in the 
neoclassical property rights view are or should be included explicitly in the financing 
decision framework. To determine which variables should be included we probably 
need other views or theories of the firm than the neoclassical alone. Zingales (2000) 
                                                 
88 Block (2005) finds that on average 56% of his surveyed CFOs of Fortune 1,000 companies has 
stockholder wealth maximization as predominant goal. This percentage is much lower than 100% but 
higher than the results of Petty et al. (1975) and Stanley and Block (1984) where this percentage was 
only 11% (of their sample of Fortune 500 Companies) and 21% (of their sample of Fortune 1,000 
companies) respectively. 
89 Miller (1977, p.272) states that …‘harmful heuristics, like harmful mutations in nature die out. 
Neutral mutations that serve no function, but do no harm, can persist indefinitely.’ Miller (1977, p.273) 
further argues that a pool of neutral mutations could be of value when the environment changes. 
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argues that ‘…corporate finance theory, empirical research, practical implications, 
and policy recommendations are deeply rooted in an underlying theory of the firm.’ 
(Ibid., p.1623.) Examples of attempts of new theories are ‘the stakeholder theory of 
the firm’ (see e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995), ‘the enlightened stakeholder theory’ 
as a response (see Jensen, 2001), ‘the organizational theory’ (see Myers, 1993, 2000, 
2001) and ‘the stakeholder equity model’ (see Soppe, 2006). 
 
We introduce an organizational balance sheet which is based on the organizational 
theory of Myers (1993). The intention is to offer a framework to enhance a discussion 
about criteria that could be relevant for the different stakeholders of the firm. In 
Myers’ organizational theory employees (including managers) are included as 
stakeholders; we integrate other stakeholders as suppliers, customers and the 
community as well. Figure 3 presents the adjusted organizational balance sheet.  
 
Figure 3. Adjusted organizational balance sheet in market values 
 
                           Balance sheet of the levered firm
Pre-tax value existing assets (PTA) PV residual claims equityholders (E)
Pre-tax value growth opportunities (PVGO) Debt (D)
Employees' Surplus (ES)
Other stakeholders' Surplus (OTS)
PV government claims (Gl)
Pre-tax value (PTV) Pre-tax value (PTV)  
 
Note that pre-tax value of the existing assets and the growth opportunities is the 
value of the firm including the present value of all stakeholders’ surplus. The present 
value of the stakeholders’ surplus (ES plus OTS) is the present value of future costs of 
perks, overstaffing, above market prices for inputs (including above market wages), 
above market services provided to customers and the community etc.90 Depending on 
the theory of the firm, the pre-tax value can be distributed among the different 
stakeholders following certain ‘rules’. Note that what we call ‘surplus’ in this 
framework is still based on the ‘property rights’ principle of the firm. Second, only 
                                                 
90 To a certain extent - as long as debt is not risk free - the firm can expropriate wealth from the debt 
holders which would result in a broader definition.  
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distributions in market values are reflected in this balance sheet. Neutral mutations are 
not.91 
Based on the results of Graham and Harvey (2001) and common sense we 
formulate a list of criteria or heuristics that could be integrated into the financing 
decision framework. Some criteria lead to neutral mutations others do not. We call 
these criteria ‘quasi non-economic criteria’; non-economic because the criteria are not 
based on the neoclassical view. Quasi, because the relations with economic value are 
not always clear cut. We include criteria that lead to neutral mutations as well, 
because managers might have good reasons that we overlook or are relevant for other 
reasons than financial wealth. 
The broadest decision framework we propose in this chapter is the one that 
includes both the economic and quasi non-economic variables. Figure 4 illustrates the 
idea. The additional quasi non-economic variables are listed in Table 2. This list is far 
from complete. Relevant variables to be included depend on i) the theory of the firm, 
ii) characteristics of the particular firm/industry/country and iii) judgment and the 
preferences of the manager(s). 
 
Figure 4. Example of basic idea of possible relations 
 
Agency costs equity-debt Agency costs equity-management
Shareholder value
Capital structure
Present value tax shield
Other instrument Other instrument
Flexibility Financial reward
 
 
Financial flexibility (excess cash), the first variable in Table 2 is valued by 
managers because it increases their independence from the capital market. Managers 
may invest more often in projects that do not create shareholder value when they have 
excess cash or unused debt capacity. For this reason financial flexibility could be 
relevant for at least employees and the suppliers of resources needed for these 
projects. As long as managers only would invest in zero net present value projects this 
variable would have no value effect in the organizational balance sheet. But if it 
                                                 
91 Myers (1984) defines - after Miller (1977) - neutral mutations as financing patterns or habits which 
have no material effect on firm value and makes managers feel better. 
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influences the value of the sum of the projects undertaken this will be reflected in this 
balance sheet. Of course, financial flexibility is also valued for economic reasons, see 
Section 2 and 4. 
The probability of bankruptcy influences job security for employees and the 
duration of a ‘profitable’ relationship with the firm for suppliers, customers and 
possibly the community. For managers (and other stakeholders without diversified 
portfolios) the probability of default could be important. The cost of bankruptcy is for 
them possibly much higher than for shareholders with diversified portfolios. As with 
financial flexibility, the probability of default influences shareholder value as well. In 
Section 2 and 4 we discuss this variable in relation to shareholder value. Here the 
variable is relevant, because it has an effect on the wealth or other ‘valued’ variables 
of stakeholders other than the equity (and debt) holders. 
We assume owner-managers dislike sharing control of their firms with others. For 
that reason, debt financing could possibly have non-economic advantages for these 
managers. After all, common stock carries voting rights while debt does not. Owner-
managers might prefer debt over new equity to keep control over the firm. Control is 
relevant in the economic framework as well, see Section 2 and 4. 
In practice, earnings dilution is an important variable effecting the financing 
decision.92 Whether it is a neutral mutations variable or not, the effect of the financing 
decision on the earnings per share is often of some importance.93 If a reduction in the 
earnings per share (EPS) is considered to be a bad signal, managers try to prevent 
such a reduction. Thus the effect on EPS becomes an economic variable. As long as it 
is a neutral mutation variable, or if it is relevant for other reasons, we treat EPS as a 
quasi non-economic variable. 
The reward package could be relevant for employees. If the financing decision 
influences the value of this package this variable will be one of the relevant criteria 
for the manager. If it is possible to increase the value of this package, the influence on 
shareholder value is ceteris paribus negative. If the reward package motivates the 
                                                 
92 E.g., Block (2005) finds that on average 28% of his surveyed CFOs of Fortune 1,000 companies have 
‘growth in earnings per share’ defined as predominant goal of the firm, and Brav et al. (2005) state that 
three-fourth of their survey respondents (financial executives) indicate that increasing earnings per 
share is an important factor affecting their share repurchase decision.  
93 In perfect capital markets earnings dilution does not influence the value of equity. This is often 
misunderstood, see Brealey et al. (2006), Chapter 32. 
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manager to create extra shareholder value compared with the situation without the 
package, this would possibly more than offset this negative financing effect. 
Other criteria that might be relevant are maturity matching, because of liquidity 
reasons, and the influence of the capital structure on the credit rating of debt. 
 
Table 2. Multiple Criteria of Capital Structure 
 
Category # Multiple Criteria 
1 Flexibility (self sufficiency) 
2 Job security 
3 Control 
4 Earnings dilution 
5 Financial reward Q
ua
si
 n
on
-
ec
on
om
ic
 v
al
ue
s 
6 Maturity matching, Credit rating etc. 
 
3.4. Capital structure as multiple criteria decision problem 
Ideally, capital structure decisions are embedded in a capital structure management 
process, with 1) periodic planned evaluations (e.g. around reporting dates and 
connected with dividend decisions), 2) events or anticipated events concerning the 
assets of the company (large investments, mergers and acquisitions, unexpected 
results) or 3) concerning the liabilities side (changing financial market circumstances, 
new products offered by the financial industry, refinancing loans etc.). Given the 
multiplicity of considerations, the large variety of choices and the presence of many 
contingent claims, both real and financial, make many capital structure decisions unfit 
for being framed as an optimization problem. In such cases, it does make sense to 
solicit a variety of solutions by advisors, banks and other providers of capital, which 
can then be compared in terms of their impact on the criteria considered to be 
important for the firm concerned.  
The factors considered to be important are determined by firm, industry, 
environmental, country or institutional characteristics. For example, profitability, risk, 
tangibility of assets, size, growth opportunities of the firm, the competition within and 
concentration of the industry, the legal system and corporate governance regulations 
are all more or less important in the selection and weighting of the appropriate 
criteria. 
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As an example of capital structure as a multiple criteria decision problem, consider 
the 100% equity financed firm ‘OCS’. In the coming year OCS has to make an 
investment and financing decision.94 Let: 
x = new investment in millions of euros; 
y = new issue of debt, in millions of euros; 
z = new issue of equity, in millions of euros. 
Assume the investment generates a perpetual free cash flow of €1 million. Assume for 
simplicity there are only two financing solutions: 100% debt (plan 1) and 100% equity 
financing (plan 2). OCS is a listed firm. Managers own 10% of total equity. Assume 
the unlevered cost of capital is 10% and x is € 10 million. The corporate tax rate is 
30%. Taxes on a personal level are 0%. OCS has to decide whether she goes ahead 
with the project and if so, whether y = € 10 million or z = € 10 million. To support the 
financing decision OCS evaluates both financing solutions on the criteria listed in 
Table 1 and Table 2. If possible, the influence of the financing plans on the criteria is 
measured in euros. If this is not possible, we only make a qualitative statement. The 
scores on the economic and quasi non-economic criteria are given in Table 3. In this 
example we choose to score the quasi non-economic variables from the perspective of 
the manager.95 The economic variables are scored from the perspective of the 
shareholders.  
Tax shield. The main advantage of debt financing is the reduction of the present 
value of the government’s claim. In general, the higher the proportion interest bearing 
debt, the higher the PVTS. However, the level of non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo and 
Masulis, 1980) and, among others a low level and high variability of earnings could 
have a negative impact on the PVTS of additional debt. If we assume the profits are 
high enough to realize the tax shields then the tax shield score on the corporate level 
of plan 1 is corporate tax rate times the amount of debt, i.e. 0.3 * € 10 million = € 3 
million.96 If on the personal level income tax for received interests is higher than for 
equity income, the advantage on the corporate level could be offset by the 
disadvantage on the personal level. For now, we assume there are no personal taxes. 
This implies there is no difference on the criterion ‘Tax shield on a personal level’. 
                                                 
94 The example is based on Myers and Pogue (1974). 
95 It is possible to score the criteria from the perspective of other stakeholders as well. 
96 We assume that the additional amount of debt is fixed and the assets of the project serve as collateral. 
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Table 3. Example scores simplified example ‘OCS’ 
 
Category # Multiple Criteria Scores plan 1 and 2 
  
Plan 1 Plan 2 Preference for plan 
1 Tax shield 
- corporate level 
- personal level 
 
€ 3 million 
€ 0 
 
€ 0 
€ 0 
 
1 
- 
2a Direct costs financial 
distress ' & 2 
2b Agency costs equity-debt ' & 2 
2c Non-financial stakeholders
- customers 
- employees 
- suppliers 
- community 
 
' 
' 
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& 
& 
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- 
 
2 
2 
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- 
3 Agency costs equity-
management 
- residual claim  
- free cash flow  
- control 
 
 
& 
& 
' 
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1 
2 
4 Following hierarchy 
Flexibility 
& 
' 
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& 
1 
2 
5 Signaling & ' 1 
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6 Subsidy - - - 
 Multiple Criteria Scores plan 1 and 2 
  Plan 1 Plan 2 Preference for plan 
1 Flexibility ' & 2 
2 Job security ' & 2 
3 Control & ' 1 
4 Earnings dilution & ' 1 Pa
ne
l B
: Q
ua
si
 n
on
-
ec
on
om
ic
 v
al
ue
s 
5 Financial reward & ' 1 
 
Direct costs of financial distress or the direct bankruptcy costs are the costs of the 
legal mechanism that allows creditors taking over the assets of a firm when a firm 
defaults (see Brealey et al., 2006). If a firm increases leverage, it increases the 
probability of default and the present value of the direct costs of bankruptcy. Lenders 
foresee these costs and foresee that they will pay them if default occurs. Therefore 
lenders will charge a higher interest rate which reduces both equity cash flows and 
equity value as a result. If we assume that the risk of the assets in place of OCS is low, 
and the size of the investment is small relative to the expected free cash flow, the 
expected probability of default is low. The impact of plan 1 on the direct costs of 
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financial distress then is limited. Of course, plan 2 scores better on this criterion than 
plan 1.  
Agency costs equity-debt. If OCS is not in financial distress, the probability that 
OCS will play games with the debt holders is small. But if the FCFs are unexpectedly 
low, it could be that managers on behalf of the existing shareholders try to expropriate 
wealth from the debt holders. Therefore the agency costs equity-debt are low but 
positive. Of course the agency costs equity-debt are zero if the investment is financed 
with an issue of shares. 
Non-financial stakeholders. If stakeholders foresee that—because of a higher 
leverage—the probability of default exceeds acceptable levels, stakeholders could e.g. 
charge higher prices or buy less products. If the products need a lot of services the 
value of the assets in place and the value of the new project could be reduced by using 
an excessive amount of debt. If OCS chooses plan 1 we assume customers will buy 
less products and employees will charge higher wages. We assume that neither 
suppliers nor the community is impacted by the financing decision.  
Agency costs equity-management. Under plan 1 the residual claim managers hold 
remains the same. That means that the price of shirking for the managers remains the 
same as well. Under plan 2 this price decreases, which means the agency costs caused 
by a reduction in the residual claim for the managers increases. Under plan 1 free cash 
flows (FCFs) are reduced because of the promised interest payments. Under plan 2 
these FCFs are not reduced. This means that plan 1 scores better on both criteria; 
residual claim and free cash flow. Given the stake managers have, under plan 1 they 
could prevent harder possible bidders to take-over the firm. If plan 2 is chosen the 
stake of the managers dilutes and -we assume- the power of the market for corporate 
control increases. Plan 2 scores better than plan 1 on the criterion control. The 
governance structure of the firm, e.g. the way the firm rewards their managers 
influences the importance of the FCF problem.  
Following hierarchy / flexibility. If debt is issued instead of equity the negative 
impact of mispricing caused by information asymmetry is reduced. However, plan 1 
also has a possible negative effect: plan 1 reduces the FCFs, which may negatively 
influence the future flexibility of the firm. Financial flexibility (excess cash or the 
preservation of debt capacity) is valued positively because it prevents firms from not 
investing in positive net present value projects. For example if the net present value of 
a new project is 1.5 million and the firm has—because of a lack of excess cash, i.e. a 
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lack of financial flexibility—to issue shares to collect 10 million but are really worth 
12 million, the firm will not pursue. It only goes ahead if the net present value of the 
project is at least 2 million. (See Myers, 1984, p.584.) The score for plan 1 is 
relatively good for the aspect hierarchy and bad for expected flexibility. 
Signaling. Given information asymmetry it could be argued that if managers have 
the incentive to always issue the correct signal (that is to tell the truth) an issue of debt 
could be interpreted as a positive signal about future cash flows (Ross, 1977). The 
score for plan 1 then is better than the score for plan 2.  
Subsidy. There is no subsidy. 
 
The first quasi non-economic variable flexibility is reduced if managers select plan 1. 
As under panel A FCF is reduced if debt is issued. If the new project generates 
positive FCFs then expected flexibility will increase due to an accumulation of free 
cash. 
Job security increases inversely with the probability of default. If the new project 
contributes to stability of the firm’s cash flows the new project could increase job 
security. 
We assume that the managers do not like their stake to dilute. Managers prefer plan 
1. This is also in accordance with the control score in Panel A of Table 3 where we 
assume that external shareholders prefer plan 2.97 
Earnings dilution is higher if new shares are issued. If managers prefer higher 
earnings per share, plan 1 is favored by managers. Expected earnings increase due to 
the profitability of the new project, while the number of shares remains the same. 
If the financial reward exists—besides the equity stake—of call options, plan 1 
again is best. It increases the volatility of equity with a relative positive effect on call 
options as a result. If plan 2 is implemented the volatility remains the same.98 
The next step is that the manager evaluates the relative scores on all the criteria and 
gives his/her own weighting factors to the relevant criteria and then decides which 
                                                 
97 Management could prefer Plan 2 if for instance the power of certain active monitoring shareholders 
is reduced by a placement of new shares to minority shareholders. 
98 We assume the volatility of the assets remains the same. 
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plan is optimal.99 If the perceived value of all the side effects under the favored plan is 
positive the manager will go ahead with this project.100 This simplified ‘numerical’ 
example shows how complex capital structure problems can be. Even, if we only take 
the economic criteria into account. 
 
3.5.  Summary 
The capital structure decision (or rather, the management of the capital structure over 
time) is never a goal on its own, but should be instrumental to the goal of the firm. In 
the traditional case of the firm that strives for the maximization of the value of the 
shares for the current shareholders, all choices concerning the capital structure should 
be evaluated in terms of their effect on the firm’s market value. No wonder that so 
much research effort is devoted to the value effects of capital structure decisions. The 
capital structure decision is often pictured as an optimization problem in which a 
value function including all costs and benefits is to be maximized, possibly subject to 
some hard constraints. 
We have shown that the management of the firm’s capital structure is not that easy 
at all. The reason is that a number of considerations that enter the capital structure 
decision and have value implications, cannot be translated into clearly quantifiable 
costs or benefits that can be entered into the value function or be transformed into 
hard constraints. Examples discussed include agency costs between equity holders and 
management (including corporate control and corporate governance), costs of 
financial distress, benefits and costs for other financial stakeholders, flexibility and 
even the tax shield. Still these considerations cannot be ignored in the capital structure 
decision and its economic value implications. Therefore, we propose to translate some 
of these considerations as separate criteria, which can be traded off against the hard 
and quantifiable criterion of market value. 
Many firms exist that explicitly choose for more objectives than value 
maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple 
stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual 
corporate structure dominating finance literature. An example of the latter is the co-
                                                 
99 MCDA methods that allow the incorporation of quantitative and qualitative criteria could support 
this decision problem. See Zopounidis (1999) for arguments that could justify the use of MCDA 
methods in investment decisions and portfolio management decisions. 
100 We assume the present value without side effects equals €1 million / 0.1 = €10 million. 
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operation, a legal entity which can be found in, among others, many European 
countries. So in addition to the criteria that capture the value implications of capital 
structure decisions, this kind of firms may have other criteria as well. An example is 
bankruptcy risk and its implications for various stakeholders. 
Ideally, capital structure decisions are embedded in a capital structure management 
process, with 1) periodic planned evaluations (e.g. around reporting dates and 
connected with dividend decisions), 2) events or anticipated events concerning the 
assets of the company (large investments, mergers and acquisitions, unexpected 
results) or 3) concerning the liabilities side (changing financial market circumstances, 
new products offered by the financial industry, refinancing loans). Given the 
multiplicity of considerations, the large variety of choices (e.g. all the specifications 
that can be connected with a loan or with a leasing contract) and the presence of many 
contingent claims, both real and financial, makes many capital structure decisions 
unfit for being framed as an optimization problem. In such cases, it does make sense 
to solicit a variety of solutions by banks and advisors, which can then be compared in 
terms of their impact on the criteria considered to be important for the firm concerned. 
The definition of the criteria and the study of the impact of the decision alternatives 
on these criteria is thus a sine qua non for financial structure decisions. 
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Chapter 4 
Optimal capital structure decision in a multi-criteria framework; 
solutions for an M&A case as proposed by practicing financial experts101 
 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we analyse financing solutions as proposed by two consultants, one 
full service banker and one investment banker, for a merger and acquisition problem. 
We asked each specialist to construct three financing proposals: the first would focus 
on the interests of current shareholders; the second would center on the interests of 
management; and the third would examine how the specialist should advise the 
management of the bidder. We compare the resulting proposals using criteria 
described in Chapter 3, along with additional criteria mentioned by the specialists. 
We find that: i) the solutions differ between specialists; ii) the solutions and criteria 
applied by the specialists depend on the stakeholder (shareholders versus 
management) that the solution is tailored for; and iii) some economic criteria do not 
appear to be as relevant as suggested by theory. 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
In Chapter 3 we formulate the capital structure decision within a multi-criteria 
framework. We make a distinction between capital structure decisions from the 
neoclassical perspective, where the ultimate goal is maximizing shareholder value, 
and a perspective in which other objectives and considerations are also relevant. 
Capital structure decisions influence shareholder value via various determinants or 
criteria, such as the present value of tax shields, and agency costs. We call these 
criteria ‘economic criteria’.102 Capital structure decisions influence other criteria that 
might be relevant for certain stakeholders as well. Examples include managerial 
flexibility and financial reward for management. We call these criteria ‘quasi non-
                                                 
101 This chapter is based on Schauten and Spronk (2007) and is presented at the European Conference 
on Operational Research in Prague, July 2007. 
102 Economic criteria are criteria based on the neoclassical view and are relevant for the shareholder 
who aims for the maximization of shareholder wealth. 
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economic criteria’.103 As shown in the preceding chapter, Figure 1 depicts possible 
relations between the capital structure and these criteria; on the left-hand side are 
criteria that influence shareholder value, and on the right-hand side are criteria that 
might be relevant for other reasons.104 
 
Figure 1. Example of possible relations 
 
Agency costs equity-debt Agency costs equity-management
Shareholder value
Capital structure
Present value tax shield
Other instrument Other instrument
Flexibility Financial reward
 
 
What becomes clear is that the issue of financing is a complex, multi-criteria 
problem, where capital structure is not a goal in itself, but an instrument to achieve 
certain outcomes and/or to influence certain criteria values. As concluded in Chapter 
3, the multiplicity of considerations and the large variety of choices (e.g., all the 
specifications that can be connected with a loan or with a leasing contract) makes the 
capital structure decision unfit for consideration as an optimization problem. Rather, it 
makes sense to solicit a variety of solutions from finance specialists that can be 
compared on criteria considered to be important. 
In this chapter, we analyse various financing solutions generated by specialists for 
a merger and acquisition (M&A) financing problem. We sent out an M&A case study 
to two consultants, two ‘full service’ bankers, and one investment banker and 
processed the answers of four of them. We are interested in i) the financing solutions 
provided by the respondents for the bidding firm’s financing problem, in order to 
compare them on selected criteria, ii) the criteria that specialists use in the evaluation 
of their solutions, in order to compare them with the criteria from Chapter 3, and iii) 
whether specialists acknowledge conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
management. We asked the specialists to draw up i) a financing proposal focused on 
                                                 
103 Quasi non-economic criteria are criteria which might be relevant for the management. Quasi non-
economic criteria are called non-economic, because the criteria are not based on the neoclassical view. 
Quasi, because the relations with economic value are not always clear cut. 
104 Figure 1 in this chapter is an exact copy of Figure 4 in Chapter 3, inserted here to easify the reading 
of this chapter. 
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the interests of the current shareholders of the bidder, ii) a financing proposal focused 
on the interests of the management of the bidder, and iii) a financing proposal such as 
would be recommended by the specialist to the management of the bidder.105 
We find that i) solutions differ among specialists, ii) the differences between the 
specialists’ preferred proposals are less than between the proposals for shareholders 
and management, respectively, iii) the criteria and solutions depend on the stakeholder 
the solution is made for (i.e., conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
management are acknowledged), iv) some economic criteria from the neoclassical 
view do not seem as relevant as would be suggested by theory, and v) the solutions 
can be compared using qualitative criteria only. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the M&A case in 
more detail. We introduce the bidder and the target firm, as well as the financing 
problem. In Section 3, we present all questions posed to the specialists and the 
expected solutions for this financing problem in general terms. These expected 
solutions are based primarily on Faccio and Masulis (2005), who study the M&A 
payment choices of European bidders for publicly and privately held targets. In 
Section 4 we present and explain the solutions offered by the various specialists, 
including their most important insights. In Section 5, we compare the criteria used by 
the specialists with the ‘economic’ criteria (relevant to shareholders who strive for 
wealth maximization) and the ‘quasi non-economic criteria’ (relevant to managers) 
from Chapter 3. As we will see, most of these criteria are explicitly or implicitly used 
by specialists, although some economic criteria from the neoclassical view do not 
seem as relevant as what would be suggested from theory. Further, we discuss 
additional criteria that the specialists consider relevant for shareholders. The 
specialists did not mention any additional criteria relevant to management. In Section 
6, the ultimate proposals are evaluated from the perspectives of shareholders and of 
management. Section 7 summarizes our main findings and conclusions. 
 
                                                 
105 We do not send out a questionnaire to CFOs as in Graham and Harvey (2001), Bancel and Mittoo 
(2004), Brounen et al. (2004, 2006), and De Jong and Van Dijk (2007) to determine which criteria or 
determinants are relevant in capital structure decisions in practice. Instead, we consult several finance 
specialists (non-CFOs) and present this question indirectly via an M&A case. 
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4.2. Case Vita: the bidder, the target, and the financing problem 
This section gives a summary of the case. Case Vita—as it was sent to the 
specialists—is included in Appendix A. Vita (the bidder) is considering the 
acquisition of all the shares of competitor Duplo (the target) for €300 million. The 
business of both (virtual) firms is selling food to consumers via supermarkets. 
 Vita is a listed company with 400 supermarkets and total revenues of €1,613 
million in the last fiscal year. Vita achieved an EBITDA of €93.5 million and had 
4,100 FTE employed. All Vita stores are located in ‘the green valley’. Vita 
differentiates itself from competitors by offering high quality fruit and vegetables at 
relatively low prices. In this market, low autonomous growth is realized mainly by 
elbowing out specialty stores that do not distinguish themselves from supermarkets 
with respect to their product offering and customer service. Substantial growth in this 
slow-growing market can be achieved only by taking over competitors. That is what 
Vita did successfully in the past—it acquired Shop & Carry, a chain with 190 
supermarkets, five years ago— and Vita is now seeking additional acquisition targets. 
Duplo is a player with 350 stores that essentially does not compete with Vita, 
because of the geographical location of Duplo’s stores. As a result of Duplo’s poor 
market positioning, it is experiencing a decrease in total revenues and relatively small 
margins. Within 2 years post-acquisition, nearly all Duplo stores will be repositioned 
as Vita stores. The investment required amounts to approximately €150,000 per store, 
a total of €52.5 million (350 x €150,000). The acquisition will increase Vita’s buying 
power and will improve the company’s ability to take advantage of economies of 
scale. See Appendix A for more details about the expected financial performance of 
Vita and Duplo as separate firms and Duplo as part of Vita (including synergies). 
The management team of Duplo consists of its two founders, the Bakker brothers. 
Post-acquisition, they will leave the company as they have reached retirement age. 
The Bakker brothers each own 50% of Duplo’s shares. 
Vita’s management is led by De Wit Jr., one of the sons of Jan de Wit, who 
founded Vita in the 1960s. De Wit Jr. (age 40) succeeded his father as CEO in 2001 
and is successfully leading the company. Apart from De Wit Jr., the management 
team consists of De Bruin (age 48) and Van Ginkel (age 52). De Bruin is the CFO of 
Vita; Van Ginkel is the marketing manager. Each of De Bruin and Van Ginkel own a 
2.5% interest in Vita. Each of De Wit Jr. and De Wit Sr. own a 20% interest in Vita. 
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All other shares are owned by third parties, of which one institutional investor holds a 
10% interest. 
The financing problem consists of €300 million for the acquisition of the shares 
from the Bakker family, and €52.5 million for the repositioning of the 350 Duplo 
stores. The required investment of €52.5 million will be financed through internally 
generated cash flow. The €300 million for the acquisition must be financed externally, 
although a fraction could be paid from excess cash (approximately €15 million). The 
De Wit family agreed upon the price of €300 million, but did not yet decide how to 
finance the acquisition. 
 
4.3. Questions posed to the specialists and expected solutions 
All the specialists (the respondents) work in actual companies: a consultancy firm, an 
investment bank, and a full service bank. These institutions are all well known in The 
Netherlands. For reasons of confidentiality, neither the names of the institutions nor 
the names of the specialists will be reported. To explain the purpose of the case study, 
the specialists were engaged in initial contact by telephone. After their commitment to 
participate in our research, we sent to them the (virtual) case by mail (electronic and a 
hard copy). We enclosed an answer sheet. After receiving the responses we 
interviewed the specialists in their office or by phone. The goal of this ‘focused 
interview’ (see Yin, 2003) was to prevent misunderstandings in the interpretation of 
their solutions. 
The case included the following questions (see section PROBLEM in Appendix 
A). 
We requested the following: 
1)  a financing proposal focused on the interests of the current shareholders (of Vita), 
excluding management; 
2)  a financing proposal focused on the interests of management (of Vita); 
3)  a financing proposal as you would advise it to the management of Vita. 
We requested that specialists point out the possible consequences of their proposals 
on the interests of a) the shareholders (excluding management), b) management, and 
c) other stakeholders. Implicitly, we asked them to apply a single or multi-criteria 
framework to each of the stakeholders. For each question, we expected to receive 
differing solutions. First, this is because the specialists involved might have different 
views on what is good and bad for the various stakeholders. Second, it is possible that 
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each specialist’s proposal is the solution that they have the most experience with, and 
experiences do differ. Third, conflicts of interest might influence the content of the 
proposal.106 As a result of conflicts of interest between shareholders and management, 
we expect different answers from each specialist on each question as well. We 
received responses from four specialists. Unfortunately, one full service banker was 
not able to deliver his responses due to unforeseen circumstances. 
We formulate some general expected solutions for questions 1 and 2 of the case 
(i.e. the first two requests explained above). These expected solutions are based 
primarily on Faccio and Masulis (2005), who study the M&A payment choices of 13 
European bidders (excluding The Netherlands) for publicly and privately held 
targets.107 We follow the reasoning spelled out in their hypotheses and empirical 
findings. 
Corporate Control. From the perspective of the De Wit family, Vita should be 
reluctant to use public stock financing, because this financing method reduces family 
control. According to Faccio and Masulis (2005), a bidder with diffuse or highly 
concentrated ownership, is less likely to be concerned with corporate control issues. 
Since the De Wit family owns 40% of Vita, we expect them to prefer cash financing 
over equity financing.108 An issue of new shares by Vita directly to the shareholders 
of the bidder—instead of to the public—is even more unlikely, because the target is 
held entirely by the Bakker family (and the relative deal size is high).109 The Bakker 
                                                 
106 See e.g. Loonen (2006) for a study in the Investment Consultancy Industry. Loonen (2006) finds 
that investment consultants do not give advice which is best for their private clients but which is best 
for the firm they work for. 
107 The sample of Faccio and Masulis (2005) include acquisitions announced over the years between 
January 1997 and December 2000 by listed bidders from Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and U.K.. 
108 Dutch bidders with a fraction of closely held shares that lies between 20% and 60% are more likely 
to use cash-financing because of loss of control as a result of stock-financing during 1996-2005 period. 
(See Swieringa and Schauten, 2007.) 
109 The relative deal size is computed by Faccio and Masulis (2005) as the ratio of offer size (excluding 
assumed liabilities) to the sum of a bidder’s equity pre-offer capitalization plus the offer size. If we 
assume a WACC for Vita of 8% then the pre-offer capitalization is €342 million and the relative deal 
size for Vita 47% (= 300 / (342 + 300)). This is high compared to 10% (mean) and 4% (median) in 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) for 11 Continental European countries excluding The Netherlands during 
1997-2000 period. Swieringa and Schauten (2007) report for The Netherlands during 1996-2005 period 
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family would then be a new block holder in the combined firm, with the possible risk 
to the De Wit family of losing control as a result. So, we expect that the De Wit 
family prefers financing with debt as much as possible, with the remainder financed 
by equity issued to the public. 
From the perspective of the outside shareholders, the creation of a new large block 
holder in the combined firm could prove advantageous, since it could reduce agency 
costs between management and outside equity. Outside shareholders, including 
institutional investors, will probably prefer an equity issue directly to the Bakker 
family over a payment in cash. In ‘case vita’, we do not provide information about the 
preferred payment method of the Bakker family. However, it could be expected that 
the Bakker family prefers cash because the Bakker brothers will retire after 
completion of the deal. 
Collateral, Financial Leverage and Debt Capacity. Faccio and Masulis (2005) use 
the fraction of fixed tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) as the primary 
measure of a bidder’s ability to pay cash, financed from additional borrowings. Vita’s 
Collateral is 69% (323/471). This is high compared to 27% (mean) and 23% (median) 
in Faccio and Masulis (2005) and 32% (mean) and 27% (median) in Swieringa and 
Schauten (2007). Given the high collateral of Vita, a payment in cash (financed with 
debt) can be expected. Financial leverage is, according to Faccio and Masulis (2005), 
the sum of a bidder’s face value of the debt plus the deal value (including assumed 
liabilities), divided by the sum of the book value of the total assets at year-end prior to 
the bid, plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities). Financial leverage for Vita 
is 69% (= (210 debt Vita + 300 bid eq. + 78 debt Duplo) / (471 Vita + 300 bid eq. + 
78 debt Duplo)). This ratio captures the bidder’s post-deal leverage under the 
assumption that the transaction is completely debt financed (Faccio and Masulis 
(2005)).110 Financial leverage for Vita is high compared to the 32% (mean) and 31% 
                                                                                                                                            
an average relative deal size of 11% and a median of 5%. A relative deal size of 47% for Vita in 
combination with 100% closely held shares by Duplo implies a control loss of 47% which again is high 
compared to Faccio and Masulis’ results of 7% (mean) and 2% (median) for their Continental 
European countries and high compared to Swieringa and Schautens’ mean of 8% (mean) and 3% 
(median) for The Netherlands. 
110 The pre-deal bidder leverage used by Martin (1996) adjusted for an industry mean is not significant 
related with method of payment. That is the reason why FM use the ‘as if 100% debt financing’ post 
deal leverage. 
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(median) in Faccio and Masulis (2005) and the 36% (mean) and 34% (median) in 
Swieringa and Schauten (2007). Given this outcome, an issue of equity is the most 
obvious conclusion. Faccio and Masulis (2005) further use cross holdings with banks 
and interlocking directorships as proxy for accessibility of debt financing. There are 
no cross holdings of stock between Vita and banks, and there are no interlocking 
directorships reported in this case. This means there is no extra mechanism that 
facilitates easier access to debt financing. Asset size of Vita is €471 million at the end 
of the year prior to the bid. This is small compared to the €68,505 million (mean) and 
the €2,467 million (median) in Faccio and Masulis (2005), and the €43,970 million 
(mean) and €1,513 million (median) in Swieringa and Schauten (2007). This would 
make debt financing less attractive because Faccio and Masulis (2005) assume that 
larger firms are more diversified, thus having proportionately lower expected 
bankruptcy costs and lower flotation costs. Vita is relatively small, which in this 
context makes debt less attractive. 
Asymmetric information. The pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) predicts that Vita 
first uses internal funds to finance the acquisition, then external debt, and as last 
resort, external equity. Excess cash, the internal source, stands at around 15 million, 
which is not sufficient to finance the acquisition. From the perspective of the external 
shareholders, Vita should follow the pecking order; i.e., it should issue debt to finance 
the residual amount. However, the market timing theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
states that bidding firms prefer stock offers when they perceive their stock to be 
overvalued, and they prefer cash offers financed with debt when they consider their 
stock undervalued by the market. Information about relative pricing error is not given 
in case Vita; if it were offered, this information could have too severe an impact on 
the financing solutions chosen by the specialists.111 Given the pecking order theory, 
we expect shareholders (including the management of Vita) to prefer debt financing. 
                                                 
111 If the specialists would have informed about market values or returns our response would have been 
that the market is efficient in the semi strong form (which is not often believed by practitioners). Faccio 
and Masulis (2005) use the buy and hold cumulative stock return over the year preceding the M&A 
announcement as proxy for bidder overvaluation. Note: if we assume WACC is 8% then Market to 
book of Vita in the year prior to the bid is (342+210)/(167+210) = 1.5 which is close to 1.9 (mean) and 
1.3 (median) in Faccio and Masulis (2005) but low compared to 3.3 (mean) and 2.0 (median) in 
Swieringa and Schauten (2007).  
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To summarize, from the perspective of the outside shareholders, equity financing 
seems preferable, because it reduces the stake of management in Duplo. On the other 
hand, for shareholders, debt financing would be best according to the pecking order 
theory. From the perspective of management, debt financing is preferred, in order to 
retain as much control as possible. However, a 100% debt financing solution could 
result in a (too) highly levered firm compared with results from Faccio and Masulis 
(2005) and Schauten and Swieringa (2007). 
 
4.4. The proposals 
In this section, we describe the financing proposals in general terms highlighting 
specialists’ most important considerations. Proposal 1 is the best proposal for 
shareholders (excluding the management of Vita), proposal 2 is best for the 
management of Vita, and proposal 3 is the one that specialists would recommend to 
the management of Vita. We discuss the proposals given by two consultants (C1 and 
C2), one investment bank (IB1), and one full service bank (FSB1). Consultant 1’s first 
proposal is referred to as C11, Consultant 1’s second proposal is referred to as C12, 
etc. The proposals are summarized in Table 1. 
Appendix B contains a detailed description of the proposals including all criteria—
as enumerated by the specialists—for each stakeholder. In Section 5, we compare 
these criteria with the ‘economic’ and ‘quasi non-economic criteria’ from Chapter 3. 
Since FSB1’s first answer to our questions was that ‘an optimal capital structure 
does not exist’ and ‘in practice we are not asked to formulate an optimal financing 
solution for a specific stakeholder’, we reformulated the questions for the banker as 
follows: ‘is it possible to finance the acquisition completely with debt?’. The answer 
to this question was positive. FSB1 suggests financing on covenants (‘cash flow 
based’) instead of assets (‘asset based’) because ‘in this market (the market that FSB1 
is in) you only get the deal if you finance this proposition on covenants’. See 
Appendix B for a detailed description of the evaluation report by FSB1. 
Proposal 1. C11 and C21 both contain solutions with 100% debt. IB11 comprises 
50% debt and 50% equity as the optimal solution for shareholders. C11 contains a 
total recapitalization where the operational companies (Opcos) Vita and Duplo issue 
as much debt as possible. This amounts to €450 million, which makes it possible to 
pay a dividend of €150 million to the holding company (Holdco) of both firms. 
Holdco issues €150 million of mezzanine debt (we define mezzanine debt as 
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unsecured debt that represents a claim on a firm’s assets that is senior only to 
shareholders) which, including the dividend from the Opcos totals €300 million. C21 
proposes to create a new corporation (REneco) for the real estate of Duplo. Duplo 
sells the real estate to this highly levered SPV and pays, after a recapitalization, the 
net proceeds as a dividend to Holdco. Vita increases its leverage and pays a dividend 
to Holdco as well. If the solvency of the Opcos as a result of this increase in debt 
declines too much, Holdco will issue mezzanine debt instead. C1 and C2 both argue 
that 100% debt financing is preferred by shareholders since this prevents dilution. 
IB11 contains an issue of €150 million debt and an issue of €150 million equity, 
facilitated by an issue of tradable claims. The issue of claims gives the shareholders 
the right to participate in the issue of new equity and, in this way, prevents dilution. 
According to IB1, the size of the equity issue is limited, which means that for most 
shareholders (except management) it would be possible to exercise all allocated 
rights. The advantage of lower leverage is the lower financial risk profile for the 
shareholders. 
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Proposal 2. C12 and C22 both contain solutions with approximately 50% debt and 
50% equity. According to IB1, 100% debt is best for management. C12 is identical to 
C11 except for the issue of mezzanine debt by Holdco. Instead of an issue of €150 
million mezzanine debt, Holdco issues €150 million ‘cum prefs’ with a fixed dividend 
and no voting rights.112 According to IFRS, cumprefs are registered as debt.113 For 
banks, cumprefs are seen as equity since bank claims are senior. The structure of C22 
is the same as C21. However, the financial solution contains substantially less debt. 
C2 determines the amount of the ‘debt base’ on the expected ‘worst case scenarios’. 
The leverage that will not bring Vita into financial difficulties would be the solution 
proposed. (This reasoning could be compared with the Recession Cash Flow Analysis 
of Donaldson, 1961.) The ‘wild guess estimate’ by C2 is an issue of €150 million 
equity by Holdco. C1 and C2 argue that less debt favors management since it reduces 
management’s pressure to perform. The obligated interest payments give management 
less freedom. IB1 suggests 100% debt is best for management since their stake in the 
firm is not negatively influenced, and the probability that another major shareholder 
will claim (partial) control of the firm is limited. The negative impact on free cash 
flow is notable, but of minor importance. If management can participate pro rata in a 
new issue, an issue with less debt can be considered. 
Proposal 3. C13 is quite similar to C12, and C2 makes no distinction between 
proposals 2 and 3 at all. C2 implicitly states that its ultimate proposal is whatever 
proposal is best for the management. IB13 comprises 33% debt and 67% equity. C13 
contains, in contrast to the €150 million cumprefs in C12, €50 million common 
equity, €50 million cumprefs, and €50 million mezzanine debt. The reason for issuing 
common shares rather than cumprefs is that this lowers the published leverage. The 
issue in using mezzanine debt rather than cumprefs is that debt lowers the tax 
payment, since interest is tax deductible and dividends are not. The issue of equity 
suggested by IB1 is, as in IB11, facilitated by an issue of tradable claims. The amount 
of debt issued is lower than under IB11 and IB12. The advantage of less debt and 
more equity is the creation of an unused debt capacity for new (expansion) investment 
                                                 
112 Cum prefs or cumulative preferred stock is stock that takes priority over common stock in regard to 
dividend payments. Dividends may not be paid on the common stock until all past dividends on the 
preferred stock have been paid. 
113 See De Jong et al. (2006) for the effect of IFRS regulation on the use of cumprefs in The 
Netherlands. 
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programs. IB is convinced that the magnitude of the acquisition justifies a major issue 
of equity. The use of a small amount of debt would decrease the negative pressure of 
the costs of an equity issue on earnings per share. 
In summary, we conclude that i) solutions differ among specialists; ii) differences 
among specialists’ preferred proposals is smaller than between proposals for 
shareholders and management, respectively, and iii) the criteria and solutions depend 
on which stakeholder the solution is made for; i.e., conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and management are acknowledged. 
 
4.5. Comparison of specialists’ criteria with ‘economic’ and ‘quasi non-
economic’ criteria 
In this section, we compare specialists’ criteria with the ‘economic’ and ‘quasi-non- 
economic’ criteria from Chapter 3. The specialists’ proposals we refer to are all 
included in Appendix B (and summarized in Table 1). 
First, we compare the ‘economic’ criteria with those specialist criteria which are, in 
the opinion of specialists, relevant for shareholders. Table 2 shows which economic 
criteria are mentioned by financial specialists C1, C2, IB1 and FSB1 implicitly or 
explicitly (yes) and which are not (no). Variables which are, according to the 
specialists, relevant for shareholders but are not mentioned by us as economic criteria, 
are listed in Table 3. 
Second, we compare the ‘quasi non-economic criteria’ with specialist criteria 
which are, according to the specialists, relevant to the management. Table 4 presents 
those ‘quasi non-economic criteria’ mentioned by the financial specialists implicitly 
or explicitly (yes) and those that are not (no). 
The first criterion mentioned in Table 2 is the tax shield of debt. The positive effect 
of debt on the tax shield of debt is explicitly mentioned by one expert only (C1). The 
effect on personal taxes is ignored by all specialists. 
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Table 2. Economic criteria mentioned by Specialists 
This table shows which economic criteria are mentioned by financial specialists C1, C2, IB1 
and FSB1 implicitly or explicitly (yes) and which are not (no). 
 
Category # Multiple Criteria Mentioned by specialist 
  C1 C2 IB1 FSB1 
1 Tax shield 
- corporate level 
- personal level 
 
yes 
no 
 
no 
no 
 
no 
no 
 
no 
no 
2a Direct costs financial 
distress no no no yes 
2b Agency costs equity-debt 
- games 
- covenants 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
no 
 
yes 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
2c Non-financial 
stakeholders 
- customers 
- employees 
- suppliers 
- community 
 
 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
 
 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
 
 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
 
 
no 
no 
no 
no 
3 Agency costs equity-
management 
- residual claim 
- free cash flow 
- control 
 
 
no 
yes 
no 
 
 
no 
yes 
no 
 
 
no 
yes 
yes 
 
 
no 
no 
no 
4 Following hierarchy 
Flexibility 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
5 Signaling no yes no no 
Ec
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s (
fr
om
 C
ha
pt
er
 3
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) 
6 Subsidy no no no no 
 
Direct costs are not mentioned; higher operational or business risk for the 
shareholder as a result of the acquisition (integration of riskier operations results in a 
higher risk profile of the assets of Vita, see C21) is seen as relevant though. Higher 
financial risk because of higher leverage is also seen as relevant (see Table 3). Direct 
costs of financial distress, however, were not mentioned. We can remark only that 
‘exit scenarios’ (i.e., a sale and a sale and lease back of the stores) are mentioned in 
the report by FSB1 in the event that the firm does not meet its covenants. This could 
refer implicitly to costs to be incurred if financial difficulties occur. 
Agency costs (equity-debt) are mentioned by IB1. IB1 states that by (unexpectedly) 
increasing leverage, the wealth of the existing debt holders could be expropriated 
(IB12). Other examples of agency costs are the negative effects of debt covenants. 
The existence of debt covenants could, for example, prevent firms from investing in 
valuable projects. Covenants that prohibit firms making risky but value-enhancing 
investments are an example of agency costs of equity-debt. Covenants are mentioned 
by almost all specialists (see e.g., C11, IB12 and FSB1). 
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Non-financial stakeholders play an important role; neither customers nor the 
community are mentioned, but employees and suppliers are. The risk for suppliers and 
employees could increase, with a possible positive or negative effect on the market 
value of equity as a result. The value of equity is positively influenced if the value of 
the stakeholder claim(s) decreases. On the other hand, if these stakeholders have the 
right to change their contracts with the firm to their own advantage, the effect on the 
value of equity could be less severe, or even negative. 
Agency costs (equity-management) are mentioned by all specialists but never in 
explicit terms. All specialists claim a positive relation between leverage and 
organizational efficiency and the efficiency of working capital management. They 
implicitly state, the higher the leverage, the lower the free cash flow, and the higher 
the pressure on management to perform. IB1 mentions large shareholders who could 
enter the arena if the manager’s stake dilutes. Managers would not appreciate the 
interference of a major shareholder in the operations of the firm; i.e., managers fear 
loss of control. From the perspective of external shareholders, the monitoring role of a 
large shareholder could benefit the shareholders (i.e., it could improve corporate 
governance/control). Agency costs that result from a reduction in the price of shirking 
(residual claim) as the stake of management decreases is not mentioned by the 
specialists. 
Following hierarchy. Information asymmetry is not mentioned by practitioners as 
an argument favoring debt over equity. It seems that Myers’ arguments for his 
pecking order (see Myers, 1984) are not recognized by practitioners. 
Flexibility. Flexibility was mentioned by all specialists—often as a relevant 
criterion for management (see Table 4)—but recognized as relevant for shareholders 
as well (see e.g., IB13).114 A disadvantage of high leverage is the inherent 
accompanying inflexibility in executing additional positive net present value 
investment programs. Management must enter the capital markets to source funds 
before it can invest. This can lead to underinvestment if the firm is not able to exercise 
                                                 
114 IB13 formulates flexibility as advantage of a low leverage… ‘the advantage of less debt and more 
equity is the creation of an unused debt capacity for new (expansion) investment programs’, see 
Appendix B. 
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real options (if any) in time.115 The existence of covenants could also prevent the firm 
from investing in valuable projects, or it could postpone the timing of investments.116 
Signaling. Only C2 suggested that an issuance of equity can be interpreted as a 
positive signal to the market (see C22). This is in contrast with traditional signaling 
with debt, or the stake management has in the firm. 
Subsidy was not mentioned by the specialists. This is not a surprise since subsidy 
was not included in the Vita case. 
 
Table 3. Additional variables identified by the specialists that are relevant for shareholders. 
This table presents criteria that are mentioned by practitioners but that are not listed among 
the economic criteria in Chapter 3, Table 1. 
 
 Multiple Criteria Mentioned by specialist 
  C1 C2 IB1 FSB1 
1 Dividends yes yes yes yes 
2 Dilution yes yes yes no 
3 Earnings per share no no yes no 
4 Financial risk 
Absolute value lost 
Structures/claims 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes 
5 Cost of debt yes no no no 
6 Credit rating no yes no no A
dd
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7 Liquidity no no yes no 
 
A series of criteria not mentioned in Chapter 3, but relevant for shareholders, 
according to the specialists, are: dividends, dilution, earnings per share, financial risk, 
absolute value lost, structures/claims, cost of debt, credit rating and liquidity (see 
Table 3). 
Dividends are reduced if the obligated payments to debt holders are higher. This is 
seen as a disadvantage by all practitioners. Dividends are restricted because of debt 
covenants or because the generated free cash flow is simply insufficient.117 
                                                 
115 This criterion was called elasticity (offensive criterion) by Diepenhorst (1962). Diepenhorst (1962) 
distinguished further guarantee capital (defensive criterion) and profitability (pricing criterion) as 
criteria for the evaluation of a financing structure. See Smit and Trigeorgis (2004) for a problem 
solving approach that synthesizes ideas from game theory, real options, and strategy. 
116 We do not refer to the underinvestment problem of Myers (1977) here. The underinvestment 
problem of Myers is part of the agency problem between equity and debt. Specialists did not refer to 
this problem. 
117 Theoretically one could argue dividend policy is irrelevant, see Brealey et al. (2008). 
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Dilution is the most important factor mentioned by all specialists. Besides the fact 
that an issue of equity could influence the monitoring and control function exercised 
by existing shareholders (as discussed in Table 2 under Control), such issue also has 
an effect on the earnings per share. It seems that some specialists (IB1) assume 
existing shareholders also do not want their stake to be diluted for this latter reason. 
To prevent dilution, C1 and C2 propose 100% debt financing. IB1 proposes a 
different solution to prevent dilution. IB1 assumes that (external) equity holders do 
not prefer a very highly-leveraged firm because of the higher financial risk, in 
combination with more control by debt holders as a result of strict covenants. For this 
reason, IB11 contains new equity and only a small amount of new debt. To prevent 
dilution resulting from the issuance of equity, the firm gives the equity holders claims 
which give them the right to participate in any new issue of equity; the result of 
exercising these claims is that their stake does not dilute. Further, the financial risk for 
the shareholders remains roughly the same, because the extra use of debt is limited. 
Note that according to IB1, shareholders value a higher earnings per share more than 
the increase in financial risk as a consequence of higher leverage so long as the 
increase is not extreme. IB1 states further that although earnings per share is from a 
theoretical point of view not a good evaluation criterion, in practice, for listed firms, it 
is a leading criterion (as is the ‘net debt/EBITDA ratio’). 
According to C1 and IB1, financial risk increases with leverage. C2 takes an 
alternative view, claiming that the risk to shareholders decreases if debt is used rather 
than new equity, since it limits the total amount of equity invested in the firm. If one 
invests more in equity, the possible loss is higher if the firm encounters financial 
difficulties; if one invests less by using (more) debt, the possible value lost is lower. 
This is a totally different kind of reasoning than Proposition II of Miller and 
Modigliani (1958). Further, legal structures are established and act to reduce the 
downside risk for shareholders and the claims owing to debt holders (see e.g., C21 
and C22). 
Cost of debt is relevant according to C1 (see C11); the lower, the better.118  
The effect on credit rating can affect shareholder value via the investment 
guidelines of institutional investors (see C21). 
                                                 
118 As long as the return is not in accordance with the risk borne by debt holders, this variable 
influences shareholder wealth. 
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Liquidity is positively related to the free float of shares (see IB11 and IB13) and 
benefits shareholders because liquidity is negatively related to the required rate of 
return. 
 
Table 4. Quasi Non-Economic Criteria mentioned by Specialists 
Quasi non-economic criteria mentioned by financial specialists C1, C2 and IB1 implicitly or 
explicitly (yes), and which are not (no). 
 
 Multiple Criteria Mentioned by specialist 
  C1 C2 IB1 FSB1 
1 Flexibility(self sufficiency) yes yes yes no 
2 Job security no yes yes no 
3 Control no no yes no 
4 Earnings dilution / per 
share 
no no yes no 
5 Financial reward no no no no 
6 Maturity matching, yes yes no no Q
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Criteria that might be relevant for managers and that are not directly based on the 
neo-classical view are listed in Table 4 (see Chapter 3, Table 2). 
Flexibility (self sufficiency) or freedom of action. The specialists did not express an 
assumption that managers would invest in self-enriching projects. However, 
advantages of low leverage for the manager were mentioned: higher internal cash 
flow for investment, ‘peace’ in operational activities (C12, C22 and IB12), and lower 
pressure for achieving organizational efficiencies. Flexibility, or freedom of action, is 
valued positively by management, but often negatively by shareholders (see ‘agency 
problem’ between equity and management in Table 2). 
Job security is mentioned by C2 and IB1 and is negatively related to leverage. 
Control. According to IB1, for management, control is an extremely relevant 
factor. Losing control to other major shareholders seems worse than losing control to 
debt holders (see IB12). More control for management could of course result in a 
negative effect on shareholder value if management pursues self-interested projects at 
the expense of shareholders. 
Earnings dilution or earnings per share. According to IB1, earnings per share is 
relevant for management since it is an important factor in communicating with the 
capital markets. 
Financial reward other than income from equity is not mentioned. 
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Maturity matching was mentioned by C1 and C2; it is used in asset-based 
financing solutions.  
Credit rating was mentioned by C2 as a criterion relevant for to shareholders (see 
Table 3), but not to management. We encountered no other criteria we could add to 
the list of quasi non-economic variables. 
 
4.6. Evaluation of specialists’ preferred proposals 
In this section we evaluate the ultimate proposals (four proposals 3) that specialists 
would actually present to the management of Vita. We include the proposal by FSB1 
since it would give a positive response to a request by Vita for a 100%-debt financing 
solution to consummate the acquisition. The solutions will be compared on all criteria 
listed in Tables 2–4. We choose to score the variables listed in Table 2 and Table 3 
from the perspective of the shareholders, and the quasi non-economic variables listed 
in Table 4 from the perspective of the Vita management. We incorporate, to the extent 
possible, the qualifications enumerated by the specialists themselves. If specialists did 
not apply a certain criterion in their evaluation, we made a qualitative statement 
ourselves. The relative scores were, of course, assigned by us. Since it is not possible 
to measure the influence of the financing plans in currency units, as became clear in 
the hypothetical ‘OCS’ example in Chapter 3, we make only qualitative statements. 
The symbol (&) means good, (') means bad, and (&&&&) f  (&&&), (&&&) f  (&&), 
(&&) f  (&), (&) f  (&'), (&') f  ('), (')f  (''), ('')f  ('''), (''')f  
(''''). The qualifications of the ultimate proposals are presented in Table 5. 
The present value of the tax shield of debt (PVTS) is mentioned only by C1 and is 
highest for FSB13, since the amount of debt in FSB13 is highest, at €300 million. The 
amount of debt in C13 (see Table 1) totals €200 million—€150 million of debt in 
Opcos, plus €50 million of mezzanine debt in Holdco. The amount of debt in C23 is 
approximately €150 million, i.e., the sum of the debt in REneco, the Opcos, and if 
applicable, mezzanine debt in Holdco rather than debt in Opcos. The debt in IB13 is 
€100 million. If we assume that PVTS is positively related to the amount of interest-
bearing debt, then the ranking of PVTS is, in decreasing order, FSB13, C13, C23 and 
IB23. 
Direct costs of financial distress were not mentioned by the specialists, although 
FSB1 mentioned ‘exit strategies’, which could refer to costs triggered by a default. If 
we assume that the probability that financial difficulties occur is positively related to 
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leverage, then the negative influence on shareholder value is negatively related to 
leverage. The ranking is the same as for PVTS, although the sign is reversed. 
Agency costs (equity-debt). As stated in Section 5, IB1 mentions the probability of 
wealth expropriation of debt as a result of an unexpected increase in leverage (at event 
date). IB1 and FSB1 both assume (or at least do not mention) that there is neither a 
recapitalization, nor an adjustment of covenants in existing debt contracts. This 
implies the possibility of wealth expropriation. An unexpected increase in debt is an 
unpleasant surprise for existing debt holders and a positive surprise for shareholders 
under IB13 and FSB13. C13 and C23 both assume old debt will be redeemed (i.e., a 
recapitalization is suggested). This implies no wealth transfer from existing debt 
holders to the shareholder under C13 and C23. 
Now we focus on the agency costs placed on the shoulders of the shareholders by 
the new debt holders. New debt holders will try to protect themselves against the 
negative effects of possible manipulation by the shareholders after the acquisition. For 
simplicity, we assume agency costs to be higher i) the higher the leverage after the 
acquisition, and ii) the riskier the loan at issue date since we assume more (restricting) 
covenants if the loan is riskier or not asset based. Agency costs of debt are then 
highest for FSB13, followed by C13. C13 uses more debt than C23 and IB13. Besides 
this higher leverage, €50 million out of the €200 million is mezzanine debt. C23 
contains more debt than IB13; however, a substantial amount of this debt is asset 
based (via REneco), which implies lower agency costs. That is why we assume that 
the agency costs of C23 are equal to the agency costs of IB13. 
Non-financial stakeholders. We assume, as do the specialists, that neither the 
customer nor the community is impacted by the financing proposal; employees and 
suppliers, however, are indeed impacted. The claims these parties hold will (in favor 
of the shareholders) decrease in value with increasing leverage. However if, as a result 
of higher leverage, employees (middle management, etc.) charge higher wages, or 
suppliers adjust their terms of payment, the positive effect on shareholder value is 
reduced or even negatively related to leverage. We assume the total effect is neutral 
for IB13, and negative for the other solutions. 
Agency costs (equity–management). The residual claim managers hold remains the 
same under FSB13, since the entire amount needed for the acquisition is borrowed. In 
other words, under FSB3, the management’s stake does not dilute, resulting in a 
minimal effect on agency costs. If management’s stake becomes diluted, then 
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management’s price of shirking decreases; i.e., agency costs increase. If we assume 
that management has limited resources, dilution increases with the amount of equity 
issued. This implies C13 is the second best proposal, since the issuance of common 
equity is only €50 million. The other €50 million of equity is preferred equity with a 
fixed dividend without voting rights. Since holders of preferred equity do not benefit 
as do holders of common equity from value enhancing projects, they are not hurt as 
holders of common equity if management does not invest in these projects. C23 and 
IB13 comprise most equity. 
Free cash flow (FCF) is negatively related to leverage. All specialists (except 
FSB1) point out the positive effects of low FCF—it increases organizational 
efficiency. 
From a control perspective, external shareholders could benefit from monitoring 
activities by a (new) large shareholder. Under FSB13, this cannot be accomplished. 
The higher the issue of new common equity, the higher is the possible advantage of 
better governance by external shareholders. A claim issue reduces the possible 
appearance of a new large shareholder. This is the reason why we ranked IB13 equal 
to C13. 
Hierarchy. If we follow Myers’ pecking order, FSB13 is the best proposal, 
followed by C13, then by C23 and IB13. 
Flexibility. High leverage with strict covenants limits new financing solutions. 
Firms that expect more profitable projects are hurt most by a multitude of restrictions. 
For simplicity, we assume that the higher the leverage, the lower the positively valued 
flexibility. The issue of €200 million in equity under IB13 is the solution that limits 
future borrowings least. 
Signaling. If Vita issues debt, the market could interpret this as positive news. The 
firm informs the market about an anticipated prosperous future. As a result, share 
prices could rise. We expect this signal to strengthen the more debt the firm uses. The 
fact that the stake of the manager/entrepreneur does not dilute by using debt rather 
than equity further strengthens the signal. Note I: C2 stated that a successful issue of 
equity is a positive signal (see Section 5) which might be a reason to score C23 better 
than we do now. Note II: The issue of equity with tradable claims by IB13 could be 
interpreted as worse than an equity issue without the use of claims. It can be expected 
that the claims are issued, because the probability of a successful issue of common 
shares is otherwise low. With the use of claims, a successful issue may be enforced. 
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The announcement of an issue of claims could have a negative effect on shareholder 
value (this could also be explained by a possible wealth transfer from equity holders 
to old debt holders). 
 
Table 5. Scores proposal 3 
Table 5 shows the scores for the four proposals 3. ‘Yes’ means the criterion was used in the 
evaluation by the specialist, ‘no’ if the criterion was not applied. If ‘yes’, then the 
qualification good/bad is based on an evaluation by the specialist. The relative scores are 
made by us. The symbol (&) means good, (') means bad and (&&&&) f  (&&&), (&&&) f  
(&&), (&&) f  (&), (&) f  (&'), (&') f  ('), (')f  (''), ('')f  ('''), (''')f  
(''''). Scores in Panel A1 and A2 are from the perspective of the shareholders; scores in 
Panel B are from the perspective of the management of Vita. 
 
Category # Multiple Criteria Scores 
  C13 C23 IB13 FSB13 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
 Multiple Criteria Scores 
  C13 C23 IB13 FSB13 
1 Dividends yes 
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Panel A2 of Table 5 contains the scores on the additional variables mentioned by 
the specialists. 
The first variable is dividends. C1, C2 and IB1 indicate that a high level of debt 
might have repercussions for dividends. C1 and C2 value this result as negative for 
the shareholders. Propositions with a lot of debt score low on the criterion dividend 
because of the higher interest payments and redemptions. FSB13 with €300 million 
debt scores definitively the lowest. The other proposals have slight or no significant 
influence on dividend, according to the specialists. 
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Since C13 contains €50 million of common equity without claims, the problem of 
dilution exists but is limited. C23 contains a larger issue of equity, i.e., €150 million. 
This implies a larger dilution problem for C23. IB13 contains €200 million of 
common equity with claims, which could be exercised to prevent dilution. For 
simplicity, we score C23 and IB13 as equal. The 100% debt of FSB1 gives the 
shareholders no dilution problem at all. 
If the return on total assets is higher than the cost of debt, then earnings per share 
is positively related to leverage. That would mean that FSB13 scores highest and IB13 
the lowest. 
The higher the leverage, the higher the fluctuation in the returns of equity; 
financial risk is high when leverage is high. Although IB1 states that the positive 
effect of leverage on earnings per share is of more value than the impact on risk, the 
impact on risk is positive. 
To reduce the claims of debt holders if financial difficulties occur, C1’s (two 
Opcos) and C2’s (two Opcos and one REneco) structures might benefit shareholders 
more than the structure of IB1 and FSB1. We score C23 with REneco highest. As C2 
mentioned, the absolute value lost by the equity holders is negatively related to 
leverage. From that perspective, FSB1 gets the highest score, and IB1 the lowest. 
The cost of debt (marginal cost of debt as a percentage of marginal debt issued) is 
highest for mezzanine debt in Holdco. If we assume the amount of mezzanine debt is 
zero in C23, then the cost of debt score in a negative respect is highest for C13, 
followed by FSB13, C23 and IB13. 
Higher leverage can have a negative impact on the credit rating of debt. A negative 
impact on the credit rating could be interpreted as a negative signal to the capital 
markets. For simplicity, we assume that the higher the total amount borrowed, the 
lower the credit rating of debt. 
Liquidity is positively influenced by the free float of shares. We assume the 
positive effect is highest for IB13, followed by C23, C13 and FSB13. 
 
Panel B of Table 5 contains the variables or heuristics that could be relevant for the 
management of the firm. All variables—except credit rating and financial reward—
were implicitly or explicitly mentioned by at least one specialist (see Table 4). New 
variables were not added to this list. 
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Flexibility (self sufficiency). FCF is rewarded positively by managers. The higher 
the FCF, the less efficient the organization needs to be (in the short run). FCF is 
highest under IB13, because promised payments to debt holders under this alternative 
are lowest. The scores for flexibility for management are opposite to the scores for 
agency costs equity-management (FCF) in Panel A1 of Table 5. 
Job security. If we assume job security within Vita is highest as the probability of 
financial distress is lowest, the same valuation applies as under flexibility. 
Control. Management of Vita are shareholders and they do not wish to see their 
stake diluted and, above all, do not want a large shareholder to interfere with 
management decisions. The valuation of control is scored as in Panel A1, but with 
reversed signs. 
Earnings dilution is already discussed as an item (earnings per share) that might be 
relevant for shareholders. See Panel A2 of Table 5. 
Financial reward. Except for holdings of shares, no other relevant information is 
given in this case. If the reward is linked to earnings per share, then the preference of 
management for proposal FSB1 is clear. Since we did not give information about this 
variable, we cannot assign a ranking to the proposals. 
C1 applied explicitly the maturity matching principle. The maturity of the loan 
with real estate as collateral is 25 years; the maturity for the fixed inventory is only 5 
years. C2 uses real estate as collateral in a separate entity. Other proposals contained 
information about neither the maturity of assets nor of loans. The loans however, can 
be claimed if covenants are violated. We do not evaluate the proposals on this 
criterion. We state only that maturity matching is applied. 
Credit rating is already discussed, as was earnings dilution. See Panel A2 of Table 
5. We assume management does not like a downgrade of the status of their debt. 
 
If we compare the financing proposals by simply summing the numbers of the 
proposals that score highest on the various criteria, we would conclude that the corner 
solutions, i.e., IB13 and FSB13, are the best solutions. FSB13 scores for example 
relatively well in Panel A on tax shield, free cash flow and earnings per share. IB13 
scores highest on the flexibility-, and the job security criterion in panel B. This may 
suggest that IB3 is best from management’s perspective, and that FSB13 is best from 
the shareholder’s perspective. 
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Of course, the outcome of the evaluation of the proposals depends on the criteria 
used, the scores given, and the weighting factors applied. In our evaluation, we made 
simplifying assumptions in order to generate qualifications and comparisons. If we 
made other assumptions, the outcome would probably have differed. 
Given the (soft) qualitative scores on the various criteria, management is able to 
compare the solutions. Management must decide which criteria are most relevant for 
them, and should collect more information (if necessary) to make more precise 
comparisons. Further, it could even be wise to collect additional financing proposals 
before making the ‘final’ financing decision.119 
 
4.7. Summary 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this M&A case. First, the optimal solution for 
shareholders is not, per se, the optimal solution for management. In other words, 
conflicts of interest are acknowledged. 
Second, there is an optimal solution neither for the shareholders nor for the 
management. If there were just one optimal solution, one would expect that each 
specialist would present the same solution for each stakeholder. This is not the case, 
however. 
Third, the relevance of the criteria based on the neoclassical view and summarized 
in Chapter 3 is more or less confirmed by the specialists, although there are notable 
differences. The criterion of a tax shield provided by debt is mentioned as important 
for shareholder value by only one specialist, while this is a major advantage according 
to financial theory. Those criteria that command no or almost no importance include 
taxes on the personal level, direct costs of financial distress, stakeholder customers, 
and the community, the influence of the magnitude of the ‘residual claim’ on agency 
costs between equity and management, and the pecking order (based on information 
a-symmetry). 
Fourth, criteria that are relevant for shareholders according to the specialists, but 
that are not mentioned in our list with criteria based on the neoclassical view are: 
                                                 
119 We received a solution from another investment banker (IB2), who was later informed about case 
Vita. We did not include IB2’s solutions, since the solutions were made after the start of the credit-
crisis and the others were not. The solution by this investment banker deviates from the proposals 
discussed and is as such interesting to analyse. The solution is available at 
http://people.few.eur.nl/schauten/Solution_Case_Vita_IB%202.pdf. 
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dividends, dilution, earnings per share, financial risk, structures/claims, absolute value 
lost, cost of debt, credit rating and liquidity. 
Fifth, some criteria such as job security are relevant for management, but not 
directly for the shareholders. Other criteria such as flexibility and control are relevant 
for both stakeholders, but are evaluated with opposite signs. 
Sixth, the financing proposals can be evaluated in qualitative terms. Since it is not 
possible to define the financing problem as an optimization problem, the collection of 
financing proposals and their comparison on relevant criteria seems (at minimum) a 
satisfying solution for an M&A financing problem. 
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Appendix A. Case ‘Super-Vita’ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Super-Vita (Vita) is a listed company with approximately 400 supermarkets and total 
revenues of €1,613 million in the last fiscal year. Vita achieved an EBITDA of €93.5 
million and had 4,100 FTE employed. All Vita stores are located in ‘the green valley’. 
Vita differentiates itself from competitors by offering high quality fruit and vegetables 
at relatively low prices. 
Vita is considering acquisition of the shares of an average-size chain for €300 
million. This acquisition will further increase the buying power of Vita and will 
improve the company’s ability to utilize economies of scale. The increased buying 
power will most likely lead to lower purchase prices. The economies of scale mainly 
pertain to the use of the distribution center and the marketing department. The 
acquisition candidate, company Duplo, is a player with stores that hardly compete 
with Vita, because of their geographical location. As a result of poor market 
positioning, company Duplo is dealing with a decrease in total revenues and relatively 
small margins. Furthermore, Duplo is struggling with management problems because 
of the unexpected departures of both the marketing manager and the financial director. 
 
MARKET 
The food market is characterized by low growth and heavy competition, especially in 
the prices of dry grocery goods (DGG). Autonomous growth, where possible, is 
primarily realized by elbowing out specialty stores that do not distinguish themselves 
from supermarkets with respect to their product offering and customer service. This 
trend is expected to continue in the coming years. The market leader in the green 
valley is Allied, which is also the market leader at the national level. Vita, with a 
regional market share of 20%, is the second largest player within the green valley and 
is positioned fourth on a national level. 
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MARKET STRATEGY 
Vita’s strategy is aimed at growth from acquisitions and from ousting inferior 
specialty stores from the market. Here, the competition is strongest in the fruit and 
vegetables segment. By acquiring Duplo, the number of stores will increase from 400 
to 750 and total revenues will increase from €1,613 million to €3,009 million in year 
1. Specialty stores in the vicinity will lose market share to Vita in the next few years. 
For the coming 3 years, we expect the total revenue growth of Vita, including Duplo, 
to be approximately 2% higher than the expected market growth of 0.5%. The 
expected revenue growth without the acquisition amounts to 1.5% more than the 
market growth. 
 
MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION 
Vita’s management is led by De Wit Jr. De Wit Jr. is one of the sons of Jan de Wit, 
who founded Vita in the 1960s. De Wit Jr. (age 40) succeeded his father as CEO in 
2001 and is successfully leading the company. Under his leadership, Vita has been 
repositioned as a supermarket with fresh products at low prices. For the past 5 years, 
the increase in total revenues significantly exceeded market growth. Absenteeism is 
low compared to direct competitors, while the average age of the workforce is 
relatively high. The coming years will be tipped at introducing a younger workforce, 
which will lower personnel costs. This is necessary considering the price competition 
that is expected to continue into the future. 
Apart from De Wit Jr, the management team consists of De Bruin (age 48) and 
Van Ginkel (age 52). De Bruin is the CFO of Vita, and both he and Van Ginkel, the 
marketing manager of Vita, consider the expansion as a challenge. De Bruin used to 
be the CFO of POVI, the number 2 in the industry, but he switched to Vita 6 years 
ago. Van Ginkel is responsible for the new store formula that was successfully 
implemented. Both De Bruin and Van Ginkel own a 2.5% interest in Vita. De Wit Jr., 
just like De Wit Sr., owns a 20% interest. All other shares are owned by third parties, 
of which one institutional investor holds a 10% interest. 
Five years ago, Vita decided to make a public offering because of its acquisition of 
Shop & Carry. Vita financed this acquisition with a mix of debt and new equity. The 
management team has successfully incorporated the 190 stores of the acquired chain, 
and is ready for a new move. Considering the development of the market and the 
opportunity at hand, this is a logical next step. 
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The management team of Duplo consists of the 2 founders of the company, the 
Bakker brothers. After the acquisition, they will leave the company as they have 
reached retirement age. The Bakker brothers, each owning 50% of the shares, would 
like to sell their company to Vita. The Bakker family does not have successors. Also, 
the employees of Duplo are not interested in taking over the company. The Bakker 
brothers are of the opinion that selling the company to Vita will work out well for 
their employees. Nevertheless the price (of equity and debt at 1/1/year 1) equals the 
market value, namely approximately 7 x EBITDA (end of the year). 
Vita has 400 stores of its own, each with an average surface area of 800 m2 and 
total revenues per m2 of approximately €5,000. 
 
THE INVESTMENT 
The acquisition of the shares of Duplo requires €300 million. Approximately €15 
million of this amount could be financed by available liquid assets. For the remainder, 
external financing will be needed. External financing will most probably consist of 
issuing new equity and/or raising debt. Vita has not yet decided on this matter, and is 
seeking information and advice with respect to the possibilities. 
Company Duplo owns 350 stores, each with an average surface area of 800 m2. All 
buildings are suited for the store formula of Vita. The buildings are owned by Duplo. 
Within 2 years, nearly all of the Duplo stores will be repositioned as Vita stores. The 
required per store investment amounts to approximately €150,000, for a total of €52.5 
million (350 x €150,000). 
The repositioning and merger of Duplo with Vita will lead to an improvement in 
Duplo’s gross margin from 20% last year, to 21.7% in year 3. Without the merger 
(and the increased buying power), margin would increase to only 20.5%. Both 
personnel and other costs will increase in the first three years as a result of the merger. 
The appendices contain the forecasted balance sheets and income statements for the 
proximate five years for Duplo, both as an independent entity and as a part of Vita. 
The appendices also contain the historical balance sheets and income statements of 
Vita for the past three years, and the forecasted balance sheets and income statements 
for the coming 5 years (without Duplo). 
The appraised value of the Duplo and Vita store premises at direct sale amounts to 
€168 million and €240 million respectively. 
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Investment plan (amounts x €1 million): 
 
Acquisition shares €  300.00 at   1/ 1/ year 1 
Repositioning €   52.50 at 31/12/ year 1 
Total € 352.50 
 
Financing plan (amounts x €1 million): 
 
External € 300.00 at   1/ 1/year 1 
Internal  € 52.50 at 31/12/year 1 
Total € 352.50 
 
The external financing could be reduced by using approximately €15 million of 
excess cash. The required investment of €52.50 will be financed through internally 
generated cash flow. 
 
PROBLEM 
Vita has decided to take over Duplo. The management of Vita has agreed to the price 
for the Duplo shares. However, the management has not yet decided upon the 
financing structure of the takeover. 
 
We ask for the following information: 
1) A financing proposal focused on the interests of the current shareholders of Vita, 
excluding management; 
2)  A financing proposal focused on the interests of the management of Vita; 
3)  A financing proposal as you would advise it to the management of Vita. 
You can answer these questions on the enclosed answer sheet. Would you please also 
point out the possible consequences of your three proposals on the interests of: a) the 
shareholders (excluding the management), b) the management, and c) the other 
stakeholders. 
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Appendices: 
1)  Balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements of Vita without 
Duplo. 
2) Balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements of Duplo as an 
independent entity. 
3)  Balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements of Duplo as a part 
of Vita, including investments and synergies. 
4) Answer sheet. 
 
If desired, these appendices can also be downloaded from: 
http://people.few.eur.nl/schauten/#research 
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Appendix A1 
Balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements of Vita without Duplo. 
 
Vita  
Statement of income Realised Realised Realised Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected
(x € 1 mln) Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Revenues 1550.0 1581.0 1612.6 1644.9 1677.8 1711.3 1745.6 1780.5
Cost of goods sold 1209.0 1230.0 1254.6 1279.7 1317.0 1340.0 1365.0 1392.3
Gross Profit 341.0 351.0 358.0 365.2 360.7 371.4 380.5 388.1
  
Personnel 186.0 189.7 195.1 197.4 199.7 201.9 204.2 208.3
Other expenses 77.5 71.1 69.3 69.1 70.5 71.9 73.3 74.8
Depreciation fixed assets 37.9 37.9 38.7 39.5 40.3 41.1 41.9 42.7
Operating income (EBIT) 39.6 52.2 54.8 59.2 50.3 56.5 61.1 62.3
  
Financial 2.0% 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.1
Financial costs 4.5% 6.0 9.2 9.2 9.4 9.6 9.8 10.0 10.2
Income before tax 33.6 42.9 45.9 50.5 41.8 48.0 52.8 54.2
  
Tax 30.0% 10.1 12.9 13.8 15.1 12.5 14.4 15.8 16.3
Net income 23.5 30.1 32.2 35.3 29.2 33.6 37.0 37.9
  
Dividend 9.4 12.0 12.9 14.1 11.7 13.4 14.8 15.2
  
Balance sheet (book Realised Realised Realised Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected
(x € 1 mln) Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Fixed assets 316.2 316.2 322.5 329.0 335.6 342.3 349.1 356.1
Inventories 93.0 94.9 96.8 98.7 100.7 102.7 104.7 106.8
Accounts receivable 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.7 8.9
Cash working capital 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.7 8.9
Goodwill  
Excess Cash 0.5 18.4 35.1 53.7 68.5 85.9 105.3 125.2
Total assets 425.2 445.3 470.5 497.8 521.5 548.0 576.6 605.9
  
Equity 130.0 148.0 167.3 188.5 206.1 226.3 248.4 271.2
Provisions 15.5 15.8 16.1 16.4 16.8 17.1 17.5 17.8
Debt long term 189.8 189.7 193.5 197.4 201.3 205.4 209.5 213.7
Debt short term 15.5 15.8 16.1 16.4 16.8 17.1 17.5 17.8
Accounts payable 74.4 75.9 77.4 79.0 80.5 82.1 83.8 85.5
Total Liabilities & Equity 425.2 445.3 470.5 497.8 521.5 548.0 576.6 605.9
  
Statement of Cash Flows Realised Realised Realised Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected
(x € 1 mln) Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Operating 52.2 54.8 59.2 50.3 56.5 61.1 62.3
Depreciation 37.9 38.7 39.5 40.3 41.1 41.9 42.7
Provisions 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Operating Cash Flow before tax 90.4 93.8 99.0 90.9 97.9 103.3 105.4
  
Inventories -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -2.0 -2.0 -2.1 -2.1
Cash working -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Accounts receivable -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Accounts payable 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7
Investment in working capital -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8
  
Investments in fixed assets (capex) -37.9 -45.0 -45.9 -46.8 -47.8 -48.7 -49.7
  
Redemption -41.1 -41.1 -41.9 -42.8 -43.6 -44.5 -45.4
Financial expenses -9.2 -8.9 -8.7 -8.5 -8.4 -8.3 -8.1
Tax -12.9 -13.8 -15.1 -12.5 -14.4 -15.8 -16.3
Dividend -12.0 -12.9 -14.1 -11.7 -13.4 -14.8 -15.2
Cash used in financing activities -75.2 -76.6 -79.9 -75.6 -79.9 -83.4 -84.9
  
Long-term debt 37.9 41.7 42.6 43.4 44.3 45.2 46.1
Short-term debt 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8
Excess Cash -17.9 -16.7 -18.6 -14.9 -17.4 -19.4 -19.9
Cash flow from financing activities 23.4 28.5 27.6 32.2 30.6 29.6 30.0
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Appendix A2 
 Balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements of Duplo as an independent entity. 
 
Duplo  
Statement of income Realised Realised Realised Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected
(x € 1 mln) Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Revenues 1360.0 1355.9 1350.5 1357.2 1370.8 1391.4 1419.2 1447.6
Cost of goods sold 1081.2 1082.0 1080.4 1083.1 1089.8 1106.1 1128.3 1150.8
Gross Profit 278.8 273.9 270.1 274.2 281.0 285.2 290.9 296.8
  
Personnel 163.2 162.7 158.0 156.1 157.6 160.0 163.2 166.5
Other expenses 61.2 61.0 64.8 61.1 61.7 62.6 63.9 65.1
Depreciation fixed assets 29.4 31.7 34.0 34.2 34.5 35.1 35.8 36.5
Operating income (EBIT) 25.0 18.4 13.2 22.8 27.1 27.5 28.1 28.7
  
Financial 2.0% 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Financial costs 5.0% 5.2 2.3 3.1 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.8
Income before tax 20.1 16.2 10.2 18.9 23.3 23.8 24.4 24.8
  
Tax 30.0% 6.0 4.8 3.0 5.7 7.0 7.1 7.3 7.4
Net income 14.1 11.3 7.1 13.2 16.3 16.7 17.1 17.4
  
Dividend 9.9 7.9 5.0 9.3 11.4 11.7 11.9 12.2
  
Balance sheet (book Realised Realised Realised Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected
(x € 1 mln) Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Fixed assets 244.8 264.4 283.6 285.0 287.9 292.2 298.0 304.0
Inventories 95.2 94.9 94.5 95.0 96.0 97.4 99.3 101.3
Accounts receivable 27.2 27.1 27.0 27.1 27.4 27.8 28.4 29.0
Cash working capital 13.6 13.6 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.9 14.2 14.5
Goodwill  
Excess Cash 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total assets 380.8 400.0 418.7 420.7 425.0 431.3 440.0 448.8
  
Equity 255.0 258.4 260.5 264.5 269.4 274.4 279.5 284.7
Provisions 13.6 13.6 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.9 14.2 14.5
Debt long term 36.7 42.3 56.7 57.0 57.6 58.4 59.6 60.8
Debt short term 8.8 19.3 21.7 19.2 17.1 16.4 17.1 17.8
Accounts payable 66.6 66.4 66.2 66.5 67.2 68.2 69.5 70.9
Total Liabilities & Equity 380.8 400.0 418.7 420.7 425.0 431.3 440.0 448.8
  
Statement of Cash Flows Realised Realised Realised Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected
(x € 1 mln) Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Operating 18.4 13.2 22.8 27.1 27.5 28.1 28.7
Depreciation 31.7 34.0 34.2 34.5 35.1 35.8 36.5
Provisions 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
Operating Cash Flow before tax 50.1 47.2 57.1 61.8 62.8 64.1 65.4
  
Inventories 0.3 0.4 -0.5 -1.0 -1.4 -1.9 -2.0
Cash working 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Accounts receivable 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6
Accounts payable -0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.4
Investment in working capital 0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.7 -1.0 -1.4 -1.4
  
Investments in fixed assets (capex) -51.3 -53.2 -35.6 -37.4 -39.4 -41.6 -42.4
  
Redemption -9.1 -12.3 -15.7 -15.2 -14.9 -15.0 -15.3
Financial expenses -2.3 -3.1 -3.9 -3.8 -3.7 -3.7 -3.8
Tax -4.8 -3.0 -5.7 -7.0 -7.1 -7.3 -7.4
Dividend -7.9 -5.0 -9.3 -11.4 -11.7 -11.9 -12.2
Cash used in financing activities -24.2 -23.4 -34.5 -37.5 -37.5 -38.0 -38.8
  
Long-term debt 12.9 22.9 11.6 12.0 12.4 12.9 13.1
Short-term debt 12.2 6.3 1.8 1.8 2.7 4.0 4.1
Excess Cash 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cash flow from financing activities 25.2 29.2 13.4 13.7 15.1 16.8 17.3
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Appendix A3 
Balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements of Duplo as a part of Vita, including 
investments and synergies. 
Duplo  
Statement of income Realised Realised Realised Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected
(x € 1 mln) Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Revenues 1360.0 1355.9 1350.5 1364.0 1404.9 1447.1 1483.2 1512.9
Cost of goods sold 1081.2 1082.0 1080.4 1061.2 1102.9 1133.1 1159.9 1183.1
Gross Profit 278.8 273.9 270.1 302.8 302.1 314.0 323.3 329.8
  
Personnel 163.2 162.7 158.0 191.0 196.7 188.1 185.4 177.0
Other expenses 61.2 61.0 64.8 81.8 84.3 86.8 74.2 63.5
Depreciation fixed assets 29.4 31.7 34.0 34.4 34.6 34.7 35.6 36.3
Depreciation repositioning 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1
Operating income (EBIT) 25.0 18.4 13.2 -4.4 -26.6 -8.8 15.1 39.8
  
Financial 2.0% 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Financial costs 5.0% 5.2 2.3 3.1 3.9 6.3 6.1 5.7 5.0
Income before tax 20.1 16.2 10.2 -8.3 -32.9 -14.9 9.4 34.8
  
Tax 30.0% 6.0 4.8 3.0 -2.5 -9.9 -4.5 2.8 10.4
Net income 14.1 11.3 7.1 -5.8 -23.0 -10.4 6.6 24.4
  
Dividend 9.9 7.9 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  
Balance sheet (book Realised Realised Realised Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected
(x € 1 mln) Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Fixed assets 244.8 264.4 283.6 286.4 288.0 289.4 296.6 302.6
Investment repositioning 52.5 39.4 26.3 13.1
Inventories 95.2 94.9 94.5 95.5 95.5 94.1 93.4 90.8
Accounts receivable 27.2 27.1 27.0 20.5 14.0 7.2 7.4 7.6
Cash working capital 13.6 13.6 13.5 10.9 7.0 7.2 7.4 7.6
Goodwill  
Excess Cash 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total assets 380.8 400.0 418.7 465.8 444.0 424.2 418.1 408.5
  
Equity 255.0 258.4 260.5 254.7 231.7 221.3 227.9 252.2
Provisions 13.6 13.6 13.5 13.6 14.0 14.5 14.8 15.1
Debt long term 36.7 42.3 56.7 43.0 43.2 43.4 44.5 45.4
Debt short term 8.8 19.3 21.7 82.9 78.6 69.8 56.1 23.1
Accounts payable 66.6 66.6 66.4 66.2 71.6 76.4 75.2 74.8
Total Liabilities & Equity 380.8 400.0 418.7 465.8 444.0 424.2 418.1 408.5
  
Statement of Cash Flows Realised Realised Realised Expected Expected Expected Expected Expected
(x € 1 mln) Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Operating 18.4 13.2 -4.4 -26.6 -8.8 15.1 39.8
Depreciation 31.7 34.0 34.4 47.7 47.9 48.7 49.4
Provisions 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
Operating Cash Flow before tax 50.1 47.2 30.1 21.5 39.5 64.1 89.6
  
Inventories 0.3 0.4 -0.9 -0.1 1.5 0.6 2.7
Cash working capital 0.0 0.1 2.6 3.9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Accounts receivable 0.1 0.1 6.5 6.4 6.8 -0.2 -0.1
Accounts -0.2 -0.3 5.4 4.8 -1.2 -0.5 -2.1
Investment in working capital 0.2 0.3 13.6 15.1 6.9 -0.2 0.2
  
Investments in fixed assets (capex) -51.3 -53.2 -89.7 -36.1 -36.1 -42.8 -42.2
  
Redemption -9.1 -12.3 -15.7 -25.2 -24.4 -22.6 -20.1
Financial expenses -2.3 -3.1 -3.9 -6.3 -6.1 -5.7 -5.0
Tax -4.8 -3.0 2.5 9.9 4.5 -2.8 -10.4
Dividend -7.9 -5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cash used in financing activities -24.2 -23.4 -17.1 -21.6 -26.0 -31.1 -35.6
  
Long-term debt 12.9 22.9 -2.4 8.8 8.9 9.8 9.8
Short-term debt 12.2 6.3 65.5 12.3 6.9 0.3 -21.8
Excess Cash 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cash flow from financing activities 25.2 29.2 63.1 21.2 15.7 10.0 -12.0
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Appendix B. Solutions by specialists, including their evaluations 
 
In this appendix, we describe the various solutions proposed by the various 
specialists, including relevant criteria mentioned per specialist per stakeholder. 
Proposal 1 is the best proposal for shareholders (excluding the management of Vita); 
proposal 2 is the best proposal for the management; and proposal 3 is the proposal the 
specialists would actually recommend to the management of Vita. We discuss the 
proposals given by two consultants (C1 and C2), one investment bank (IB1), and one 
full service bank (FSB1). Consultant 1’s first proposal is referred to as C11, 
Consultant 1’s second proposal is referred to as C12, etc. The proposals are evaluated 
from the perspective of the shareholders, managers, and other stakeholders on the 
criteria mentioned by the specialists. We follow the reasoning taken by the specialists. 
Note that FSB1 only evaluated whether the acquisition could be financed completely 
with debt. FSB1 did not construct alternative financing solutions. 
 
CONSULTANT 1 (C1) 
Proposal 1: best for current shareholders (of Vita), excluding the management 
(C11) 
100% debt would be best for shareholders according to C1.120  A total recapitalization 
of debt (by syndication), including 100% debt financing for the acquisition, is 
suggested. The proposed structure is as follows: a legal entity Newco (= Holdco) is 
created which holds the shares of Vita and Duplo. The operating companies (Opcos) 
Vita and Duplo remain legally separate. The borrowing base of both Opcos is 70% of 
the appraised value of the real estate, plus 50% of the book value of the fixed 
inventory (not stocks of goods), and 70% of the accounts receivable. The borrowing 
base for Vita and Duplo, then, is €215 million121 and €220 million122 respectively.123 
                                                 
120 C1 was the only specialist who recommended not to acquire Duplo. According to this specialist, the 
investment outweighs the extra earnings / extra cash flows generated by the acquisition.  
121 The borrowing base for Vita (€215 million) is: 70% of €240 million (real estate) plus 50% of €82.5 
million (total fixed assets minus €240 million) plus 70% of €8.1 million (accounts receivable). 
122 The borrowing base for Duplo after the acquisition (€220 million) is 70% of €168 million (real 
estate) plus 50% of €115.6 (total fixed assets, minus €168 million) million plus 50% of €52.5 
(repositioning) plus 70% of €27 (accounts receivable). 
123 The amount borrowed by both Opcos was rounded by Consultant 1 to €450 million. 
132
 122
The maturity of the debt with real estate as collateral (€286 million) is 25 years; the 
debt with fixed inventory as collateral is 5 years (€125 million). 
 
Vita will borrow €215 million, redeems the existing debt of €210 million (€193.5 
million long term debt, plus €16.1 million short term debt), and will pay a dividend of 
€40 million (the residual €5 million, plus excess cash of €35 million) to Newco. 
Duplo borrows €220 million, pays off the existing debt of €78 million (€56.7 million 
long term debt and €21.7 million short term debt) and pays a dividend of €142 million 
(€220 million, minus €78 million) to Newco. The total amount paid to Newco then, is 
€182 million. Newco needs €300 million to buy the shares. That means Newco must 
issue another €118 million (€300 million minus €182 million) with the shares of Vita 
and Duplo as the only collateral.124 This issue would be an issue of mezzanine debt 
(12% interest). The equity / total assets ratio of the Opcos Vita and Duplo decreases 
as a result from 36% to 29%, and from 62% to 25%, respectively. If this decrease is 
too high for suppliers, it could be appropriate to reduce the amount borrowed by the 
Opcos and to increase the amount borrowed (mezzanine debt) by Holdco. 
 
Perspective: shareholders 
The first positive effect for the shareholders mentioned by C1 is that there is no 
dilution if the acquisition is 100% debt financed. Second, management should follow 
a strict working capital policy and make available financial reports on a regular basis. 
A third advantage, a higher gearing with a higher tax shield as a result was mentioned 
(the value is estimated as the corporate tax rate multiplied by the additional amount 
borrowed). Disadvantages mentioned were the higher risk profile for shareholders 
because of debt holders’ claims on the assets of the Opcos, the high cost of debt, and 
the prohibition on dividends. 
 
Perspective: management 
For management, only negative effects were mentioned. First, management must deal 
with many covenants enforced by the syndicate of banks and has to present financial 
reports often (each quarter). Second, management is less flexible in executing 
additional investment programs, i.e., management must consult the syndicate of banks 
                                                 
124 The amount borrowed (mezzanine debt) by Holdco was rounded by Consultant 1 to €150 million. 
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first. Because of the high leverage, free cash flow is low with a need for new external 
financing for major investments as a result. 
 
Perspective: other stakeholders 
Suppliers were mentioned with demands for ‘stricter terms on trade credit’ to 
compensate them for the increase in risk they perceive. C1 mentioned that some firms 
have contracts with suppliers that first must be renegotiated if the risk profile of the 
firm changes dramatically. If important suppliers do not agree with the new situation, 
proposal 1 (100% debt) could be non-executable or rather expensive. 
 
Proposal 2: best for the management of Vita (C12) 
Instead of issuing mezzanine debt of €118 million (rounded to €150 million in Table 
1), Holdco issues ‘cum prefs’ with a fixed dividend and no voting rights. According to 
IFRS, cumprefs are registered as debt. For banks, cumprefs are seen as equity, since 
bank claims are senior, i.e., the higher the fraction of cumprefs and the lower the 
fraction of debt, the lower the risk for holders of debt. 
 
Perspective: shareholders 
Proposal 2 has the following advantages for shareholders. First, it would be possible 
to pay a limited amount of dividends. Second, the cost of debt would be lower 
compared with proposal 1. Third, equity’s financial risk is lower. Disadvantages 
include a lower gearing with a lower tax shield as a result (dividends are not tax 
deductible), and a less strict working capital management / less disciplined 
management. 
 
Perspective: management 
Compared with proposal 1, management must deal with fewer covenants and 
financial report requirements. In other words, there is more peace within the 
operational activities. Second, management is more flexible in executing additional 
investment programs without the need for new external finance since the internal cash 
flow is relatively high. 
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Perspective: other stakeholders 
No change in risk for the suppliers, which can be seen as advantageous for this 
stakeholder. They need not change the terms of their given trade credit. 
 
Proposal 3: the ultimate proposal (C13) 
Instead of the issue of cumprefs by Holdco for €150 million (see C12), Holdco will 
issue €50 million of common equity, €50 million cumprefs125 / convertibles and €50 
million mezzanine debt. The issue of common shares instead of cumprefs lowers the 
published leverage. The issue of mezzanine debt instead of cumprefs lowers tax 
payments since interest is tax deductible and dividends are not. 
 
Perspective: shareholders 
Proposal 3 has the following advantages for shareholders. First, management should 
follow a strict working capital policy and must issue reports regularly. Second, the 
cost of debt is lower compared with proposal 1. Third, the gearing is reasonably high 
as is the tax shield compared with proposal 2. Fourth, management is rather 
disciplined compared with proposal 2 because of the higher obligatory payments to 
the debt holders. This is good for organizational efficiency. The disadvantages are 
higher financial risk and a some dilution. 
 
Perspective: management 
The covenants by banks are reasonable; there is moderate peace within the Opcos and 
the number of conferences with banks is limited. Refinancing is (only) needed if free 
cash flow is too limited. 
 
Perspective: other stakeholders 
None, or just a moderate adjustment in the term of payments with suppliers. 
 
                                                 
125 Again, cumprefs with a fixed dividend and no voting rights. 
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CONSULTANT 2 (C2) 
Proposal 1: best for current shareholders (of Vita), excluding the management 
(C21) 
Consultant 2 starts with the statement that Vita is a healthy firm without Duplo. If it 
acquires Duplo, the risk of the assets of Vita increases. From the perspective of the 
shareholders of Vita, this is undesirable. Consultant 2 suggests keeping Duplo in a 
separate legal entity in order to keep the risk to the shareholders of Vita as low as 
possible. In the basic structure, legal entity Holdco holds the shares of Vita and the 
shares of the legal separate entity Duplo. This is the same structure as in the proposals 
by C1. 
 
Two financing solutions were discussed. Under each scenario, Vita pays the excess 
amount of cash to Holdco. That means that the external financing need is €352.5 
million – €35 million (excess cash Vita) = €317.5 million.126 Alternative 2 was 
preferred because the borrowing base of this alternative is a bit higher and the real 
estate of Duplo is relatively safe. 
 
Alternative 1: 
Duplo borrows approximately 6 x EBITDA (cash flow based), i.e., Duplo borrows 
€283 million (= 6 x €47 million). Subsequently, Duplo pays off the current amount of 
debt of €78 million and pays the residual of €205 million to Holdco.127 
This means that €112.5 million (= €317.5 million – €205 million) should be 
borrowed by Vita or Holdco (mezzanine). Vita could increase its outstanding debt 
from €210 million to €322.5 million and pay out €112.5 to Holdco. This is a possible 
solution since the borrowing base of Vita is 6 x EBITDA, i.e., Vita could borrow €561 
million (= 6 x €93.5 million) while the current amount of interest bearing debt is only 
€210 million. However, the equity of Vita is €167 million. If Vita pays €112.5 million 
(plus the excess amount of cash of €35 million) to Holdco, then the equity of Vita 
                                                 
126 C2 adds the needed investment for the repositioning to the acquisition price. The fact that it could be 
financed with internally generated cash is explicitly ignored. 
127 This amount will probably be lower because €52.5 million is needed for the repositioning of the 
stores by Duplo. If so, the equity of Duplo does not decline by €205 million but by €152.5 million 
instead. 
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becomes rather low. To prevent this, an issue of mezzanine debt by Holdco could be 
considered. 
 
Alternative 2: 
Duplo sells the real estate to a new real estate vehicle (REneco). REneco borrows 
80% of the direct sale value, i.e., 80% of €168 million = €134 million. Duplo redeems 
the current debt and pays the residual of €56 million (= €134 million – €78 million) to 
Holdco. Next, Duplo borrows the maximum amount based on expected cash flows. 
The cash flow (EBITDA) is lower now because Duplo pays rents for the use of the 
sold real estate to REneco. If we assume rents are €12 million (= 7% of €168 million), 
then the adjusted EBITDA of Duplo is €35 million (= €47 million – €12 million). For 
Duplo it is possible to borrow 4.5 x €35 million = €158 million. The total amount 
available from the ‘old’ Duplo is €214 million (= €158 million + €56 million). Equity 
of Duplo, which was €260 million, declines significantly if this amount is paid to 
Holdco.128 Again, the residual will be borrowed by Vita or Holdco (mezzanine). The 
residual now is €103.5 million (= €317.5 million – €214 million). Vita could increase 
its current debt from €210 million to €313.5 million and pay out €103.5 to Holdco. To 
prevent an excessively extreme reduction in solvency, an issue of mezzanine debt by 
Holdco—as under alternative 1—could be a solution. 
 
Perspective: shareholders 
As stated under C11, the first positive effect is no dilution if the acquisition is 100% 
debt financed. Aside from that, shareholders need not invest more capital in the firm. 
In other words, the extra value lost if the firm encounters financial difficulties is nihil. 
Second, high leverage gives management an incentive to increase organizational 
efficiency. Management will do its utmost to prevent getting into financial difficulties. 
The disadvantages mentioned are no or lower dividends during the first years after the 
acquisition and a possible negative effect on the credit rating of bonds, which might 
have a negative effect on share price. (Certain institutional investors would not be 
allowed to invest in the firm’s downgraded securities any longer.) 
                                                 
128 This amount will probably be lower because €52.5 million is needed for the repositioning of the 
stores by Duplo. If so, the equity of Duplo does not reduce with €214 million but with €161.5 million 
instead. 
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Perspective: management 
For the management of Vita, only one negative effect was mentioned: pressure to 
increase organizational efficiency. The advantage for the shareholder is seen as a 
disadvantage for management. 
 
Perspective: other stakeholders 
Other stakeholders mentioned are suppliers, personnel, works committee, institutional 
investors and competition. Suppliers see creditworthiness decrease and will probably 
respond with an adjustment of the terms of payments. Personnel suffer from increased 
leverage in the sense that the probability of getting into financial difficulties is higher. 
The works committee was mentioned since this committee often plays a crucial role 
in major changes within firms. If credit ratings are downgraded because of an 
increase in leverage, institutional investors could encounter difficulties with 
investment guidelines and sell their shares or bonds as a result. This could have a 
negative effect on securities prices. From the perspective of competitors, a high 
leverage is positive; by lowering their prices, they could hurt the financial situation of 
Vita. 
 
Proposals 2 and 3: best for the management of Vita and the ultimate proposal 
(C22/C23) 
Consultant 2 makes no distinction between proposals 2 and 3. Consultant 2 implicitly 
states that their ultimate proposal is that proposal which is best for management. The 
financial solution contains substantially less debt. The amount of debt will be 
determined by expected ‘worst case scenarios’. For example, what happens if Vita is 
not able to increase the gross margin of Duplo. The leverage that will not bring Vita 
into financial difficulty would be the solution proposed. The ‘wild guess estimate’ by 
C2 is an issue of €150 million equity. In any case, to safeguard the real estate of 
Duplo, it will be placed in a separate legal entity. 
 
Perspective: shareholders 
The only disadvantage mentioned explicitly is dilution. If the old shareholders do not 
participate in the new equity stake, their share in the firm will decrease. This is seen 
as a disadvantage. And contrary to C21, the shareholders must implement an 
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additional financial investment under C22, which can be seen as a disadvantage, 
because this amount could be lost if difficulties occur. 
 
Perspective: management 
If the buffer (solvency) against losses is higher, management will experience more 
freedom (because of higher free cash flows) and need not visit their banks (monitoring 
/ new loans) often. 
 
Perspective: other stakeholders 
Shareholders give their ‘commitment’ to the firm if the firm successfully issues new 
shares. This is perceived as a positive signal. The acquisition then is perceived 
positively by the market. 
 
THE INVESTMENT BANKER (IB1) 
Proposal 1: best for current shareholders (of Vita), excluding the management 
(IB11) 
One of the main issues again is dilution. In contrast to the consultants, management, 
rather than the external shareholders, gains most if the acquisition is financed 
completely with debt. Proposal 1 does not contain a solution with 100% debt as with 
the consultants, but an issue of €150 million debt and €150 million equity. According 
to IB1, the issue of debt would lead to a net debt / EBITDA multiple of 2.9, which is, 
according to IB1, acceptable. Because of positive cash flows generated by the assets 
of the firm, this multiple could return to the current 1.8 of Vita. The issue of equity is 
facilitated by an issue of tradable claims. The guarantee of a successful issue of equity 
is, in this way, greatest. 
 
Perspective shareholders 
The first advantage of the proposal addresses the issue of tradable claims. The 
issuance of claims gives the shareholders the right to participate in the issuance of 
new equity and in this way prevents dilution. Because the size of the equity issue is 
limited, for most shareholders (except management) it would be possible to exercise 
all allocated rights. Shareholders who want to increase their stake in the firm can try 
to buy claims from shareholders who have no such intention. Another advantage is 
that if management cannot participate in the new issue, the free float of shares will 
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increase with a positive influence on share liquidity. Furthermore, as a result of partial 
debt financing, earnings per share will increase while the increase in risk remains 
within acceptable levels. 
 
Perspective: management 
If management is unable to participate in the new issue (e.g., for lack of funds) their 
stake will dilute with a loss of control as a result. A new large shareholder would 
mean more interference. These are the main disadvantages for management. 
 
Perspective: other stakeholders 
For employees, creditors, and the old holders of debt, the creditworthiness of the firm 
decreases and the risk of their claims increases. 
 
Proposal 2: best for the management of Vita (IB12) 
Instead of a mix of new equity and debt, a 100% debt financing solution is suggested. 
If management has sufficient capital, an issue of equity is given in consideration as 
well, so long as they can participate in it on a pro rata basis. However, as stated by 
IB1, it would be wise for management to diversify—in other words, not to put all its 
capital in the same basket. 
 
Perspective: shareholders 
First, the financial risk for shareholders is higher, which is seen as a disadvantage. 
Further, holders of debt have more control because of new covenants. The 
substantially higher earnings per share are seen as an advantage. However, if the firm 
encounters future difficulties, this could have a negative effect on dividends, which is 
seen as a disadvantage. 
 
Perspective: management 
There are no negative dilution effects for the managers, no loss of control to other 
(large) shareholders, and the earnings per share are higher. The disadvantage is the 
reduction in free cash flow to finance additional (expansion) investment programs. 
 
140
 130
Perspective: other stakeholders 
For employees, creditors, and the old holders of debt, the creditworthiness of the firm 
decreases and the risk of their claims increases significantly more than under  
proposal 1. 
 
Proposal 3: the ultimate proposal (IB13) 
Proposal 3 contains an issue of €100 million of debt and €200 million of equity. 
According to IB3 the issuance of debt leads to a net debt / EBITDA ratio of 2.5, 
which can be reduced to 1.8 via generated cash flows. The issue of equity is again 
facilitated by an issuance of tradable claims. The amount of debt issued is lower than 
under proposals 2 and 1. The advantage of less debt and more equity is the creation of 
an unused debt capacity for new (expansion) investment programs. IB is convinced 
that the magnitude of the acquisition justifies a major issuance of equity. The use of a 
small amount of debt decreases the negative pressure of the costs of an equity issue on 
the earnings per share. 
 
Perspective: shareholders 
The same advantages and disadvantages are mentioned as under alternative 1. The 
only difference is the possible higher free float that could arise if some large 
shareholders do not exercise their rights, but sell them instead. 
 
Perspective: management 
The same advantages and disadvantages are mentioned as under alternative 1. The 
risk of dilution is a bit higher compared with proposal 1 because of the larger issuance 
of common equity. 
 
Perspective: other stakeholders 
The decrease in creditworthiness and the increase in risk of the claims of employees, 
creditors and the old holders of debt is limited compared with proposals 2 and 1. 
 
FULL SERVICE BANKER (FSB1) 
The banker wrote a 2 page report that contained the following sections: i) the credit 
base, ii) the request, iii) the financial position, performance, perspectives and 
operational risks, iv) pricing and return, and v) conclusion. 
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The credit base of Vita, with its 400 supermarkets, is substantial. The banker wants 
to know the number of franchise stores (if any) and calls this a ‘condition precedent’. 
Also, more information is needed about the legal structure of the organization. The 
banker assumes none of the stores has ‘joint and several liability’, which implies 
structure risk is obvious. Total risk is perceived as acceptable, given centralized 
purchasing, marketing, and distribution. The banker assumes that after the acquisition, 
all stores are structured in one legal entity. De Wit Senior and De Wit Junior are part 
of the credit base, since they both own 20% of Vita and leave their mark on the 
healthiness of the firm. 
The request consists of the financing of the acquisition (€300 million), plus the 
repositioning (€52.5 million), minus excess cash. The strategic rationale for the 
acquisition is valid: economies of scale, advantages on the purchase of goods, and the 
improvement of the market position of Duplo. FSB1 expects the firm could 
accomplish this strategy under normal business conditions. FSB1 suggests financing 
on covenants (‘cash flow based’) and not on assets (‘asset based’). As FSB1 explained 
‘in this market (meaning the market FSB1 is in) you only get the deal if you finance 
this proposition on covenants’. The following covenants should be obtained: cross 
default129, negative pledge130, pari passu131, interest coverage ratio (ICR) > 3, 
debt/ebitda < 3, and an effective cash sweep132. The acquisition price is perceived as 
not excessive. A possible exit scenario would include a sale or sale and leaseback of 
the stores. 
In the opinion of FSB1, the solvency of Vita is good. Returns and cash flow are 
acceptable to good. The profitability of the firm did not suffer, or suffered only 
marginally, from the severe competition in the market. The most important risks are 
continuing competition (‘price wars’), the changing nature of customer demand, and 
the turnaround and integration of Duplo. The forecasts seem realistic; the investment, 
however, is huge. The positive track record of management is seen as advantageous. 
                                                 
129 A cross default means a default if the borrower defaults on any other obligation. If Vita defaults on 
another loan agreement, this gives our FS banker the right to demand the loan. 
130 A negative pledge is a clause which prevents the borrower from pledging greater security or 
collateral to other lenders (http://glossary.reuters.com/index.php/Negative_pledge). 
131 Securities issued with a pari passu clause rank equally with existing securities of the same class. 
Ibid. 
132 All excess cash is used to finance the acquisition and for redemption.  
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Because of severe competition in the banking industry, the pricing should be sharp, 
that is, according to the bank, 150/175 basis points above Euribor. The pricing should 
be in accordance with the Net Raroc Hurdle rate, otherwise sufficient ‘cross sell’ 
should be realized. 
The conclusion of the report represents positive advice (to the credit committee). 
The financing request is large for a well performing firm. The most significant risks 
revolve around the turnaround and integration of Duplo. Other strong points include 
the financial health of Vita, the good market position of the firm, and the positive 
track record of the management team. 
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Chapter 5 
Cost of capital of government’s claim 
and the present value of tax shields133 
 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter we derive a general formula for the cost of capital of government’s 
claim (rg). Given our valuation framework that distinguishes three claimholders—
equity holders, debt holders and government—we show for the models used in Myers 
(1974), Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985), that the present value 
of tax shields is equal to the difference between the present value of the expected taxes 
paid by the unlevered firm and the levered firm, with each of the models’ implied rg as 
discount rate. We provide a numerical example of how to calculate rg and we give a 
logic explanation for the low implied rgs of Miles and Ezzell’s and Harris and 
Pringle’s model. 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
This chapter is inspired by Fernández (2004). Although Fernández’s derivations 
leading to his final results are disputable, his conclusion that the present value of tax 
shields (PVTS) is equal to the difference between the present value of expected taxes 
paid by the unlevered firm (Gu) and the present value of expected taxes paid by the 
levered firm (Gl) is valid.134 
                                                 
133 This chapter is based on Schauten and Tans (2006) and was presented at the 3rd Corporate Finance 
Day K.U. Leuven, September 2005. We thank Martijn van den Assem, Ingolf Dittmann, Winfried 
Hallerbach, Thierry Post, Anoop Rai, Onno Steenbeek and Nicholas Wonder for their helpful 
comments. All remaining errors are our own. 
134 For a discussion of the validity of the final results of Fernández (2004), see Fieten et al. (2005), 
Fernández (2005), Arzac and Glosten (2005) and Cooper and Nyborg (2006). According to Fernández 
(2004), the PVTS for non-growing perpetuities is equal to τD, where τ is the tax rate and D is the 
market value of debt. PVTS for constant growth firms would be τDru/(ru-g), where ru is the required 
return to unlevered equity and g is the constant growth rate. 
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In this chapter we introduce a general formula for rg, ‘the discount rate for 
expected tax payments’ or ‘the cost of capital of the government’s claim’.135 We 
establish a relation between rg and the cost of equity of an unlevered and levered firm 
and the cost of debt.136 Second, we derive the implied rgs for traditional models such 
as Myers (1974), Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985) and show 
that—given our assumption about the risk of the pre-tax cash flow—the implied rgs 
for the models of Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985) are relatively 
low. Given our valuation framework that distinguishes three claimholders—equity 
holders, debt holders and government—we further prove that PVTS = Gu - Gl, where 
Gu and Gl are equal to the present value of the expected tax payments with each of the 
models’ implied rg as the discount rate.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general discussion of the 
concept of the total value of firms. Section 3 introduces our valuation framework; we 
derive a formula for PVTS based on the difference between Gu and Gl, and derive a 
general formula for rg. Section 4 compares the implied rgs for the models used by 
Myers (1974), Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985).137 Section 5 
contains a numerical example for a hypothetical firm. Section 6 concludes. 
 
5.2. Total value of firms 
The total value of the firm (TV) is calculated on a before-tax basis and is equal to the 
sum of the present values of equity (E), debt (D) and government’s claim (G). Figure 
1 presents the expanded balance sheets in market values of an unlevered and a levered 
firm.138 The pre-tax asset value appears on the left and the value of the government’s 
tax claim recognized as a liability on the right. 
 
                                                 
135 Galai (1998) internalizes the corporate tax claim in a one-period framework and analyses the 
tradeoffs between various policies available to the government to encourage investments to their 
socially optimal level. 
136 Fernández presented his results without deriving a discount rate for the expected tax payments. 
Fernández (2004) states ‘we cannot establish a clear relation between the required return to taxes and 
the required return to assets’, (p.150). 
137 Ruback (2002) makes the same assumption about the risk of the PVTS as Harris and Pringle (1985) 
do, and use the same implied implied rg as a result. 
138 See Brealey et al. (2006), p.471. 
145
 135
Figure 1. Total value of the firm 
This figure presents the expanded balance sheet of the unlevered and the levered firm with on the left 
hand side the pre-tax value of the firm and on the right hand side the present value of the tax payments 
to the government by the unlevered firm (Gu) and the levered firm (Gl), the market value of equity of 
the unlevered firm (Eu) and the levered firm (El) and the market value of debt of the levered firm (D). 
 
           Balance sheet of the unlevered firm
           Balance sheet of the levered firm
Total value (TV )
PV residual claim equityholders (E l )
Debt (D )
Pre-tax firm value
Total value (TV )
PV government's claim (G u )
PV residual claim equityholders (E u )
Total value (TV ) Total value (TV )
Pre-tax firm value PV government's claim (G l )
 
 
We assume TV does not depend on leverage.139 This implies that the TV of an 
unlevered firm is equal to the TV of an (except for leverage) identical levered firm. 
That is, we assume that the level and risk of the operating cash flows (OCFs) 
generated by the assets of both firms are the same.140 The OCF of an unlevered firm is 
divided between the government (GCF) and the equity holders (ECF). The OCF of a 
levered firm can be split into a government cash flow (GCF), equity cash flow (ECF) 
and debt cash flow (DCF). In other words, the unlevered firm cuts the cake in two 
slices, the levered firm in three, but the size of the cake remains the same: 
 DEGEGTV lluu ++=+=        (1) 
Because we assume that the risk of the OCF is unaffected by leverage, the total cost 
of capital for the unlevered firm is equal to the total cost of capital of the levered firm: 
 DrErGrErGr dlelgluuugu ++=+       (2) 
where rgu is the cost of capital of government’s claim of an unlevered firm, rgl of a 
levered firm, ru is the cost of equity of the unlevered firm, and re and rd are the cost of 
equity and debt for the levered firm, respectively. 
 
                                                 
139 This is in accordance with Proposition I of Miller and Modigliani (1958), see Brealey et al. (2006), 
p.471. We ignore costs / benefits related to leverage.  
140 Operating cash flow is earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) minus net investments in fixed 
assets and working capital. 
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5.3. The present value of tax shields and the derivation of rg 
Before we derive the general formula for rg, equation (14), we introduce our 
‘valuation framework’ (which is based on Figure 1) in Table 1 and a general formula, 
equation (11), for the PVTS. 
As shown in Table 1, TV at t = 0 of the unlevered, as well as the levered firm, is 
equal to the present value of the expected OCFs, where the OCF at t = 1 is equal to 
the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) minus gZ.141 We assume OCF is a 
growing perpetuity. The discount rate for both streams of cash flows is the same since 
the risk of the OCF of the unlevered firm and the levered firm is equal. 
For the unlevered firm, E at t = 0 (Eu) is the present value of the expected ECFs. 
The ECF at t = 1 is EBIT after tax at t = 1 minus gZ. The discount rate for the ECFs is 
ru, the unlevered cost of equity. Gu is the present value at t = 0 of the expected EBITs 
times the corporate tax rate τ. We assume the risk of the ECF for the unlevered firm is 
equal to the risk of the OCF, since the only risk for both streams is the business risk of 
the assets. This implies the same cost of capital for the claim of the government as 
well. TV of the unlevered firm at t = 0 is Gu plus Eu. (If we add A1 and A2 from Table 
1, we find A4.) 
For the levered firm, E at t = 0 (El) is the present value of the expected ECFs, 
where the ECF at t = 1 is equal to the net earnings after tax minus gZ plus gD (g times 
the amount of debt at t = 0).142 We further assume a constant leverage ratio,143 a fixed 
cost of debt (rd) and a dividend that is equal to the ECF. The discount rate for the 
ECFs (re) is higher than ru because of the leverage effect. Gl at t = 0 is the present 
value of the expected earnings times τ. The discount rate for the tax payments, rg, is 
not equal to ru (as it was for the unlevered firm) nor is it equal to re of the levered 
firm. However, since ru is the discount rate for TV, the weighted average of the 
discount rates of E, D and G must equal ru: 
 udlelg rDrErGr =++        (3) 
                                                 
141 gZ is the net investment at t = 1 in fixed assets and working capital to achieve growth (g). In our 
model, Z is the book value of the net fixed assets and working capital at t = 0. 
142 A net increase of debt at t = 1 is an outflow for the debt holders, but an inflow for the equity holders. 
143 The leverage ratio is expected to be constant in market values as well as book values over time, 
although both ratios could differ. 
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For the levered firm, TV at t = 0 is Gl plus El plus D. (If we add B1, B2 and B3 from 
Table 1, we find TV in B4.) 
 
Table 1. Valuation Framework 
This table presents the value at t = 0 of the claims hold by the government (G), equity holders (E) and 
debt holders (D) for an unlevered (column A) and levered (column B) firm. EBIT is the expected 
earnings before interest and tax at t = 1. G is the present value of the expected taxes at t = 0; Gu for an 
unlevered firm, Gl for a levered firm. E and D are the value at t = 0 of equity and debt, respectively; Eu 
is the value of equity at t = 0 for an unlevered firm, El is the value of equity for a levered firm at t = 0. 
TV is the total value of the firm at t = 0 and equals (G+E+D). τ is the corporate tax rate, g is the 
expected growth rate, gZ is the net investment in fixed assets and working capital at t = 1, ru is the cost 
of capital of an unlevered firm and the total firm (G+E+D), rg is the cost of capital for government’s 
claims, re and rd are the cost of equity and debt (for the levered firm), respectively. 
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Given this framework we can derive the PVTS. In the traditional way, the PVTS 
could be derived directly by discounting the expected tax savings due to debt 
financing.144 The approach we follow recognizes that the value of equity plus debt of 
a levered firm (Vl) is equal to the value of an unlevered firm (Vu) plus the PVTS: 
 PVTSVDE ul +=+         (4) 
However, since we assume that TV of the unlevered firm is equal to TV of the levered 
firm, it follows that by substituting (4) where Vu is set to Eu into (1), 
 lu GGPVTS −=         (5) 
Following this approach, the PVTS could be defined as (see A1 and B1 from Table 2): 
gr
DrEBIT
gr
EBITGGPVTS
g
d
u
lu −
−−−=−=
ττ )()(     (6) 
Rewriting (6) yields: 
                                                 
144 Note that the value of the firm in this traditional sense is only E plus D since it ignores the present 
value of the expected taxes for the government. 
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Equation (7) can be rewritten as: 
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Recognizing that equation A1 from Table 1 is present in the first part on the right 
hand side, equation (8) becomes: 
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By inserting (5) into (9) we find: 
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Equation (9) and (11) both give the PVTS by taking the difference between Gu and Gl. 
 
To derive the general formula for rg, we make use of column B of Table 1: 
DE
gr
GCFDCFECFDETVG l
u
ll −−−
++=−−=  (12) 
If we multiply each side by ( )gru −  and substitute ( )grE el − , ( )grD d −  and 
( )grG gl −  for ECF, DCF and GCF, respectively, we find: 
)()()()()()( grDgrEgrGgrDgrEgrG uulgldelul −−−−−+−+−=−  (13) 
Equation (13) can be rewritten as: 
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Equation (14) is the general formula for rg.145 If debt is zero, then rg = re = ru. If 
debt is higher than 0, we expect rg to be higher than ru. However, as will be shown in 
the next section, this is not always true. 
 
5.4. A comparison of implied rgs 
To derive the implied rgs for the models used by Myers (1974), Miles and Ezzell 
(1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985), we insert the equity functions as summarized in 
Table 2 into (14). 146 The implied rgs for the models are given in Table 3. If we insert 
the implied rgs from Table 3 into (11) we find for each of the models the PVTS as 
presented in Table 2 (see Appendix A).  
 
Table 2. APV, WACC and re 
This table presents the adjusted presents value (APV), weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and 
the cost of equity formulas for the models used by Myers (1974), Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris 
and Pringle (1985). Vl is the value of a levered firm, Vu is the value of an unlevered firm, PVTS is the 
present value of the tax shield, τ  is the corporate tax rate, D is the value of debt, E is the value of 
equity, L = D/V, rd is the cost of debt, ru is the cost of capital of an unlevered firm, ra is the ‘textbook’ 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC), and re is cost of equity. 
 
Model  Adjusted Present Value Vu plus PVTS 
Weighted Average 
Cost of Capital Cost of Equity 
Myers (1974) 
 
gr
DrVV
d
dul −+=
τ  Lr
gr
gr
rr d
d
u
ua τ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−= ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−+= E
D
gr
rrrrr
d
d
duue
τ1)(
Miles and 
Ezzell (1980) 
 
D
gr
r
r
rVV
u
d
d
uul τ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
++=
1
1 Lr
r
r
rr d
d
u
ua τ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+−=
1
1 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−−+= E
D
r
rrrrr
d
d
duue 1
1)( τ  
Harris and 
Pringle (1985) 
 
gr
DrVV
u
dul −+=
τ  Lrrr dua τ−=  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+=
E
Drrrr duue )(  
 
If we compare the formulas in Table 3, we find that the implied rg for Harris and 
Pringle’s model is not and for Miles and Ezzell’s model is almost not influenced by 
leverage. For both models (in contrast to that of Myers), it seems that the risk of the 
claim of the government is (and for Miles and Ezzell, almost) independent of 
leverage. At first, this finding may seem hard to explain. As we know, re increases 
                                                 
145 Equation (14) is the general formula for rg under the assumption that ru is the discount rate for the 
pre-tax cash flows. If we do not make this restriction we find; rg = rtv + (D/Gl)(rtv - rd) - (E/Gl)(re - rtv) 
where rtv is the pre-tax discount rate. For the unlevered firm, the implied cost of capital of 
government’s claim (rgu) then is; rtv - (Eu/Gu)(ru - rtv), and the PVTS = (EBIT)τ / (rgu - g) - ((EBIT - 
rdD)τ)/(rg - g). 
146 See Ehrhart and Daves (2002) for general formulas. 
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with leverage, because of the increase in financial risk. That is, equity holders hold a 
residual claim just like the government. Firms first pay interest, then tax and 
dividends. If leverage increases the variability in ECFs, it increases the variability in 
GCFs as well. However, under the assumptions we made, the low rgs for Harris and 
Pringle’s model and Miles and Ezzell’s are a logic consequence which will be 
illustrated in the next section with a numerical example.  
 
Table 3. Implied rg 
This table presents the cost of government’s claim, rg, for the models used by Myers (1974), Miles and 
Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985). We derived rg by inserting the cost of equity functions 
from Table 2 into equation (14). ru is the cost of capital of an unlevered firm, rd is the cost of debt, D is 
the market value of debt, Gl is the present value of the expected taxes levered firm, τ is the corporate 
tax rate and g the expected growth rate. 
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5.5. A numerical example: rg and the PVTS for three classical models 
In this section, we provide a numerical example of how to calculate rg for the models 
of Myers, Harris and Pringle and Miles and Ezzell. We show that PVTS is equal to the 
present value of the expected tax shields and equal to Gu minus Gl. Further, we give a 
logical explanation for the low implied rgs for Harris and Pringle’s (and Miles and 
Ezzell’s) model. We look at two scenarios. In scenario one, we assume the expected 
growth rate is zero, while in scenario two, we assume an expected growth rate of 
2.5%. 
The firm’s balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, cash flows, valuation 
parameters and calculations for scenario one and two are presented in Table 4 and 
Table 5, respectively. The balance sheets at t = 0 and the profit and loss accounts at t 
= 1 are identical for both scenarios. However, the expected cash flows at t = 1, except 
for the government cash flow (GCF),147 differ because of the investments that have to 
be made at t = 1. Under the no growth scenario, the firm must invest to maintain its 
fixed assets at a level that enables it to ensure constant cash flows. Under this 
                                                 
147 The GCFs are identical because GCF is a percentage of earnings before tax at t = 1. 
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scenario, working capital remains constant. This implies that the yearly investment is 
equal to the depreciation of its fixed assets. Under the growth scenario, the firm has to 
invest more to achieve growth. This extra investment at the end of year t equals 2.5% 
of the book value of its assets at the beginning of year t. The firm starts to invest in 
growth at t = 1. The dividend under each scenario is equal to ECF. 
The cost of capital for the government, rg, is calculated as follows. First we 
calculate Vl using the APV method with the formulas from column 2 of Table 2. We 
calculate the market value of E by subtracting D from Vl. We then calculate TV by 
applying (12) and Gl by subtracting Vl from TV. We calculate re using the formulas 
from column 4 of Table 2. Finally, to find rg for the three models, we insert the 
appropriate value for ru, re, D, E, and Gl into (14).148 Tables 4 and 5 present the 
alternative calculation for the PVTS following equation (5), as well as an alternative 
calculation for Gl. PVTS is equal to the present value of the expected tax shields but is 
also equal to the difference between Gu and Gl. In addition, Gl is the difference 
between TV and Vl, and is equal to the present value of the expected tax payments 
with rg as discount rate. 
Under both scenarios, the implied rg for Miles and Ezzell’s model as well as for 
Harris and Pringle’s model is close to or equal to ru. This low rg can be explained as 
follows. For Miles and Ezzell’s model, the weighted average of rd and re is close to ru, 
and for Harris and Pringle, it is equal to ru. Since the total cost of capital of TV is ru, 
the implied rg is close to or equal to ru. After all, the weighted average of rd, re and rg 
equals the cost of capital of TV, see (3). 
The implied rg for Myers’ model is higher than the implied rgs of the former 
models. The explanation follows the same line of arguments. Since the weighted 
average of rd and re is lower than ru (because the discount rate for PVTS is lower than 
ru),149 and the total cost of capital of TV is still ru, rg must be higher than ru. The 
difference between rg in the non-growth and growth scenario for Myers’ model can be 
explained by the difference in the relative value of Vu and PVTS. Because the cash 
flows from operations and the cash flows from the tax shields are discounted at 
different rates, their respective values are affected differently non-proportionally by 
                                                 
148 An alternative for this last step is to use the derived relations from Table 3. 
149 The weighted average of the required returns of the assets in the traditional sense, i.e., Vu + PVTS, 
equals the weighted average of the required returns of the providers of capital (E + D). 
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growth. Hence the weighted average of rd and re becomes a function of growth (see 
Ehrhardt and Daves, 2002). If rd is the discount rate for the tax shield, the weighted 
average of rd and re decreases with growth. Since the cost of capital of TV remains ru, 
and is equal to the weighted average of rd, re and rg, rg increases with growth.150 
                                                 
150 In the model used by Myers, re decreases from 11.88% to 10.47% because i) the risk of the assets 
(Vu + PVTS) decreased as a result of an increase in the PVTS as percentage of Vl, and ii) leverage (D/E) 
decreased. Leverage decreased due to growth because debt at t = 0 is fixed and the value of this firm is 
positively related to growth (i.e., the return on new invested capital is higher than the cost of capital). 
Appendix B contains another numerical example. The example in Appendix B is based on an 
illustration from Harris and Pringle (1985) where Vl, D/Vl, re, rd and τ are given.  
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Table 4. Example without Growth 
This table presents the balance sheets, profit and loss accounts (P & L), cash flows and valuation for 
the scenario without growth. The balance sheets show net working capital (NWC), net fixed assets 
(NFA), and debt and the book value (BV) of equity. The P & L shows earnings before interest, taxes 
and depreciation (EBITDA), depreciation, interest, profit before tax (PBT), and tax and profit after tax 
(PAT). The column Cash presents the investment (I) in NWC and NFA, the operating cash flow (OCF), 
government cash flow (GCF), the increase of debt (Δ Debt), the debt cash flow (DCF), the equity cash 
flow (ECF), the capital cash flow (CCF) and the free cash flow (FCF). The valuations items are 
measured at t = 0: the unlevered value of the firm (Vu), the present value of tax shields (PVTS), the 
value of equity of the levered firm (El), the value of the government’s claim for a levered firm (Gl) and 
an unlevered firm (Gu) and Total Value (TV). 
 
Balance Sheet t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 P & L t = 1 t = 2 Cash Flows t = 1 t = 2
NWC 100.0 100.0 100.0 EBITDA 270.0 270.0 EBITDA 270.0 270.0
NFA 1,000.0 1,000.0 1,000.0 Depreciation 50.0 50.0 I in NWC 0.0 0.0
Total Assets 1,100.0 1,100.0 1,100.0 EBIT 220.0 220.0 I in NFA -50.0 -50.0
 Interest 30.0 30.0 OCF 220.0 220.0
Debt 600.0 600.0 600.0 PBT 190.0 190.0 GCF 76.0 76.0
Equity (BV) 500.0 500.0 500.0 Tax 76.0 76.0 Δ Debt 0.0 0.0
Total Liabilities 1,100.0 1,100.0 1,100.0 PAT 114.0 114.0 DCF 30.0 30.0
  ECF 114.0 114.0
  CCF 144.0 144.0
  FCF 132.0 132.0
Valuation parameters 
g = growth rate = 0%; rd = cost of debt = 5%; 
ru = cost of unlevered firm = 10%; τ = corporate tax rate = 40% 
 
Application APV to find Vl 
Vl = E + D = Vu + PVTS 
Vu = FCF1/( ru ) = 132 / (0.1) = 1,320 
PVTS Myers (1974) = (0.05 x 0.4 x 600) / 0.05 = 240 
Vl = 1,320 + 240 = 1,560. E = 1,560 - 600 = 960 
PVTS Miles and Ezzell (1980) = ((1 + 0.1) / (1 + 0.05)) x (0.05/0.1) 0.4 x 600 = 125.71 
Vl = 1,320 + 125.71 = 1,445.71. E = 1,445.71 - 600 = 845.71 
PVTS Harris and Pringle (1985) = (0.05 x 0.4 x 600) / 0.1 = 120 
Vl = 1,320 + 120 = 1,440. E = 1,440 - 600 = 840 
 
Present value of government’s claim (Gl) 
Gl = TV - Vl  
TV = E + D + G = (ECF1 + DFC1 + GFC1) / ru = (114 + 30 + 76) / 0.1 = 2,200 
Gl Myers (1974) = 2,200 - 1,560 = 640 
Gl Miles and Ezzell (1980) = 2,200 - 1,445.71 = 754.29 
Gl Harris and Pringle (1985) = 2,200 - 1,440 = 760 
 
Required return on equity (re) 
re Myers (1974) = 0.1 + (0.1 - 0.05) x (1 - (0.05 x 0.4) / 0.05)) x (600 / 960) = 11.88% 
re Miles and Ezzell (1980) = 0.1 + (0.1 - 0.05) x (1 - (0.05 x 0.4) / (1+ 0.05)) x (600 / 845.71) = 13.48% 
re Harris and Pringle (1985) = 0.1 + (0.1 - 0.05) x (600 / 840) = 13.57% 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Cost of government’s claim (rg) 
rg Myers (1974) = 0.1 + (600 / 640) x (0.1 - 0.05) - (960 / 640) x (0.1188 - 0.1) = 11.88% 
rg Miles and Ezzell (1980) = 0.1 + (600 / 754.29) x (0.1 - 0.05) - (845.71 / 754.29) x (0.1348 - 0.1) = 10.08% 
rg Harris and Pringle (1985) = 0.1 + (600 / 760) x (0.1 - 0.05) - (840 / 760) x (0.1357 - 0.1) = 10% 
 
Alternative valuation method for PVTS 
PVTS = Gu - Gl 
Gu = TV - Vu = 2,200 - 1,320 = 880 
PVTS Myers (1974) = Gu - Gl Myers (1974) = 880 - 640 = 240 
PVTS Miles and Ezzell (1980) = Gu - Gl Miles and Ezzell (1980) = 880 - 754.29 = 125.71 
PVTS Harris and Pringle (1985) = Gu - Gl Harris and Pringle (1985) = 880 - 760 = 120 
 
Alternative valuation method for present value of government’s claim (Gl) 
Gl = GCF1/ rg 
Gl Myers (1974) = 76 / 0.1188 = 640 
Gl Miles and Ezzell (1980) = 76 / 0.1008 = 754.29 
Gl Harris and Pringle (1985) = 76 / 0.10 = 760 
 
5.6. Summary 
The total value of a firm comprises the present value of equity cash flows, debt cash 
flows and government cash flows. The value of the claim the government is equal to 
the present value of the expected tax payments, with its own discount rate rg. In this 
chapter we derive a general formula for this particular ‘cost of capital’. We show that 
for the models used in Myers (1974), Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle 
(1985), the PVTS is equal to the difference between the present value of the expected 
taxes paid by the unlevered firm and the levered firm with each model’s implied rg as 
discount rate. Given our valuation framework where we assume that ru is the discount 
for the pre-tax cash flow, we show in contrast to Myers’ mode, low implied rgs for 
both Miles and Ezzell’s model and Harris and Pringle’s model. This result is a logic 
consequence of the assumption we made about the risk of the pre-tax cash flow. 
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Table 5. Example with Growth 
This table presents the balance sheets, profit and loss accounts (P & L), cash flows and valuations for 
the scenario with growth. The balance sheets show net working capital (NWC), net fixed assets (NFA), 
and debt and the book value (BV) of equity. The P & L shows earnings before interest, taxes and 
depreciation (EBITDA), depreciation, interest, profit before tax (PBT), and tax and profit after tax 
(PAT). The column Cash presents the investment (I) in NWC and NFA, the operating cash flow (OCF), 
government cash flow (GCF), the increase of debt (Δ Debt), the debt cash flow (DCF), the equity cash 
flow (ECF), the capital cash flow (CCF) and the free cash flow (FCF). The valuations items are 
measured at t = 0: the unlevered value of the firm (Vu), the present value of tax shields (PVTS), the 
value of equity of the levered firm (El), the value of the government’s claim for a levered firm (Gl) and 
an unlevered firm (Gu) and Total Value (TV). 
 
Balance Sheet t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 P & L t = 1 t = 2 Cash Flows t = 1 t = 2
NWC 100.0 102.5 105.1 EBITDA 270.0 276.8 EBITDA 270.0 276.8
NFA 1,000.0 1,025.0 1050.6 Depreciation 50.0 51.3 I in NWC -2.5 -2.6
Total Assets 1,100.0 1,127.5 1,155.7 EBIT 220.0 225.5 I in NFA -75.0 -76.9
 Interest 30.0 30.8 OCF 192.5 197.3
Debt 600.0 615.0 630.4 PBT 190.0 194.8 GCF 76.0 77.9
Equity (BV) 500.0 512.5 525.3 Tax 76.0 77.9 Δ Debt 15.0 15.4
Total Liabilities 1,100.0 1,127.5 1,155.7 PAT 114.0 116.9 DCF 15.0 15.4
   ECF 101.5 104.0
      CCF 116.5 119.4
      FCF 104.5 107.1
Valuation parameters 
g = growth rate = 2.5%; rd = cost of debt = 5%; 
ru = cost of unlevered firm = 10%; τ = corporate tax rate = 40% 
 
Application APV to find Vl 
Vl = E + D = Vu + PVTS 
Vu = FCF1/( ru - g) = 104.5 / (0.1-0.025) = 1,393.33 
PVTS Myers (1974) = (0.05 x 0.4 x 600) / (0.05 - 0.025) = 480 
Vl = 1,393.33 + 480 = 1,873.33. E = 1,873.33 - 600 = 1,273.33 
PVTS Miles and Ezzell (1980) = ((1 + 0.1) / (1 + 0.05)) x (0.05/(0.1-0.025)) 0.4 x 600 = 167.62 
Vl = 1,393.33 + 167.62 = 1,560.95. E = 1,560.95 - 600 = 960.95 
PVTS Harris and Pringle (1985) = (0.05 x 0.4 x 600) / (0.1-0.025) = 160 
Vl = 1,393.33 + 160 = 1,553.33. E = 1,553.33 - 600 = 953.33 
 
Present value of government’s claim (Gl) 
Gl = TV - Vl 
TV = E + D + G = (ECF1 + DFC1 + GFC1) / (ru – g )= (114 + 30 + 76) / (0.1- 0.025) = 2,566.67 
Gl Myers (1974) = 2,566.67 - 1,873.33 = 693.33 
Gl Miles and Ezzell (1980) = 2,566.67 - 1,560.95 = 1,005.71 
Gl Harris and Pringle (1985) = 2,566.67 - 1,553.33 = 1,013.33 
 
Required return on equity (re) 
re Myers (1974) = 0.1 + (0.1 - 0.05) x (1 - (0.05 x 0.4) / (0.05 - 0.025)) x (600 / 1,273.33) = 10.47% 
re Miles and Ezzell (1980) = 0.1 + (0.1 - 0.05) x (1 - (0.05 x 0.4) / (1+ 0.05)) x (600 / 960.95) = 13.06% 
re Harris and Pringle (1985) = 0.1 + (0.1 - 0.05) x (600 / 953.33) = 13.15% 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Cost of government’s claim (rg) 
rg Myers (1974) = 0.1 + (600 / 693.33) x (0.1 - 0.05) - (1,273.33 / 693.33) x (0.1047 - 0.1) = 13.46% 
rg Miles and Ezzell (1980) = 0.1 + (600 / 1,005.71) x (0.1 - 0.05) - (960.95 / 1,005.71) x (0.1306 - 0.1) = 10.06% 
rg Harris and Pringle (1985) = 0.1 + (600 / 1,013.33) x (0.1 - 0.05) - (953.33 / 1,013.33) x (0.1315 - 0.1) = 10.00% 
 
Alternative valuation method for PVTS 
PVTS = Gu - Gl 
Gu = TV - Vu = 2,566.67 - 1,393.33 = 1,173.33 
PVTS Myers (1974) = Gu - Gl Myers (1974) = 1,173.33 - 693.33 = 480 
PVTS Miles and Ezzell (1980) = Gu - Gl Miles and Ezzell (1980) = 1,173.33 - 1,005.71 = 167.62 
PVTS Harris and Pringle (1985) = Gu - Gl Harris and Pringle (1985) = 1,173.33 - 1,013.33 = 160 
 
Alternative valuation method for present value of government’s claim (Gl) 
Gl = GCF1/ (rg - g) 
Gl Myers (1974) = 76 / (0.1346 - 0.025) = 693.33 
Gl Miles and Ezzell (1980) = 76 / (0.1006 - 0.025) = 1,005.71 
Gl Harris and Pringle (1985) = 76 / (0.10 - 0.025) = 1,013.33 
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Appendix A. Proof: PVTS = Gu - Gl 
 
To prove that PVTS is equal to the expressions for PVTS given in Table 2, we insert 
the implied rg from Table 3 into (11) for each model. 
 
Derivation of PVTS based on Myers (1974) 
If we insert Myers’ government risk rate function from Table 3 into (11), we find: 
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Q.E.D. 
 
Derivation of PVTS based on Miles and Ezzell (1980) 
If we insert Miles and Ezzells’ government risk rate function from Table 3 into (11) 
we find: 
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Q.E.D. 
 
Derivation of PVTS based on Harris and Pringle (1985) 
If we insert Harris and Pringle’s government risk rate function from Table 3 into (11) 
we find: 
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Equation (19) can be rewritten as: 
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Q.E.D. 
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Appendix B. Example Based on an Illustration of Harris and Pringle (1985) 
 
Instead of using a fixed amount of debt at t = 0 and an unlevered cost of capital as 
given, this example (see Table B1 on the next page) starts with an observed leverage 
ratio, and an ‘observed’ cost of equity and cost of debt.151 Because re and rd are given, 
ru differs under each model with different TVs as a result (since the Gls (and Gus) 
differ). Using equation (14), we find rg for each of the models: 17.00%, 15.35% and 
15.20% for the models used by Myers, Miles and Ezzell and Harris and Pringle, 
respectively. Again, the rg of Myers model is highest and the rg of Harris and Pringle 
is the lowest. Of course, in this example, part of the differences between the implied 
rgs can be explained by different rus. 
 
 
 
                                                 
151 We use the valuation parameters of an illustration from Harris and Pringle (1985), p. 241-242. 
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Table B
.1 Exam
ple - H
arris and Pringle (1985, p. 241) 
This table presents the observed m
arket value of a levered firm
 (V
l ), the inferred cost of capital of an unlevered firm
 (ru ), the inferred total value of the levered firm
 (TV), the 
inferred value of an unlevered firm
 (V
u ), the inferred present value of the claim
 of the governm
ent of an unlevered (G
u ) and levered firm
 (G
l ) and the present value of the tax 
shields (PVTS). A
ll values are values at t = 0. Expected cash flow
s are cash flow
s at t = 1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Inferred 
M
odel 
O
bserved V
alue of Levered Firm
, V
l  
ru  
TV =
 V
u +
 G
u  
V
u  
G
u  
G
l  =
 TV - V
l  
PVTS =
 V
l  - V
u  =
 G
u  - G
l  
 
V
l  
= 
Equity 
+ 
D
ebt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
yers (1974) 
7.31 
= 
5.12 
 
2.19 
15.87%
 
11.67 
6.30 
5.37 
4.36 
1.01 
M
iles and Ezzell (1980) 
7.31 
= 
5.12 
 
2.19 
15.26%
 
12.14 
6.55 
5.58 
4.83 
0.76 
H
arris and Pringle (1985) 
7.31 
= 
5.12 
 
2.19 
15.20%
 
12.18 
6.58 
5.60 
4.87 
0.73 
 Valuation param
eters 
g = grow
th rate = 0%
; rd  = cost of debt = 11%
; re  = cost of equity = 17%
; L = leverage ratio = D
ebt / (Equity + D
ebt) = 30%
; τ = corporate tax rate = 46%
; O
C
F after tax = operating cash flow
 
as if 100%
 equity financed = 1 in perpetuity; O
C
F before tax =
 O
C
F after tax / (1 - τ) =
 1 / (1 - τ) =
 1.8519; ru  depends, given re  and rd , on the assum
ptions of the risk of the PVTS; the low
er 
this risk, the higher the ru . See H
arris and Pringle (1985). 
 V
u  =
 O
C
F after tax / ru  
V
u  M
yers (1974) = 1 / 0.1587 = 6.30; V
u  M
iles and Ezzell (1980) = 1 / 0.1526 = 6.55; V
u  H
arris and Pringle (1985) = 1 / 0.1520 = 6.58 
 G
u  = governm
ent cash flow
 of unlevered firm
 / ru ; governm
ent cash flow
 of unlevered firm
 = τ x EBIT = 0.46 x 1.8519 = 0.8519 
G
u  M
yers (1974) = 0.8519 / 0.1587 = 5.37; G
u  M
iles and Ezzell (1980) = 0.8519 / 0.1526 = 5.58; G
u  H
arris and Pringle (1985) = 0.8519 / 0.1520 = 5.60 
 C
ost of governm
ent’s claim
 (rg ) 
rg  M
yers (1974) = 0.1587 + (2.19 / 4.36) x (0.1587 - 0.11) - (5.12 / 4.36) x (0.17 - 0.1587) = 17.00%
 
rg  M
iles and Ezzell (1980) = 0.1526 + (2.19 / 4.83) x (0.1526 - 0.11) - (5.12 / 4.83) x (0.17 - 0.1526) = 15.35%
 
rg  H
arris and Pringle (1985) = 0.1520 + (2.19 / 4.87) x (0.1520 - 0.11) - (5.12 / 4.87) x (0.17 - 0.1520) = 15.20%
 
 Alternative valuation m
ethod for present value of governm
ent’s claim
 (G
l ) 
G
l  =
 G
C
F
1 / (rg  - g) 
G
l  M
yers (1974) = (1.8519 - 0.11 x 2.19)(0.46) / (0.17 - 0.025) = 4.36 
G
l  M
iles and Ezzell (1980) = (1.8519 - 0.11 x 2.19)(0.46) / (0.1535) = 4.83 
G
l  H
arris and Pringle (1985) = (1.8519 - 0.11 x 2.19)(0.46) / (0.1520 - 0.025) = 4.87 
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Chapter 6 
The discount rate for discounted cash flow valuations 
of intangible assets152 
 
 
Abstract 
To an increasing degree, companies are interested in the separate value of intangible 
assets. The need for separate valuation partly arises from new international 
accounting standards of the International Accounting Standards Board. Under 
certain conditions, these accounting standards allow the value of intangible assets to 
be determined using the discounted cash flow method, which requires the 
determination of the cost of capital of the relevant intangible assets. In this chapter, 
the required return of intangible assets for 8 different business sectors is determined 
by means of an empirical study of companies from the US Standard & Poor’s 500 
Index. The resulting required return is subsequently compared with proxies for the 
required return on intangible assets used in practice, such as the weighted average 
cost of capital. As anticipated, the average required return for intangible assets was 
higher than the WACC. The cost of equity appears to best approximate the cost of 
capital of intangible assets. 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the discount rate used for discounting cash flows generated by 
intangible assets. Intangible assets include e.g. business relations, software, 
trademarks, trade secrets or patents. To an increasing degree, companies are interested 
in the separate value of intangible assets. This knowledge is often essential for 
important commercial decisions, such as assessing brand portfolios, for purchase and 
sale transactions of intellectual properties and for valuations arising from international 
accounting standards. In the international accounting rules of the International 
Accounting Standards Board, under a number of different circumstances the value of 
an asset should be determined using the discounted cash flow (DCF) method. In 
                                                 
152 This chapter is based on Stegink, Schauten and De Graaff (2006). We are grateful to Arjan Vos and 
Jeroen Weimer for their valuable contribution. Any remaining errors are our own. 
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particular this is the case if it is not possible to determine the fair value153 of an asset 
based on a price in an active market,154 which often is the relevant situation for 
intangible assets. 
Although a range of methods is available to determine the value of intangible 
assets (some of which will be discussed below), both in the literature (Smith and Parr, 
2005; Reilly and Schweihs, 1998; Mard et al., 2002) and in practice there is a distinct 
preference for the DCF approach. The literature also explains how to determine the 
cash flows resulting from the ownership of intangible assets. However, suggestions 
for determining the appropriate discount rate are limited. This chapter aims to fill this 
gap by providing more insight into the discount rate of individual intangible assets in 
relation to the cost of equity as well as the cost of debt and the cost of capital of the 
company as a whole.155 
                                                 
153 Fair value is the amount for which an asset could be exchanged between knowledgeable, willing 
parties in an arm’s length transaction. 
154 Upon an acquisition, the acquiring company should value the identifiable assets and liabilities of the 
acquired company that satisfy the recognition criteria (IAS 38.21) at fair value (IFRS 3.36). An 
intangible asset can only be identified and recognised separately (of the acquired goodwill) on the 
balance sheet of the acquiring company if the fair value can be measured reliably (IFRS 3.37c and 45). 
IAS 38 (paragraphs 35-41) deals with measuring the fair value of an intangible asset which was 
obtained by the acquisition of another company. If the fair value cannot be measured on the basis of 
market prices on an active market, the fair value can be measured on the basis of the market prices of 
similar assets or by using indirect estimation methods (including the calculation of the present value of 
future cash flows). In certain circumstances, the DFC method can also be used for so-called impairment 
tests (IAS 36): if the value of an asset at balance sheet date exceeds its recoverable amount, the asset is 
deemed to be impaired. In this case, the company should depreciate the value on the balance sheet to 
the recoverable amount and recognise the impairment loss. The recoverable amount is the highest of an 
asset’s fair value less costs to sell and its value in use (IAS 36.18). The value in use is based on the 
cash flow projections (IAS 36 paragraphs 30-57). 
155 It is common within the field of corporate finance to determine the value of a company/division/ 
project as a whole. It is unusual to award a value to a separate balance sheet item. Apart from that, 
there is usually no need to do this. We demonstrate that it is possible to use corporate finance theory to 
determine a discount rate for intangible assets. This deduction is based on a number of assumptions: 
i) the non-intangible assets generate a certain return as separate item (without interaction with the 
intangible assets); and ii) the company as a whole generates a certain return with the aid of all the 
assets (including intangible assets). Using the derived discount rate for intangible assets, it is 
subsequently possible to measure the value of intangible assets using the DCF method. The cash flows 
generated by the intangible assets are equal to the difference between the cash flows generated by the 
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The approach we put forward is based on the WARA (Weighted Average Return 
on Assets) method of Smith and Parr (2005).156 According to the WARA method, the 
company’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is equal to the weighted average 
return on the various assets (WARA) within the company. Using this method, it is 
fairly straightforward to derive the required return (the discount rate) on intangible 
assets. 
The potential of the WARA approach is demonstrated by means of an empirical 
application involving the constituents of the S&P500 index over the year 2004.157 
Using the WARA method we obtain the required return on intangible assets for eight 
different business sectors. The calculated required returns on intangible assets are 
subsequently compared to the most common proxies for the required return on 
intangible assets. The purpose of this comparison is to determine the best proxy for 
the discount rate of intangible assets. The proxies are: the company’s WACC 
(weighted average cost of capital), the unlevered cost of equity158 and the levered cost 
of equity.159 As expected we show empirically that the required return on intangible 
assets is higher than the company’s WACC as well as the unlevered cost of equity. 
We also show that the levered cost of equity underestimates the required return on 
intangible assets. However, of the three proxies, the discount rate for intangible assets 
is best approximated by the levered cost of equity. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief background of the 
methods that are currently available for valuing intangible assets and examines the 
methods and proxies used to calculate the discount rate for a DCF analysis in practice. 
Section 3 describes the method and data of the empirical study, as well as the 
hypotheses that were tested. In Section 4, the results of the empirical study are 
presented. Finally, Section 5 summarises our conclusions. 
                                                                                                                                            
company/division/project as a whole, including intangible assets, and the same cash flows, but 
excluding intangible assets. This chapter does not deal with how to determine these cash flows. 
156 Ibid. p.764-766.  
157 For 2002 and 2003 we find similar results. In this chapter we report the results for 2004 only. 
158 The unlevered cost of equity is the required return of the company as a whole as if the company 
were fully funded by equity. 
159 The levered cost of equity is the return that the providers of equity demand for the business risk and 
the financial risk they run. The business risk is determined by the systematic risk of the assets of the 
company as a whole; the financial risk is determined by the relative size of the debt in relation to 
equity. The higher this ratio (also known as leverage), the higher the required return. 
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6.2. Methods of intangible asset valuation and the discount rate 
6.2.1. Methods for the valuation of intangible assets 
Valuation methods for intangible assets can be divided into four categories160: the 
costs approach, the market approach, the residual approach and the DCF approach. 
According to the costs approach, the value of an intangible asset is equal to the costs 
that would be incurred at the moment of valuation in order to replace or reproduce the 
intangible asset. The market approach measures an intangible asset using the market 
prices for similar intangible assets. The residual approach is indirect and sets the value 
of the total of all intangible assets equal to the difference between the total firm value 
and the net value of all other assets. Finally, the DCF approach analyses the future 
incremental free cash flows that are generated by the intangible asset. By discounting 
these free cash flows to their present value, we obtain an estimate of the value of the 
intangible asset.161 The DCF approach is preferable to the other methods in most 
cases, because the user is prompted to analyse the characteristics and market 
circumstances of the intangible asset to be valued. Moreover, the risks that 
accompany the free cash flows are taken into account. 
 
6.2.2. Methods for determining the discount rate 
The DCF method raises the question of which discount rate should be used to 
discount the future cash flows back to the present. In other words, how risky are these 
cash flows? The discount rate of an asset is also called the minimum return 
requirement for investors and is equal to the minimum return required on the asset. 
The model most used in practice to determine the required return on an asset is the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM).162 The CAPM assumes a one-to-one (positive) 
relation between systematic risk (beta)163 and required return. The beta of an asset that 
                                                 
160 Real options and the technology factor method (for measuring technologies) can be seen as hybrid 
variations of the identified methods (Smith and Parr, 2005), but will not be dealt with in view of the 
restricted scope of this chapter. 
161 For a summary of the methods that can be used to determine these cash flows, see Smith and Parr 
(2005) and Reilly and Schweihs (1998).  
162 For alternative pricing methods, please refer to Brealey et al. (2006) or Levy and Post (2005). 
163 Beta of object i is equal to the co-variance of the returns on object i with the returns on the market 
portfolio divided by the variance of the returns on the market portfolio. Since the market portfolio is 
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is publicly traded can be estimated by means of regressing the returns of the asset 
against the returns of the relevant market index.164 Intangible assets, however, are not 
publicly traded, so no return data are available and the beta cannot be estimated 
directly.  
The literature suggests several solutions for estimating betas of such non-traded 
assets,165 for example, accounting betas, the pure-play approach and full-information 
approach. With accounting betas, a regression analysis is performed on changes in the 
yearly or quarterly profit of a company in comparison to relative changes in profits for 
the entire market. The pure-play approach tries to estimate the beta of a division of a 
company by means of comparable listed companies. Since the beta of a division is not 
measurable using information on returns, a proxy beta is derived from one or more 
betas of listed companies with activities similar to the division in question. This proxy 
for the beta will then be used as a yardstick of the systematic risk of the division or 
enterprise (Fuller and Kerr, 1981). The full-information method was developed by 
Ehrhardt and Bhagwat (1991) and Boquist and Moore (1983). This approach is based 
on the assumption that one can consider a company as a portfolio of business 
components. The beta of the enterprise is the weighted average of the betas of the 
various types of business components within the enterprise. First, the betas of the 
companies and the weights of the various business components in the companies are 
determined. Secondly, a cross-section regression analysis is conducted to obtain 
estimates of the betas of the various groups of business components (Chua et al., 
2003).  
 
6.2.3. Determining the discount rate of intangible assets  
The methods discussed up to this point are, according to the literature, suitable for 
determining the betas of non-traded assets. Using CAPM, the required return on the 
asset can be determined. In this section, the most commonly used methods will be 
discussed, which, according to the literature, are used in practice for determining the 
required return on intangible assets. In line with CAPM, the required return on 
                                                                                                                                            
not observable, a market index is used instead. Strict application of the CAPM in practice is not 
possible. 
164 The assumption is that beta is stationary through time. 
165 These methods are primarily aimed at measuring the betas of projects and divisions. See Damodaran 
(1999), Ehrhard and Bhagwat (1991) and Patterson (1995). 
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intangible assets is the required return that reflects the systematic business risk of 
intangible assets. 
Reilly and Schweihs (1998) argue that the WACC of the enterprise can be used as 
a proxy for the required return on the intangible asset. The use of the WACC, 
however, is not always correct. If the risk of the intangible asset is higher (lower) than 
the risk of the enterprise as a whole, the WACC gives an underestimate (overestimate) 
of the required return. Moreover, the WACC gives an underestimate of the business 
risk if the tax benefit of debt is included in the calculation of the WACC.166 
Smith and Parr (2005) discuss a different commonly used proxy for the required 
return on intangible assets. Smith and Parr suggest that the unlevered cost of equity is 
a reasonable approximation of the actual required return, because—as they assume—
intangible assets in most cases are funded with equity. This reasoning does not appear 
to be correct in all cases. The unlevered cost of capital of the enterprise reflects the 
business risk of the enterprise as a whole. If the risk of the intangible assets is 
different from the risk of the enterprise as a whole, which is likely to occur in 
practice, the unlevered cost of capital gives a biased estimate of the required return on 
intangible assets. Hence, even if we assume that intangible assets can very rarely be 
funded with debt, it cannot be concluded that the unlevered cost of capital of the 
enterprise is a good proxy for the required return on the intangible assets. 
On the other hand, when the levered cost of equity is used as proxy, the additional 
risk arising from debt funding by the company is also charged on to the intangible 
assets. This appears to be inappropriate. We are, after all, only interested in the 
required return as compensation for the systematic business risk of the intangible 
asset. Nevertheless, it is imaginable that the levered cost of capital of the company 
provides a better approximation of the required return on the intangible asset. By 
including the compensation for incurring financial risk in the levered cost of equity, 
the levered cost of equity is higher than the WACC and higher than the unlevered cost 
of equity. If the risk of intangible assets is indeed higher than the assets of the 
                                                 
166 The tax benefit of debt (deductible interest charges) results in a lower WACC than the unlevered 
cost of equity when the discount rate of the tax shield is lower than the unlevered cost of equity. If the 
WACC is calculated as the weighted average of the cost of equity and the cost of debt after tax, the 
WACC is even lower. We calculate the WACC as the weighted average of the cost of equity and debt 
before corporate tax (see equation (3)). 
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company as a whole, the levered cost of equity may give a better approximation of the 
cost of capital of the intangible assets.  
The build-up method provides a summary of all the types of risks that are relevant 
for the intangible assets to be valued. Each risk is subsequently awarded a return value 
to compensate for that risk (Smith, 1997). The required return thus comprises the 
components that add up to the total systematic risk.  
In our opinion, the WARA method is the theoretically most sound approach for 
determining the required rate of return on assets, and hence is the preferable approach 
for obtaining the appropriate discount rate of intangible assets.167 The WARA method 
will be discussed in detail in the next section.  
 
6.3. Method, data and hypotheses 
6.3.1. Method 
The assets of a company can be divided into different categories. For the purpose of 
this study, the company consists of a portfolio of monetary assets (net working 
capital), tangible fixed assets and intangible assets. If the company is funded by both 
equity and debt we distinguish the present value of tax shields (PVTS) as a separate 
asset category. The value of the company is then composed as illustrated in Figure 1. 
This figure represents the market value of the monetary assets, tangible fixed assets, 
and intangible assets. The tax shield is stated as a separate item. The value of the other 
assets (VU) excludes the value of the tax shield; in other words, the value of the 
company as if it were entirely funded by equity.  
 
Figure 1. Company balance sheet in market values 
 
COMPANY BALANCE SHEET (MARKET VALUE)
MONETARY ASSETS
TANGIBLE FIXED ASSETS
INTANGIBLE ASSETS
TAX SHIELD
EQUITY
DEBTVU
VL VL
 
 
                                                 
167 In line with Smith and Parr (2005), we assume that the weighted average return on the different 
assets within the company equals the WACC.  
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In the absence of market information about the value of the intangible assets held 
by companies in the dataset, the empirical study uses the residual method to calculate 
the value of the intangible assets. In this context, we assume an efficient capital 
market, that is, the market values the company correctly and determines the value of 
all the assets together. The method or discount rate used by the company itself to 
measure intangible assets is not directly relevant. The value of the total of all the 
intangible assets is equal to the difference between the enterprise value and the value 
of the other assets. This can be formulated as follows: 
 
VL = E + D = VU + PVTS = MA + TFA + IA + PVTS    (1) 
 
where VL is the market value of the levered company, E is the market value of the 
equity, D is the market value of the debt, VU is the market value of the unlevered 
company, PVTS is the present value of the tax shield, MA is the market value of the 
monetary assets, TFA is the market value of tangible fixed assets, and finally IA is the 
market value of the intangible assets. The identity in (1) can be rewritten to obtain an 
expression for the market value of the intangible assets in terms of the value of other 
components of the firm: 
  
IA = VL - MA - TFA - PVTS        (2) 
 
In order to determine the discount rate of the intangible assets we apply the WARA 
method. The WARA method that we apply is an adjusted version of the WARA 
method of Smith and Parr. Our model distinguishes itself from that of Smith and Parr 
by the addition of the value of the tax shield as a separate asset as well as the 
application of the WACC before corporate tax instead of after corporate tax. Ignoring 
the tax shield as a separate item leads to an underestimate of the discount rate of the 
intangible assets.168 Applying the WACC after tax leads to an underestimate of the 
discount rate of all the assets (including the intangible assets) of the company. In other 
words, the return required by capital providers (WACC) is equated with the weighted 
                                                 
168 If the tax shield is not stated as a separate item, it is considered to be part of the intangible assets 
when the residual method is applied. Since we assume that the risk of the tax shield is the same as the 
risk of debt, the calculated discount rate of the intangible assets (including the tax shield) would be 
lower. 
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average of the required returns on all the company’s individual or groups of assets 
(WARA): 
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where WACC is the weighted average cost of capital of the company before tax, Re is 
the levered cost of equity, Rd is the cost of capital of the debt, and where RMA, RTFA, 
RIA, and RPVTS are the required returns on monetary assets, tangible fixed assets, 
intangible assets (including goodwill), and the tax shield, respectively. 
 
The required return on intangible assets can be derived from equation (3) and is given 
by: 
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The required return on intangible assets is the required return as if the intangible 
assets are financed with equity only. 
 
6.3.2. Dataset 
The dataset comprises companies from the S&P 500 index for the year 2004. We 
decided to use companies from the S&P 500 index because of the possibility to collect 
data from a large group of comparable companies spread over numerous sectors.169 
Financial institutions were excluded, however, because they have a different equity 
and asset structure.170 Companies of which the proportion of intangible assets is less 
than 15% of the total enterprise value were also removed from the dataset.171 
Ultimately, our sample contains data for 318 companies for the year 2004.  
                                                 
169 The S&P 500 index includes 500 US companies that all represent major sectors. 
170 This is consistent with the majority of the empirical studies referred to in the existing literature 
(including Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
171 We removed observations where IA/VL is less than 15% because possible inaccuracies in RTMA, RTFA, 
RPVTS and the WACC could have too great an influence on the results.  
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The WACC is the weighted average cost of capital of the company before tax. The 
levered cost of equity (Re) is calculated using the CAPM. Since the dataset consists of 
companies from the US S&P 500, the risk-free interest rate (Rf) is equated with the 
‘yield-to-maturity’ on 10-year U.S. government bonds, i.e. 3.7%. The market risk 
premium (MRP) is set at 5%.172 The estimated betas (β) as well as the costs of debt 
(Rd), are obtained from the financial database of Bloomberg. 
The required returns on the different components of monetary assets (cash and cash 
equivalents, transferable securities, receivables, inventories and other monetary 
assets) are assumed to be the same for all the companies involved in the study. The 
required return on the whole group of monetary assets (RMA) is the weighted average 
of the required returns on the different components. The required return on the 
Bloomberg Real Estate Investment Trust Index (BBREIT) was used as proxy 
estimating the required return on tangible fixed assets (RTFA). This results in a required 
return of 6.03% for the year 2004. This variable is assumed to be the same for every 
company. 
The present value of the tax shield is the same as the marginal tax rate (40%) 
multiplied by the value of the debt.173 We assume that the company adheres to a 
previously agreed funding plan, with the value of the debt and the ensuing tax shield 
being fixed for each moment in the future. This implies that the cost of capital of the 
tax shield is the same as the cost of debt (Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2006). 
Initially, the group of companies will be studied as a whole. Subsequently, this 
group is divided into eight sectors (raw materials, communication, cyclic consumer 
products, non-cyclic consumer products, energy, industry, technology and utilities).  
 
6.3.3. Hypotheses 
The hypotheses to be tested are based on the literature referred to in section 6.3. The 
hypotheses are tested using a paired t-test174. The ‘cost of capital of intangible assets’ 
is the RIA value we calculate using the adjusted WARA method. 
                                                 
172 This MRP is used by KPMG Corporate Finance for North American companies, as well as for 
European companies in industrialised countries. 
173 See Kemsley and Nissim (2002) e.g. for empirical evidence. 
174 The paired t-test is used to test the null hypothesis that states that the average of the population of 
paired differences of the two samples equals zero. It is assumed that the paired differences are 
171
 161
Hypothesis 1 
H0: The cost of capital of the intangible assets is equal to the WACC. 
H1: The cost of capital of the intangible assets is not equal to the WACC. 
The above hypothesis is used to ascertain whether intangible assets carry the same 
risk as the company as a whole. Put differently, we test whether the WACC of the 
company is a fair proxy for the required return on intangible assets. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
H0: The cost of capital of the intangible assets is equal to the unlevered cost of 
equity175. 
H1: The cost of capital of the intangible assets is not equal to the unlevered cost of 
equity.  
The above hypothesis is used to test whether the unlevered cost of equity is a fair 
proxy for the required return on intangible assets.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
H0: The cost of capital of the intangible assets is equal to the levered cost of equity. 
H1: The cost of capital of the intangible assets is not equal to the levered cost of 
equity. 
The above hypothesis is used to test whether the levered cost of equity is a fair proxy 
for the required return on intangible assets. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
H0: The difference between the cost of capital of intangible fixed assets and the 
unlevered cost of equity is equal to the difference between the cost of capital of the 
intangible assets and the levered cost of equity. 
                                                                                                                                            
distributed independently and normally. The two samples must be related to each other so that they 
form pairs together. 
175 The unlevered cost of equity is calculated by using unlevered beta in the CAPM. In the calculation 
of the unlevered beta, we assume that the cash flows are perpetual and that the level of debt is constant. 
The unlevered beta was calculated as follows (Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 2005):  
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H1: The difference between the cost of capital of intangible fixed assets and the 
unlevered cost of equity is not equal to the difference between the cost of capital of 
the intangible assets and the levered cost of equity. 
The above hypothesis is used to test whether the unlevered cost of equity is a better 
approximation of the required return on the intangible assets than the levered cost of 
equity. 
 
6.4. Results 
In the empirical study, the required return on intangible assets was calculated by 
means of the adjusted WARA method. The results for the entire dataset are shown in 
Table 1. This table also shows the results applying the Smith and Parr method. The 
estimated cost of capital of intangible assets (RIA) using the adjusted WARA method 
is higher than the RIA following the Smith and Parr method (10.67% vs. 9.12%), 
because of the different treatment of tax. Smith and Parr do not include the tax shield 
as a separate item in their model, as we do, and they assume that WARA equals 
WACC after corporate tax, while we use the WACC before corporate tax (see section 
6.3.1.).  
Average ratios for the asset structure as well as the capital structure per industry 
are presented in Table 2. Figure 2 presents the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC), the unlevered cost of capital (Re,u), the levered cost of capital (Re,l) and the 
cost of capital of the intangible assets (RIA) per industry 
 
Table 1. Average required return for the full sample 
This table presents the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), the unlevered cost of capital (Re,u), 
the levered cost of capital (Re,l) and the cost of capital of the intangible assets (RIA). The adjusted 
method distinguishes itself from that of Smith and Parr by the addition of the value of the tax shield as 
a separate asset and the application of the WACC before corporate tax. 
 
Applied method # WACC Re,u Re,l RIA
Adjusted WARA method (full sample) 318 8.25% 8.56% 9.17% 10.67%
WARA method Smith & Parr (full sample) 318 8.05% 8.56% 9.17% 9.12%
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Table 2. Average assets and liabilities ratio per industry 
Average ratios are given for monetary assets (MA), fixed tangible assets (FTA), intangible assets (IA) 
and the present value of the tax shield (PVTS). Average liability ratios are for debt (D) and equity (E). 
All ratios are calculated as the equally weighted average of the individual ratios per industry. 
 
Industry Assets Liabilities 
 % MA % FTA % IA % PVTS % D % E
Raw materials 10% 41% 39% 10% 24% 76%
Communication 8% 20% 65% 7% 15% 85%
Cyclic consumer products 13% 27% 53% 7% 18% 82%
Non-cyclic consumer products 7% 18% 69% 6% 14% 86%
Energy 5% 51% 38% 6% 16% 84%
Industry 11% 24% 58% 7% 18% 82%
Technology 13% 10% 75% 2% 6% 94%
Utility -3% 68% 14% 21% 52% 48%
Total 10% 23% 61% 6% 16% 84%
 
Figure 2. Resturns per industry 
This figure presents the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), the unlevered cost of capital (Re,u), 
the levered cost of capital (Re,l) and the cost of capital of the intangible assets (RIA) per industry.  
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Table 3 presents per industry i) the average difference between the return on 
intangible assets and the weighted average cost of capital (RIA minus WACC); ii) the 
average difference between the return on intangible assets and the unlevered cost of 
equity (RIA minus Re,u); iii) the average difference between the return on intangible 
assets and the levered cost of equity (RIA minus Re,l) and iv) the average difference 
between the deviation of the unlevered cost of equity and the levered cost of equity 
from the return on intangible assets (RIA minus Re,u)-( RIA minus Re,l).  
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unication 
38 
2.74*** 
4.36 
2.40*** 
3.89 
1.79*** 
2.94 
0.61*** 
7.53 
C
yclic consum
er products 
54 
3.37*** 
5.40 
3.02*** 
4.97 
2.26*** 
3.82 
0.76*** 
5.80 
N
on-cyclic consum
er products 
79 
1.19*** 
6.91 
0.93*** 
5.79 
0.47*** 
3.29 
0.46*** 
8.96 
Energy 
13 
0.05 
0.12 
-0.13 
-0.32 
-0.42 
-0.98 
0.29*** 
4.59 
Industry 
56 
2.93*** 
4.01 
2.56*** 
3.56 
1.82 
2.59 
0.75*** 
7.73 
Technology 
51 
2.02*** 
7.19 
1.84*** 
6.78 
1.59*** 
6.04 
0.25*** 
3.76 
U
tility 
6 
1.38 
0.69 
0.82 
0.42 
-1.30 
-1.00 
2.12 
2.84 
Total 
318 
2.42*** 
10.95 
 
2.11*** 
9.81 
 
1.50*** 
7.25 
 
0.61*** 
13.93 
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The following conclusions can be drawn from the results of the hypotheses tested: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The null hypothesis stating that the required return on intangible assets is equal to the 
WACC is rejected. One can therefore conclude that intangible fixed assets are not 
equally risky as the company as a whole. Only with respect to the two smallest 
sectors, energy and utility companies, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Generally, however, one can conclude that intangible assets carry a greater risk than 
the company as a whole. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
In almost all sectors, the null hypothesis that the unlevered cost of equity is a fair 
proxy for the required return on intangible assets is rejected. Again, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the energy and utility sectors. In general, however, 
the required return on intangible assets is significantly higher than the unlevered cost 
of equity. Consequently, the unlevered cost of equity does not appear to be a fair 
proxy for the required return on intangible assets.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
The levered cost of equity does not appear to be a fair proxy either. The null 
hypothesis is rejected in almost all sectors. In these sectors, the required return on 
intangible fixed assets is significantly higher than the levered cost of equity. Only in 
the energy, industry and utility sectors the difference in not significant. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
This hypothesis tests whether the unlevered cost of equity is as good an 
approximation of the required return on the intangible assets as the levered cost of 
equity. Table 3 clearly demonstrates that the null hypothesis is rejected in all sectors 
except the utility sector. However, it is possible to conclude from the positive average 
difference that in six of the eight sectors the levered cost of equity is a better 
approximation of the required return on intangible fixed assets than the unlevered cost 
of equity. The cost of capital of levered equity is higher than the cost of capital of 
unlevered equity. Since in six of the eight sectors, the required return on intangible 
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assets is higher than the levered and unlevered cost of equity, the levered cost of 
equity is the better proxy (for these six industries). 
 
6.5. Summary  
If it is not possible to determine the value of intangible assets on the basis of a price 
on an active market, international accounting standards allow the application of the 
discounted cash flow method under certain conditions. This involves expected cash 
flows being discounted at a discount rate, which should accurately reflect the risk of 
the asset in question.  
In this chapter, the discount rate was calculated using the adjusted WARA method. 
This method is based on the WARA method of Smith and Parr. In contrast to Smith 
and Parr, the tax shield is included as a separate asset in the model. In our opinion, if 
the tax shield is not included in the model, it leads to an underestimate of the required 
return on intangible assets. Consequently, the WACC before tax is used instead of the 
WACC after tax. The use of the WACC after tax also leads to an underestimate of the 
discount rate.  
In addition to these adjustments to the model, we have also demonstrated 
empirically that the proxies used in the literature do not produce a fair estimate of the 
discount rate for intangible assets. The study shows that for all the identified sectors, 
the required return on intangible assets is higher than the WACC. It also shows that 
the return is higher than the levered or unlevered cost of equity of the company as a 
whole. The expected differences between the calculated required return on intangible 
assets and the proposed proxies are confirmed by the results of the empirical study. In 
six of the eight sectors, the levered cost of equity appears to be the best proxy for the 
required return on intangible assets. 
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Summary 
 
This dissertation consists of six chapters that each discusses issues in Corporate 
Finance.  
In Chapter 1 we examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance 
and the value of excess cash for large European firms. We use the Deminor ratings for 
Shareholder rights, range of Takeover defences, Disclosure and Board structure, as 
proxies for the quality of corporate governance. Following the method of Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2007) we first estimate a cash model to determine the level of normal 
cash holdings and subsequently the level of excess cash. Then we analyse the 
influence of governance on the value of excess cash. We find that the level of excess 
cash as well as the value of excess cash is positively related to the governance 
Takeover defences score. We find that spending firms with excess cash and a low 
quality of corporate governance spend more than firms with a high quality of 
corporate governance. This finding might explain the positive relation between the 
level of excess cash and governance. We further find that, governance positively 
influences the ROA in the years after the year of spending. If we assume that projects 
of poorly governed firms—with relatively lower ROAs—are negative NPV projects, 
then the ‘value destructive investing behaviour’ of poorly governed firms could 
explain the value differential of excess cash between well and poorly governed firms. 
Firms that (potentially) invest in negative NPV projects, and cannot be corrected by 
being taken over, are valued lower accordingly. We find no relation between the level 
nor the value of excess cash and the quality of firms’ corporate governance categories 
Shareholder rights, Disclosure or Board. Given our empirical results, only the market 
for corporate control seems strong enough to prevent managers from wasting excess 
cash. 
In Chapter 2 we examine the relation between the quality of corporate governance 
and the cost of debt. We use the Deminor ratings for the years 2000-2004 as proxies 
for the quality of corporate governance. As proxy for the cost of debt we use the yield 
and yield spread of 319 bonds issued in the years 2001-2005. After adjusting for 
issuer characteristics, issue characteristics and market characteristics, we find a 
negative relation between the governance component Disclosure and the cost of debt. 
This relation is negatively influenced by the quality of the corporate governance 
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measure Shareholder rights. If the quality of Shareholder rights is high, the relevance 
of Disclosure is low. However, if the quality of Shareholder rights is low, Disclosure 
seems to be statistically and economically significant. The negative influence of 
Disclosure on the cost of debt is in accordance with empirical literature; the 
interaction with Shareholder rights is new. For convenience, we refer to this 
interaction between Shareholder rights and Disclosure as the ‘share rights or disclose’ 
hypothesis. Management that does not share rights with shareholders i.e., firms that 
do not score high on Shareholder rights, have higher costs of debt if their score for 
disclosure is low. Firms that do not share rights but communicate relatively well are 
rewarded with a lower cost of debt. We do not find evidence for any relation between 
the cost of debt and the governance measures Takeover defences nor Board structure 
and functioning. 
In Chapter 3 we show that despite a vast literature on the capital structure of the 
firm, there still is a big gap between theory and practice. Starting with the seminal 
work by Modigliani and Miller, much attention has been paid to the optimality of 
capital structure from the shareholders’ point of view. Over the last few decades 
studies have been produced on the effect of other stakeholders’ interests on capital 
structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or 
service guarantees from the company. Another area that has received considerable 
attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure. 
Furthermore, the issue of corporate control and, related, the issue of corporate 
governance, receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital 
structure decisions. From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure 
decision (or rather, the management of the capital structure over time) has to deal with 
more issues than the maximization of the firm’s market value alone. In this chapter, 
we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been 
proposed in the literature. We distinguish ‘economic criteria’ and ‘quasi non-
economic criteria’. Economic criteria are criteria based on the neoclassical view and 
are relevant for the shareholder who aims for the maximization of shareholder wealth. 
Quasi non-economic criteria are criteria which might be relevant for the management. 
Quasi non-economic criteria are called non-economic, because the criteria are not 
based on the neoclassical view; and quasi, because the relations with economic value 
are not always clear cut. We show that capital structure decisions can be framed as 
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multiple criteria decision problems, where capital structure is not a goal in itself, but 
an instrument to achieve certain outcomes and/or to influence certain criteria values.  
Chapter 4 discusses a merger and acquisition case as illustration of the multi-
criteria framework developed in Chapter 3. We analyse financing solutions as 
proposed by two consultants, one full service banker and one investment banker, for a 
merger and acquisition problem. We ask each specialist to construct three financing 
proposals: the first would focus on the interests of current shareholders; the second 
would center on the interests of management; and the third would examine how the 
specialist should advise the management of the bidder. We compare the resulting 
proposals using criteria described in Chapter 3, along with additional criteria 
mentioned by the specialists. We find that: i) the solutions differ between specialists; 
ii) the solutions and criteria applied by the specialists depend on the stakeholder 
(shareholders versus management) that the solution is tailored for; and iii) some 
economic criteria do not appear to be as relevant as suggested by theory. The different 
financing solutions that the financial experts should actually advise management (their 
third proposals) are scored by us—in qualitative terms only—on criteria which are 
relevant for the shareholders (from a neo classical perspective and the perspective of 
the experts) and the management. 
Chapter 5 deals with the valuation of debt tax shields. We discuss a valuation 
framework of the total firm which aims to improve the understanding of the ‘tax 
shield valuation discussion’. In this chapter we derive a general formula for the cost of 
capital of government’s claim (rg). Given our valuation framework that distinguishes 
three claimholders—equity holders, debt holders and government—we show for the 
models used in Myers (1974), Miles and Ezzell (1980) and Harris and Pringle (1985), 
that the present value of tax shields is equal to the difference between the present 
value of the expected taxes paid by the unlevered firm and the levered firm, with each 
of the models’ implied rg as discount rate. In contrast to Myer’s model we show low 
implied rgs for both Miles and Ezzell’s model and Harris and Pringle’s model. We 
provide a numerical example of how to calculate rg for each of the models and give a 
logical explanation for the low implied rgs for the last two mentioned models.  
Chapter 6 deals with the determination of the unlevered cost of capital for the 
separate valuation of intangible assets. In this chapter, the required return of 
intangible assets for 8 different business sectors is determined by means of an 
empirical study of companies from the U.S. Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. The 
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method we apply is the Weighted Average Return on Assets or WARA method. Our 
WARA method is an adjusted version of the WARA method of Smith and Parr 
(2005). Our model distinguishes itself from that of Smith and Parr by the addition of 
the value of the tax shield as a separate asset as well as the application of the WACC 
before corporate tax instead of after corporate tax. Ignoring the tax shield as a separate 
item could lead to an underestimate of the discount rate of the intangible assets. 
Applying the WACC after tax leads to an underestimate of the discount rate of all the 
assets (including the intangible assets) of the company. To determine the required 
return for intangible assets, the return required by capital providers (the before tax 
WACC) is equated with the weighted average of the required returns on all the 
company’s individual or groups of assets (WARA). The resulting required return is 
subsequently compared with proxies for the required return on intangible assets used 
in practice, such as the weighted average cost of capital. As anticipated, the average 
required return for intangible assets is higher than the WACC. For most industries, the 
cost of equity appears to best approximate the cost of capital of intangible assets. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch summary) 
 
Dit proefschrift richt zich op het vakgebied van de Corporate Finance. Centraal staan 
de begrippen ‘valuation’ of waardering, ‘capital structure decisions’ of beslissingen 
ten aanzien van de vermogensstructuur en ‘the cost of capital’ of de kostenvoet van 
het vermogen. 
In hoofdstuk 1 onderzoeken wij voor grote Europese beursgenoteerde 
ondernemingen of er een verband bestaat tussen de kwaliteit van de corporate 
governance en de waarde van de overtollige hoeveelheid liquide middelen (excess 
cash). Als maatstaf voor de kwaliteit van corporate governance maken wij gebruik 
van governance scores die zijn samengesteld door Deminor. Deminor geeft scores 
voor de volgende vier governance onderdelen: aandeelhoudersrechten (shareholder 
rights), aanwezigheid van beschermingsconstructies (range of takeover defences), 
transparantie (disclosure), en het functioneren en de kwaliteit van de board (board 
structure & functioning). In navolging van Dittmar en Mahrt-Smith (2007) schatten 
wij eerst een zogenaamd ‘normal cash’ model. Met behulp van de uitkomsten van dit 
model bepalen wij het niveau van de overtollige hoeveelheid liquide middelen, per 
onderneming, per jaar, voor de periode 2000-2004. Wij tonen aan dat de waarde van 
excess cash positief beïnvloed wordt door de kwaliteit van de governance maatstaf 
takeover defences. De overige maatstaven hebben geen invloed op de waarde van 
excess cash. Wij vinden verder dat ondernemingen met een hoge score voor takeover 
defences meer excess cash aanhouden dan ondernemingen met een lage score. Dit 
wordt verklaard doordat ondernemingen met een lage score excess cash sneller 
uitgeven. De invloed van de uitgaven op de return on assets is voor laatst genoemde 
groep ondernemingen relatief ongunstig. Onze bevindingen zijn in overeenstemming 
met die van Dittmar en Mahrt-Smith (2007) en bevestigen dat takeover defences het 
meest relevante governance mechanisme is voor de waardering van excess cash. 
In hoofdstuk 2 analyseren wij voor grote Europese beursgenoteerde 
ondernemingen het verband tussen de kwaliteit van corporate governance en de 
kosten van vreemd vermogen. Als maatstaf voor de kwaliteit van corporate 
governance maken wij weer gebruik van de governance scores die zijn samengesteld 
door Deminor. Als proxy voor de kosten van vreemd vermogen gebruiken wij de 
spread en de yield spread van de door betreffende ondernemingen uitgegeven 
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obligaties. Na controle voor ondernemings-, emissie- en marktkenmerken, vinden wij 
een negatief verband tussen de kosten van vreemd vermogen en de mate van 
transparantie van de onderneming. Hoe transparanter de onderneming, des te lager de 
kosten van vreemd vermogen. Dit verband wordt beïnvloed door de kwaliteit van de 
aandeelhoudersrechten. Hoe hoger deze kwaliteit is, des te minder sterk is het verband 
tussen de kwaliteit van de transparantie en de kosten van vreemd vermogen. Het 
negatieve verband tussen de transparantie en de kosten van vreemd vermogen is in 
overeenstemming met eerder uitgevoerd onderzoek. De invloed van 
aandeelhoudersrechten op dit verband is nieuw. Wij veronderstellen dat indien de 
aandeelhoudersrechten beperkt zijn, het belang van transparantie toeneemt. Door 
lagere aandeelhoudersrechten zijn agency-conflicten tussen het management en de 
vermogensverschaffers hoger met als gevolg een hogere mate van informatierisico. 
Hieronder wordt verstaan dat managers informatie kunnen achterhouden die 
ongunstig kan zijn voor de verschaffers van vreemd vermogen. Vandaar dat de 
kwaliteit van ‘disclosure’ er meer toe doet bij ondernemingen met een lage score voor 
aandeelhoudersrechten. Wij noemen dit verband de ‘share rights or disclose’ 
hypothese. 
In hoofdstuk 3 gaan wij in op het vraagstuk van de vermogensstructuur. Wij 
onderscheiden de neoklassieke benadering waarin het maximaliseren van 
aandeelhouderswaarde centraal staat bij het nemen van beslissingen ten aanzien van 
de vermogensstructuur en de door ons genoemde quasi non-economic benadering. Uit 
een literatuurstudie blijkt dat de neoklassieke benadering niet in staat is alle 
verschillen tussen vermogensstructuren te verklaren. Bij het nemen van 
vermogensstructuurbeslissingen houden managers niet alleen rekening met 
determinanten die aandeelhouderswaarde beïnvloeden, maar zijn ook andere 
variabelen in meer of mindere mate van belang. Deze variabelen noemen wij quasi 
non-economic variabelen. Non-economic vanwege het feit dat de variabelen niet 
direct gebaseerd zijn op de neoklassieke benadering. Quasi, omdat verbanden met 
aandeelhouderswaarde desondanks kunnen bestaan. Wij concluderen dat 
vermogensstructuurvraagstukken—door hun complexiteit—niet geschikt zijn als 
optimalisatievraagstuk. Een vermogensstructuurvraagstuk kan het beste worden 
opgelost door een aantal door financieel specialisten opgestelde 
financieringsvoorstellen met elkaar te vergelijken op criteria, die voor de 
onderneming relevant worden geacht. 
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Hoofdstuk 4 is een vervolg op hoofdstuk 3 en geeft een illustratie van een 
vermogensstructuurvraagstuk, waarbij verschillende financieringsoplossingen met 
elkaar worden vergeleken. Wij analyseren de oplossingen voor een fictieve overname. 
De oplossingen zijn opgesteld door twee consultants, een investment banker en een 
zogenaamde full service bank. Wij hebben elk van de specialisten gevraagd drie 
financieringsvoorstellen samen te stellen. Een voorstel dat in het bijzonder de 
belangen behartigt van de aandeelhouders, een voorstel dat vooral rekening houdt met 
de belangen van het management en tenslotte het voorstel dat de financieel expert 
werkelijk aan de biedende onderneming zou doen. Wij hebben de experts tevens 
verzocht aan te geven welke criteria bij elk van de voorstellen door hen relevant 
worden geacht. Uit de analyse blijkt dat de opgestelde voorstellen voor elk van de drie 
categorieën sterk van elkaar afwijken; de gehanteerde criteria afhankelijk zijn van de 
partij waar het voorstel voor is opgesteld; en dat sommige criteria vanuit de 
neoklassieke theorie van minder belang worden geacht. Een voorbeeld hiervan is de 
contante waarde van de belastingbesparingen door het gebruik van vreemd vermogen. 
De voorstellen die de financieel experts werkelijk zouden uitbrengen, hebben wij 
vervolgens met elkaar vergeleken vanuit het perspectief van de aandeelhouders en het 
management.  
In hoofdstuk 5 gaan wij in op de berekening van de contante waarde van de 
belastingbesparingen door het gebruik van vreemd vermogen (present value of tax 
shields of PVTS). Wij bespreken een raamwerk waarin de totale waarde van de 
onderneming gelijk is aan de som van de waarde van het eigen vermogen, het vreemd 
vermogen en de contante waarde van de verwachte vennootschapsbelastingbetalingen 
aan de overheid. Niet alleen de vermogensverschaffers hebben een claim op de 
kasstromen die door de onderneming worden gegenereerd, ook de fiscus heeft die. De 
PVTS is gelijk aan het verschil tussen de waarde van de claim die de overheid heeft 
op een onderneming zonder schuldfinanciering en de waarde van de claim op een 
identieke onderneming maar dan met schuldfinanciering. In dit hoofdstuk formuleren 
wij een algemene vergelijking ter bepaling van de afgeleide vermogenskosten voor de 
overheid. Hiermee wordt de disconteringsvoet bedoeld die gebruikt wordt om de 
verwachte belastingbetalingen contant te maken. Voor een aantal traditionele 
waarderingsmodellen leiden wij deze disconteringsvoet af. De consistentie van het 
model illustreren wij onder andere met behulp van enige numerieke voorbeelden. 
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Hoofdstuk 6 gaat in op de bepaling van de vermogenskosten van immateriële 
activa (RIA). De vraag uit de praktijk naar een dergelijke kostenvoet lag aan de basis 
van dit hoofdstuk. Voor acht verschillende industrieën die kunnen worden 
onderscheiden onder S&P 500 ondernemingen, bepalen wij de RIA. Wij hebben deze 
kostenvoet afgeleid met behulp van de zogenaamde weighted average cost of assets of 
‘wara methode’. Het gewogen gemiddelde van de geëiste rendementen op de 
bezittingen van de onderneming, inclusief de contante waarde van de 
belastingbesparingen, is volgens deze methode gelijk aan het gewogen gemiddelde 
van het door de vermogensverschaffers geëiste rendement (de ‘wacc’). Het geëiste 
rendement op de immateriële activa hebben wij vervolgens vergeleken met proxies 
die in de praktijk voor deze kostenvoet worden gebruikt. Voor de meeste industrieën 
blijkt dat het geëiste rendement door de verschaffers van eigen vermogen de RIA het 
best benadert. 
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This thesis consists of six essays in Corporate Finance. In Chapter 1 we examine the
relation between the quality of corporate governance and the value of excess cash for
large European firms. We use ratings for Shareholder rights, Takeover defenses, Disclosure
and Board structure as proxies for the quality of corporate governance. We find that the
value of excess cash is negatively related to anti-takeover provisions only. Chapter 2
discusses the relation between corporate governance and the cost of debt. We find a
negative relation between Disclosure and the cost of debt and uncover that this relation
depends on the quality of Shareholder rights. This novel interaction effect is explained by
our share rights or disclose hypothesis. In Chapter 3 and 4 we formulate the capital struc -
ture decision within a multi-criteria framework. We conclude that the capital structure
decision is unfit for consideration as an optimization problem. Rather, it makes sense to
solicit a variety of solutions from finance specialists that can be compared on criteria
consi dered to be important. In Chapter 4 we discuss a merger and acquisition case as
illustration. We compare different solutions generated by mutually independent financial
experts on criteria which are relevant for the shareholders and for the management. In
Chapter 5 we derive a general formula for the cost of government’s claim. We show that
the present value of tax shields is equal to the difference between the present value of the
expected taxes paid by the unlevered firm and those paid by the levered firm. In Chapter 6
the required return of intangible assets is determined for a variety of business sectors. The
required returns are subsequently compared to several proxies used in practice. For most
sectors, the levered cost of equity seems to be the best proxy.
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